Kek Lai Quan (Guo Laiquan) v Lim Junyou

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Vince Gui
• Judgment Date: 18 January 2022
• Neutral Citation: [2022] SGMC 7
• Court: Magistrates' Court (Singapore)
• Hearing Date: 07 December 2021,03 November 2021,13 January 2022
• Docket Number: Magistrate’s Court Suit No. 4358 of 2020, Summons No. 4306 of 2021
• Plaintiff Counsel: Constance Margreat Paglar (C Paglar & Co)
• Defendant Counsel: Tan Boon Chong Willy (Willy Tay's Chambers)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,Judgments and orders,Application to set aside consent interlocutory judgment,Whether judgment can be set aside on the ground of common mistake of law
• Published date: 26 January 2022

Deputy Registrar Vince Gui: Introduction

This case concerns an application to set aside a consent interlocutory judgment. The applicant, the Defendant, submitted that the judgment was entered by both parties based on an erroneous understanding of the law. In essence, the understanding was that the interlocutory judgment recorded the Defendant’s liability for a motor accident but did not preclude the Defendant from challenging, at the assessment of damages, that the accident did not cause the Plaintiff to suffer any of the alleged injuries. Parties believed that it was open to the Defendant to mount such a challenge, until the recent Court of Appeal decision of Tan Woo Thian v PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory Services Pte Ltd [2021] 1 SLR 1166 (“Tan Woo Thian”) clarified otherwise. In light of Tan Woo Thian, the Defendant took out this application to set aside the interlocutory judgment, so as to avail himself of the right to challenge the causation of the alleged losses in toto at trial.

Having heard parties, I found that the consent judgment was vitiated by common mistake and set aside the interlocutory judgment. At the end of my oral judgment, counsel for the Defendant queried whether my judgment would be published as he believed it would be useful. As parties were unable to locate any written decision on whether a consent interlocutory judgment of this nature can be set aside, I decided to issue the written grounds of my decision.

Background facts

The action arose from a motor accident. The Defendant’s vehicle collided into the rear of the Plaintiff’s vehicle. The Plaintiff alleged that the accident caused him to suffer neck and back sprains. He commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries and consequential losses.

The Defendant conceded that he was at fault for the collision. At the Court Dispute Resolution session held on 31 August 2020 before a Deputy Registrar, parties agreed to enter consent interlocutory judgment with damages to be assessed. Specifically, the interlocutory judgment provided that the Defendant was liable for “100% of the damages to be assessed” with the issue of “causation of injuries … reserved to the Registrar hearing the assessment” (the “Interlocutory Judgment”). The Defendant submitted that while he accepted responsibility of the collision, he was of the view that the impact of the collision was not severe enough to inflict any injury on the Plaintiff. This was why “causation of injuries” was expressly reserved in the terms of the Interlocutory Judgment.

After entering Interlocutory Judgment, the action proceeded towards assessment of damages. About 7 months later, the Court of Appeal issued its decision in Tan Woo Thian. Tan Woo Thian also concerns a trial that was bifurcated between liability and quantum. The appellant argued that the case should proceed for assessment of damages once breach of duty of care was made out. The court rejected this argument, holding that causation is an essential ingredient in a cause of action in negligence. In the absence of evidence of actual loss, the cause of action is inchoate (at [6]). In a trial bifurcated between liability and quantum, the claimant was obliged to prove that he did “in fact, suffer one or more types of loss that was causally connected to the alleged breach” at the trial on liability (at [8]).

It dawned upon the Defendant that the Interlocutory Judgment was wrongly entered. The issuance of the Interlocutory Judgment, following the holding in Tan Woo Thian, implied that the Defendant had accepted that the Plaintiff did suffer one or more types of loss that was causally connected to his negligent conduct. This legal outcome was inconsistent with the factual premise upon which he entered the Interlocutory Judgment. By reserving his right to challenge “causation of injuries” at the assessment of damages, the Defendant thought he had made it clear that he did not accept the Plaintiff to have suffered any injury from the accident.

In these circumstances, the Defendant proposed to set aside the Interlocutory Judgment. The Plaintiff refused. The Defendant therefore proceeded to take out the present application before me.

Discussion

Prior to Tan Woo Thian, it was common practice for parties to motor accident claims to enter interlocutory judgment by consent on the understanding that the defendant would be allowed to challenge the causation of injuries in toto at the assessment of damages. This was often reflected by an express reservation in the terms of the interlocutory judgment, as was done in the present case. This arrangement was often pursued when the defendant admitted to being responsible for the collision, but did not admit to the collision having caused the claimant to have suffered the alleged injuries.

Tan Woo Thian has however made it untenable for the Defendant to challenge the causation of the alleged injuries at the assessment of damages, insofar as the Defendant takes the position that the Plaintiff suffered none of the alleged injuries (and losses) arising...