Koh Pee Huat v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 19 August 1996
• Neutral Citation: [1996] SGHC 175
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 382 of 1995
• Date: 19 August 1996
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1996
• Plaintiff Counsel: Dominic Nagulendran and R Palakrishnan (Palakrishnan & Partners)
• Citation: [1996] SGHC 175
• Defendant Counsel: Mathavan Devadas (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Whether there was intention to fabricate false evidence which was to be used in a judicial proceeding,ss 192, 193 Penal Code (Cap 224),False evidence,Criminal Law,Whether accused knew that statements in affidavits were false

The facts

The appellant was charged in the court below for fabricating false evidence which is defined by s 192 of the Penal Code (Cap 224) as follows:

Whoever causes any circumstances to exist, or makes any false entry in any book or record, or makes any document containing a false statement, intending that such circumstance, false entry, or false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding taken by law before a public servant as such, or before an arbitrator, and that such circumstance, false entry, or false statement, so appearing in evidence, may cause any person, who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding, is said `to fabricate false evidence`.

The punishment prescribed for fabricating false evidence is provided by s 193 of the Penal Code which states:

Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Essentially, the first charge against the appellant was for falsely affirming that he was unemployed in an affidavit dated 10 April 1992 which was used in a maintenance summons action. The second charge was for falsely affirming in an affidavit dated 7 January 1993 that the handwriting in an exhibit annexed to the same was that of his wife (Shi Fang), and not his. This second affidavit was used in support of an originating summons filed by the appellant to claim that the former matrimonial home was his after Shi Fang had lodged a caveat against the title.

At the end of the trial, the appellant was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to six months` imprisonment on each of the charges, the sentences to run concurrently. The appeal was against both conviction and sentence.

The first charge - the employment charge

The prosecution case

In so far as the first charge was concerned, the offending paragraph in the appellant`s affidavit of 10 April 1992 which related to the perjury charge read as follows:

3 I am presently unemployed, having been so since February 1992. Exhibited hereto and marked `KPH-1` are the various confirmation letters from the various companies confirming that I have ceased to be under their employ.

The thrust of the prosecution case was that the appellant was at no point unemployed, and the three letters (KPH-1) which purported to show that he had ceased to be in the employment of Lian Huat group of companies since February 1992 were a sham. The prosecution`s contention was that, ever since the appellant returned from the USA, he was working for his father in the family`s group of companies, principally in Lian Huat Shipping Co Pte Ltd (Lian Huat) and Lian Teck Shipping Pte Ltd (Lian Teck) and later in Lian Seng Enterprise Pte Ltd (Lian Seng). His father effectively owns and controls all the companies of which Lian Huat is the flagship company.

The fact that the appellant drew a salary from any particular company was not an indication of his employment with that company; the converse was equally true. Therefore, the prosecution contended that, despite the appellant`s appointments in the various companies, he was in reality simply working for his father by assisting him. His appointments were not substantive but for convenience only, and his employment should be viewed in this light.

Coming to the perjury charge itself, the prosecution argued that the confirmatory letters in exh KPH-1 regarding the appellant`s resignations from the companies were a falsehood. They were in fact concocted so as to avoid his maintenance obligation to Shi Fang. In support of this contention, the prosecution adduced evidence to show that the appellant`s claim of having ceased all employment in the companies was contradicted by letters to the Central Manpower Base, Ministry of Defence (CMPB) which sought exit permits for business trips overseas. Of particular significance were three letters dated 16 December 1991, 18 November 1992 and 18 May 1993 respectively.

First, on 16 December 1991, the appellant had applied for an exit permit using a letter signed by his brother representing that he was an executive director of Lian Huat who was being assigned to a joint-venture company in China for at least one and a half years (ie from 1991 to 1993). Second, there was the letter of 18 November 1992 signed by his father that was sent to CMPB to renew the appellant`s exit permit for another two years. The letter stated that the appellant was Lian Huat`s `employee` who was `still` assigned as its representative in the joint-venture company. Third, there was a letter dated 18 May 1993 seeking exit permit renewal for two years signed by his father which again referred to the appellant as an `employee` of Lian Huat.

The prosecution argued that these letters collectively proved that the appellant had been assisting his father and Lian Huat since he commenced work in 1990 and had never left its employment since. As for the period of inactivity between 1 February 1992 to 10 April 1992, during which the appellant made no business trips abroad, it was contended that this was irrelevant because this did not alter the fact that the appellant still remained employed by his father throughout the duration. To bolster its case, the prosecution also contended that there were no letters of resignation to support the appellant`s claim that he had resigned from Lian Teck and Lian Huat since 1 September 1991, despite the fact that a letter in this regard was tendered when he allegedly left Lian Seng.

Further, the appellant had continued to occupy a cubicle in his office even after his alleged resignation from Lian Huat. Madam Leong Wai Wah (PW5) testified that she had been asked by the appellant to place a draft memo in his office`s drawer, suggesting that the appellant was still working. Moreover, no one seemed to know of the appellant`s alleged resignation from Lian Huat except his father. The prosecution argued that this appeared incredible especially when the appellant`s brother, who was the deputy chairman then, also had no notion of his departure.

The court`s attention was also drawn to the fact that during the trial itself his father had testified that the appellant was `transferred` to another company, Lian Seng. This version was contradicted by the appellant who stated that he joined Lian Seng after he had `resigned` from Lian Huat and Lian Teck with effect from 1 September 1991. In any case, the appellant`s claim that he had `joined` Lian Seng was not borne out by any letter of appointment. According to a search at the Registry of Companies and Businesses, he was already a managing director of Lian Seng since 7 June 1991 even though he claimed to be appointed as an executive director from 1 September 1991 to 31 January 1992.

The appellant had also testified that he was asked to resign from Lian Seng by his father although the latter said that it was the appellant`s own decision. In spite of his alleged `resignation`, there was no letter from Lian Seng, unlike the confirmatory letters from Lian Huat and Lian Teck, to certify that the appellant had ceased to be employed by Lian Seng.

The appellant cited marital problems as one of his grounds for resigning. However, he admitted in his affidavit that his relationship with Shi Fang had already been strained in 1988 and had worsened in November 1990, which was well before his resignation in 1992. He also stated that his bad relationship with his brother was why he resigned from Lian Seng. But in his affidavit, he claimed that he was on bad terms with his father who sacked him from all his jobs.

During the period of the purported unemployment, the appellant said that he lived off his savings but no details were given and nothing was produced to substantiate his claim. The fact that his CPF statements and income tax assessment statements did not reveal that he was drawing any income was not proof of his unemployment nor that he did not receive a salary. To illustrate this point, the prosecution argued that the appellant`s evidence showed that he received his salary from the Lian Huat`s Hong Kong office since his alleged re-employment. Hence, Lian Huat`s CPF statements and the appellant`s income tax assessment statements would not have revealed his income or employment status.

The prosecution further contended that the appellant`s re-employment by Lian Huat as its regional manager of the Hong Kong office was another sham because the evidence clearly showed that he was already intimately involved in the running of the Hong Kong office even before his new appointment.

Finally, the prosecution pointed out that the appellant`s father had paid for all his business trips, including some pleasure trips, although the appellant tried to give the impression that it was difficult to obtain such money even for business trips.

The court was therefore urged to consider the various contradictions in the defence case which went towards showing that the appellant was not a man to be believed. Thus, it was submitted that his purported resignations were merely a sham to evade his maintenance obligations to his wife, and he had perjured when he affirmed that he was unemployed.

The defence

The appellant claimed that his statement pertaining to his unemployment was true and accurate because, during the period between 1 February 1992 to 10 April 1992, he was indeed not working for anyone. In fact, he was not being paid any salary by anyone. He was not even on good terms with his father, let alone reporting to him. Neither was he...