L v L

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Goh Joon Seng J
• Judgment Date: 27 July 1996
• Neutral Citation: [1996] SGCA 40
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 132 of 1995
• Date: 27 July 1996
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1996
• Plaintiff Counsel: Richard Ang (Ang JW & Partners)
• Citation: [1996] SGCA 40
• Defendant Counsel: Belinda Ang (Belinda Ang)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Child,What constituted an interlocutory order,Civil Procedure,Change of surname,Appeal from interlocutory orders in chambers,Name,s 34(1)(c) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322),Judgments and orders,Circumstances justifying,Whether within scope of an order of custody,Family Law

Judgment:

< Delivered by Goh Joon Seng J >

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

1. This was an appeal from the decision of the court below dismissing an application by the appellant < 'the father' > for an order that his daughter < 'M' > by a dissolved marriage, whose surname had been changed by the respondent < 'the mother' > by deed poll to 'T', revert to his surname 'L'.

Brief facts
2. The parties were married in December 1980. In 1988, M was born. Twelve weeks after the birth, the mother presented a petition for divorce on grounds of irretrievable breakdown. On 10 July 1990, a decree nisi was granted. A consent order was made giving custody of M to the mother with 'generous access' to the father. The father was to pay a monthly sum for M's maintenance. The matrimonial home was transferred to the father. The decree nisi was made absolute on 24 December 1990.

3. On 16 September 1991, by an order of court, the father's 'generous access' was specified to be overnight access from Saturday 3.00 pm to Sunday 5.00 pm fortnightly. In respect of Chinese New Year either the father or mother was to have access to M on the eve of Chinese New Year and the other on the first day of Chinese New Year. Such access was to alternate from year to year. When M began schooling, the parties were to have equal time for access to M during the school holidays.

4. By order of court of 29 October 1991, the father's access was varied to weekly access on Wednesday from 5.00 pm to 9.00 pm and on Saturday from 10.00 am to 9.00 pm.

5. On 20 March 1995, the father was granted enlarged weekly overnight access from Friday 8.00 pm to Sunday morning.

6. Meanwhile, the mother returned to her parents' home with M. By a deed poll dated 26 February 1991, the mother renounced, on behalf of M, the use of the surname L and assumed for M the surname T. The father alleged that this was without his knowledge. Some nine months later, the mother married Mr T. According to the mother, M since the age of two months and therefore before the divorce petition was filed had grown to treat Mr T as 'her father role model'.

7. In January 1995 M started schooling. The father said it was at this point that he found out that M had taken the surname T. He then applied inter alia for an order that the 'deed poll be made void and inoperative'; or alternatively a joint deed poll be executed by the parties abandoning on M's behalf the assumed surname T and re-assuming the surname L, and an injunction restraining the mother from doing any act to prevent M from using the surname L.

The decision of the court below
8. The learned judge was of the view that, by the custody order without any conditions, the custodial care and upbringing of M were conferred on the mother. The mother was thereby empowered to change the surname of M although in doing so without consulting the father she had acted irresponsibly and deserved the strongest criticism. This was what the learned judge said:

A custody order is what it says it is. It is an order for custody of the child. It provides for custodial care and upbringing to be given by the parent to whom custody is awarded and while ... ... it does not deprive the father who is not given custody of the child of all his rights and obligations as the father of the child I think it is an important matter to be taken into consideration. I think it is a measure of the degree of care-giving entrusted to one parent to the exclusion of the other.

... ... What I have to consider first is whether the custody order in favour of the mother has had any effect on the father's right to change his daughter's surname. There are no conditions of any kind which have been imposed and the child was in fact living with the mother. I think that where as in this case custody has been awarded to the mother without any conditions and the child is in fact under her custodial care and upbringing a substantial degree of the management of the child's affairs has been conferred upon the mother.

At the same time much of this has been taken away from the father notwithstanding his right of access. In my opinion in the circumstances of this case a change of M's surname has been validly effected by the mother without the concurrence of the father. This is subject to the court's powers under s 118 of the Women's Charter which provides:

In any suit for divorce ... the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, or after a decree absolute has been pronounced, make such orders as it thinks fit with respect to the welfare of any child ...

I think this empowers the court in appropriate cases to make an order that has the effect of making the deed poll and the change of surname void and inoperative as the application seeks.

9. The learned judge then went on to consider if the court acting under s 118 of the Charter should for the welfare of M set aside the deed poll. He came to the conclusion that it would not be in the interest of M to have the deed poll set aside. He gave his reasons as follow:

... ... To make the change of surname void as the application asks is in effect to make another decision for M to change her surname once again. Although the surname is likely to have been less frequently used in reference to her than her given name 'M' or 'SE' nevertheless it is an important part of her identity not only in her social experience in school and in surroundings outside the home but perhaps even more so at home and as a member of a new family. As noted above the mother has married Mr T with whom she has two other children. She says that Mr T has since been caring for and supporting M and that he loves her dearly and treats her like his own daughter and M treats him like her natural father. A family has been established and a home built around it. M is now in an environment where she is the eldest of three young children.

The father has himself remarried. He is and will always remain the natural father and his rights and duties are affected only to the extent and in terms of the relevant orders of court. He is providing for M through the maintenance order and he says that he is concerned for her welfare and intends to play an active part in her formative and schooling years. I see no reason to doubt that this will be the case but I am much less able to see that his role will be the less significant or M will benefit the less from it by reason only of a refusal to change the surname back to what it was when she was born.

10. Accordingly the learned judge refused the application. The father appealed.

11. It was the father's contention that the deed poll executed by the mother without his knowledge and consent was invalid. In the alternative if...