Krishan Chand v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 12 April 1995
• Neutral Citation: [1995] SGHC 98
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 316 of 1994
• Date: 12 April 1995
• Year: 1995
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: CR Rajah (Tan Rajah & Cheah)
• Citation: [1995] SGHC 98
• Defendant Counsel: Tan Boon Kok (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: s 406(a) Companies Act (Cap 50, 1994 Ed),Sentencing,Benchmark sentences,s 403 Penal Code (Cap 224),Non-mitigating value,Ignorance of the law,Age,Tariff sentence exceeded,Genuine mitigating value,Plea of guilty made just before trial,Restitution of dishonestly misappropriated money,Mitigation,Criminal Procedure and Sentencing

The appellant pleaded guilty in the district court to one charge under s 406(a) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 1994 Ed) and another charge under s 403 of the Penal Code (Cap 224). The first charge alleged that the appellant, whilst an officer of a company known as Chabbra Corp Pte Ltd (the company) had, by dishonest means, induced UCO Bank, Singapore branch (the bank), to grant a term overdraft of $200,000 to the company. The second charge alleged that the appellant had dishonestly misappropriated the sum of $120,000. Having heard the appellant`s mitigation plea, the district judge imposed a sentence of nine months` imprisonment in respect of each charge and ordered both sentences to run concurrently. The present appeal was brought against sentence. Having reduced each sentence from nine months to six months (to run concurrently), I now give my reasons in writing.

The facts

In pleading guilty, the appellant admitted unreservedly to the statement of facts tendered by the prosecution below. This alleged that the appellant was at material times a director of the company which maintained accounts with the bank. On 21 April 1994 the company received in its fixed deposit account a sum of US$301,013.88 which had been wrongly credited as a result of a clerical error.

On 18 May 1994 the appellant applied for a temporary overdraft facility of $200,000 from the bank and proffered as security the sum of US$301,013.88 then lying in the company`s fixed deposit account. The statement of facts alleged that the bank granted the appellant the overdraft sought only because of this security and that the appellant offered the sum dishonestly, being fully aware that the moneys did not in fact belong to the company.

Shortly thereafter, on 24 May 1994, the appellant instructed the bank to close the company`s fixed deposit account and to credit US$100,000 of the moneys therein to the company`s current account. The remaining sum of US$201,013.88 was rolled over as a renewal fixed deposit and held by the bank as security for the temporary overdraft of $200,000. On 27 May 1994, however, the appellant instructed the bank to close the fixed deposit account and to credit the balance of US$201,013.88 to the company`s current account. These instructions were carried out on the same day and the appellant proceeded to withdraw a sum of $120,000 from the current account on 28 May 1994. The statement of facts alleged that this withdrawal amounted to a dishonest misappropriation of the moneys because the appellant knew at the material time that these moneys had been wrongly credited to the company`s fixed deposit account to begin with and that he was not entitled to them.

The appeal

On appeal, the appellant contended that, although he had admitted to the above facts, the concurrent sentences of nine months` imprisonment were nevertheless manifestly excessive and that in fact the district judge had failed to accord sufficient weight to certain factors.

(i) The appellant`s plea of guilt

Thus, for example, the appellant argued that the district judge had given insufficient weight to his plea of guilt in making the observation that ` (a)lthough the [appellant] had pleaded guilty to the charges against him which is a mitigating factor, he did not do so at the earliest opportunity but on the day of the trial .` Assuming, however, that the remark indicated the district judge had given less weight to the appellant`s guilty plea, there was in my view justification for his so doing, having regard to the fact that the plea had come only before the commencement of the trial proper. One of the reasons credit is given to an accused for his guilty plea is, after all, the time and effort he saves the...