Koh Hak Boon and Others v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 23 August 1993
• Neutral Citation: [1993] SGHC 198
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 288 of 1992
• Date: 23 August 1993
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1993
• Plaintiff Counsel: Lee Ah Fong (Ng Lee & Partners)
• Citation: [1993] SGHC 198
• Defendant Counsel: Seng Kwang Boon (Deputy Public Prosecutor),Tang Gee Ni (Chia Tang Kumar & Loh)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Words and Phrases,Theft,'Reason to believe',Voluntarily assisting in disposal of stolen property,Criminal Law,ss 411 & 414 Penal Code (Cap 224),Offences,Proof of 'reason to believe',Property,'Reason to believe' property to be stolen

The appellants were tried together with a fourth person in the district court, each on a separate charge of voluntarily assisting in disposing of property which he knew or had reason to believe to be stolen property, under s 414 of the Penal Code (Cap 224) which reads as follows:

Whoever voluntarily assists in concealing or disposing of or making away with property which he knows or has reason to believe to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years, or with fine, or with both; ...

At the end of the trial, on 7 August 1992, the fourth person was acquitted of the charge against him but each of the appellants was found guilty as charged. The first appellant was sentenced to six months` imprisonment, the second to eight months` imprisonment and the third to ten months` imprisonment. Each of them appealed against his conviction and sentence. I dismissed their appeals and now give my reasons for doing so.

At trial there was no dispute as to the factual circumstances surrounding the occasion on which the four accused persons were alleged to have committed the offences charged. The sole contested issue was whether the accused persons had known or had had reason to believe that the property being disposed of was stolen property.

The trial judge referred to Samad bin Kamis & Anor v PP , saying:

Chua J, in dismissing his appeal, held that the issue whether the second appellant had reason to believe that the oil was stolen was one of inference from all the circumstances ...

He then considered the relevant circumstances and found the three appellants guilty as charged, saying:

In my view, the defence of denial defied credibility. It was highly unlikely for them not to believe they were assisting in disposing of stolen property.

Before me, both counsel for the appellants contended that the circumstances in this case were not such as to arouse the suspicions of the appellants. Further, counsel for the second appellant submitted that, even if the circumstances were such as to arouse the second appellant`s suspicion, this was insufficient basis to prove that he had `reason to believe` the gold was stolen property.

It is convenient to deal with this point of law first. Counsel referred to Tan Ser Juay v PP , and submitted that it was authority for the proposition that in this jurisdiction `believe` was a much stronger word than `suspect` and involved the necessity of showing that the circumstances were such that a reasonable man must have felt convinced in his mind that the property he was dealing with was stolen property. I read carefully the judgment of Wee Chong Jin CJ in that case and I was unable to see that any part of it was to this effect. What the learned Chief Justice had said was that `... the law does not allow for a conviction based merely on suspicion ...`, a statement that on the plain words of s 414 is incontrovertible. Mere suspicion or pure speculation is quite insufficient to constitute `reason to believe`.

Counsel relied for his submission upon statements in certain Indian authorities to the effect that it is not sufficient in such a case to show that the accused person was careless or that he had reason to suspect that the property was stolen or that he did not make sufficient inquiries to ascertain whether it had been dishonestly acquired, citing Archibald George Edgecombe v Emperor , Jhagru Kurmi v State , Bhaggan v Emperor , Suraj Prasad v Emperor , Empress v Rango Timaji .

However, there was case law not cited by counsel which plainly contradicted the proposition that `reason to believe` involved circumstances which were such that a reasonable man must have felt convinced in his mind that the property he was dealing with was stolen property. The authorities he did cite really only adopted the whole of what was said in Rango Timaji `s case7 without discrimination and without giving any reasons why all of it ought to be applicable. In Gulbad Shah v The Empress , Rattigan and Roe JJ dealt with a person accused of dishonestly receiving or retaining stolen property under s 411 of the Indian Penal Code, which is in pari materia with s 411 of our Penal Code. This provides:

Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years, or with fine, or with both; ...

It may be seen that `reason to believe` is used here in the same manner in which it is used in s 414. I quote from the judgment of Rattigan J at pp 94-95 a passage of clarity and precision which I cannot but admire and adopt to the fullest degree:

... it is to be borne in mind, that while the phrase `having reason to believe` is satisfied ... with something short of actual knowledge, it is not sufficient to show, as pointed out by the Bombay High Court, `that the accused was careless, or that he had reason to suspect that the property was stolen, or that he did not make sufficient inquiry to ascertain whether it had been honestly acquired`. `The word

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