Law Society of Singapore v Ismail bin Atan

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ,Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA,Steven Chong JA
• Judgment Date: 26 July 2017
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 2 of 2017
• Date: 26 July 2017

Law Society of Singapore

and

Ismail bin Atan

[2017] SGHC 190

Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA and Steven Chong JA

Originating Summons No 2 of 2017

Court of Three Judges

Legal Profession — Disciplinary proceedings — Solicitor accused of outraging modesty of legal executive — Whether disciplinary tribunal correct to convict solicitor of charges brought — Whether solicitor should be struck off — Sections 71, 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) — Rule 53A Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap 161, R 1, 2010 Rev Ed)

Legal Profession — Professional conduct — Breach — Solicitor accused of outraging modesty of legal executive — Whether disciplinary tribunal correct to convict solicitor of charges brought — Whether solicitor should be struck off — Sections 71, 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) — Rule 53A Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap 161, R 1, 2010 Rev Ed)

Legal Profession — Professional conduct — Grossly improper conduct — Solicitor accused of outraging modesty of legal executive — Whether disciplinary tribunal correct to convict solicitor of charge of grossly improper conduct — Whether solicitor should be struck off — Section 83(2)(b) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed)

The respondent was a solicitor of about 20 years' standing. The complainant was the Attorney-General. The complaint related to certain events that concerned a female legal executive (“the victim”) employed by the firm of which the respondent was a member at the material time. The victim reported directly to the respondent at the time of the relevant events.

The events which gave rise to the present proceedings centred around what transpired between the respondent and the victim in a hotel room on the second floor of the VIP Hotel (“the Hotel”). The respondent accepted that he was accompanied by the victim to the Hotel on the day in question. He contended that at that time, he was working on a claim for a client who had been injured in an accident at the Hotel and who was bringing a claim against the Hotel. The accident in question had occurred in the public reception area of the Hotel. The respondent maintained that while surveying the second floor, a member of the staff appeared and he then persuaded the victim to go into the room with him to avoid any suspicion. Central to the respondent's case was his contention that there was no physical contact between him and the victim during the period they were both in the room.

The victim, on the other hand, contended that she was asked by the respondent to accompany him to the Hotel. The respondent suggested that they get a room to avoid suspicion whilst they surveyed the property. He then entered the room with the victim but proceeded to outrage her modesty by grabbing her, trying to hug and kiss her, kissing her, rubbing his body against her and doing various other acts. He also repeatedly suggested that they have an affair. They left the Hotel after that interlude in the room and returned to the office. According to the victim, she confided in her co-worker, Mindy, on all that had happened later that same evening.

The charges against the respondent were brought, in the alternative, under: (a) s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”); (b) s 83(2)(b) of the LPA read with r 53A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap 161, R 1, 2010 Rev Ed) and s 71 of the LPA; and (c) s 83(2)(h) of the LPA.

Held, ordering that the respondent be struck off the roll:

(1) The respondent's assertion that he booked a room on the second floor in order to understand the layout of the Hotel and the room so as to properly prepare for trial made no sense; and the respondent had not been able to explain, in a credible way, why it would ever have been reasonable or necessary to book a room on the second floor in order to prepare for cross-examination in connection with the accident that took place at the public reception area which was on the ground floor: at [2].

(2) It was unfathomable that if the respondent was truly, as he claimed, an innocent victim of a major fraud perpetrated on him by a jealous and destructive colleague, he would sit idly by despite the inflammatory tone of the victim's resignation e-mail (which was copied to most of the rest of the staff in the firm) and, worse, sign a letter of apology and issue it to the Public Prosecutor (as part of a composition offer in separate criminal proceedings) saying that he was sorry for the “unwarranted physical contact” that he had imposed on the victim without her consent. The letter was an admission by the respondent that what the victim said was essentially true and, while not necessarily conclusive in and of itself, it would bear substantial weight absent a compelling explanation. No such explanation had been forthcoming: at [12].

(3) The court did not agree with the respondent's main contention that the victim's conduct immediately after the incident was more consistent with his version of events than with hers. First, the victim's evidence that she had told everything to Mindy on the very day of the incident was not even challenged in cross-examination. Second, the victim was subjected to a grave outrage of her modesty by a senior colleague who was her direct boss. It was unsurprising that she took refuge first by confiding in her co-worker, Mindy, and soon thereafter in her husband. It was also unsurprising that her initial endeavour when she raised the issue with management was to find a way to preserve her job by seeking an alternative position within the firm, before giving up because there was no response to her efforts: at [14], [15] and [16].

(4) Having regard to all the evidence, the court was...