Kee Yau Chong v S H Interdeco Pte Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: George Wei JC
• Judgment Date: 23 October 2013
• Neutral Citation: [2013] SGHC 218
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 778 of 2012
• Published date: 10 December 2013
• Year: 2013
• Hearing Date: 21 August 2013
• Plaintiff Counsel: Tan Hee Joek (Tan See Swan & Co)
• Defendant Counsel: Suppiah Thangaveloo (Thanga & Co),Rajashree Rajan (JustLaw LLC) watching brief
• Subject Matter: Statutory Interpretation,Construction of Statute,Definitions
• Citation: [2013] SGHC 218

George Wei JC:

This is an appeal under s 29 of the Work Injury Compensation Act (Cap 354, 2009 Rev Ed) (“WICA”) in respect of a claim for work injury compensation and the dismissal of that claim by the learned Assistant Commissioner on 19 February 2013. The issues before this court concern the interpretation of certain phrases in the WICA.

After considering the parties’ arguments, I was of the view that the learned Assistant Commissioner had wrongly dismissed the claim and, accordingly, allowed the appeal. I now set out the grounds for my decision.

Background facts

The brief facts as set out below are largely adopted from the decision of the learned Assistant Commissioner dated 19February 2013 (“the Decision”) and are generally not in dispute.

On or about 26 May 2011, Kee Yau Chong (“the Claimant”), a 24-year old male, commenced work as an apprentice carpenter for S H Interdeco Pte Ltd (“the Defendant”). The place of his work was located at No 19 Senang Crescent, Singapore 416592. On 11 June 2011, at around 10.30am, the Claimant and/or an acrylic strip he was holding brushed against another employee, one Kuu Siau Lam (“Kuu”) at the place of work. Kuu reacted by scolding the Claimant with a Hokkien expletive cursing the Claimant’s mother. The Claimant responded by uttering the same expletive with the intention of seeking a clarification from Kuu as to what he meant. Kuu did not answer the Claimant but instead demanded an apology from the Claimant in a vehement manner. The Claimant did not respond and another worker stepped in to pacify the parties.

Shortly thereafter, Kuu was seen (on closed-circuit television) going to the back of the workshop where there was a back pantry. Kuu returned some five or ten minutes later with a metal mug in hand. Confronting the Claimant, Kuu again demanded an apology in Hokkien. When the Claimant did not respond to Kuu’s demand, Kuu threw the contents of the metal mug, which turned out to be thinner, at the upper shoulder area of the Claimant and set the Claimant on fire with a lighter.

As a result, the Claimant was severely burnt. According to a medical report dated 27 December 2011 submitted to the Ministry of Manpower by Dr Terence Goh Lin Hon from the Department of Plastic, Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgery (Singapore General Hospital), the Claimant suffered burns on 28% of the total surface area of his neck, chest, both upper limbs and face.

Pursuant to a police report and subsequent criminal charge, Kuu was subsequently sentenced to four years’ imprisonment on 31 October 2011 in the District Court of the Subordinate Courts of Singapore.

The Claimant then sought compensation from the Defendant’s insurers, M/s Poly Insurance Agency, through the Labour Court.

The decision below

After considering the facts as mentioned above, the learned Assistant Commissioner summarised the issues before him as follows (at [6] of the Decision): Whether the injuries suffered by the Claimant on 11 June 2011 arose from an “accident” pursuant to s 3(1) of the WICA (“Issue 1”); and If the injuries were an “accident”, whether it can be deemed in the absence of evidence to the contrary “to have arisen out of that employment” pursuant to s 3(6) of the WICA (“Issue 2”).

In reaching his decision, the learned Assistant Commissioner underscored that it was for the Claimant to show that an accident had occurred. At the end of the hearing (which spanned four days and involved nine witnesses), the learned Assistant Commissioner dismissed the claim on the basis that “no accident” had taken place within the meaning of the WICA (see [8] of the Decision).

The issues in this appeal

Section 3(1) of the WICA provides the starting point for analysis of when employers will be liable for compensation under the Act:

Employer’s liability for compensation 3.—(1) If in any employment personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to an employee, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act

Sundaresh Menon JC (as he then was), in NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd v Next of kin of Narayasamy s/o Ramasamy (deceased) [2006] 4 SLR(R) 507 (“NTUC Income”) at [20], explained that in order for an employer to be liable under s 3(1) of the WICA, the workman has to prove that: he has suffered a personal injury; that has been caused by an accident; and that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment.

It was not disputed either at first instance or during the appeal that the Claimant suffered a personal injury. The issues before me, therefore, were the same as the two issues before the learned Assistant Commissioner (ie, Issue 1 and Issue 2) (see above at [10]). However, I also had to consider a preliminary issue regarding whether this was an appeal which was properly brought under the framework for dispute resolution under the WICA. I will deal, first, with this preliminary issue before I proceed with my analysis on Issue 1 and Issue 2.

Analysis The preliminary issue

The preliminary issue was raised at the start of the appeal hearing, where the Defendant argued that the requirements for an appeal against the order made by the learned Assistant Commissioner pursuant to s 29(2A) of the WICA were not satisfied. Section 29 of the WICA provides that:

Appeal from decision of Commissioner 29.—(1) Subject to section 24(3B), any person aggrieved by any order of the Commissioner made under this Act may appeal to the High Court whose decision shall be final.

(2) Subject to the Rules of Court, the procedure in an appeal to the High Court shall be the procedure in a civil appeal from a District Court with such modifications as the circumstances may require. (2A) No appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and the amount in dispute is not less than $1,000. (3) Notwithstanding any appeal under this section, the employer shall deposit with the Commissioner the amount of compensation ordered by the Commissioner under section 25B, 25C or 25D within 21 days from the date of the Commissioner’s decision, and the deposit shall be held by the Commissioner pending the outcome of the appeal.

[emphasis added in italics and bold italics]

As can be seen, it is necessary (but insufficient) for there to be a “substantial question of law” before an appeal against an order made by the learned Assistant Commissioner will avail itself to “any person aggrieved” by such order. In deciding whether the requirements for an appeal against an order made by the learned Assistant Commissioner have been met, it is not enough for there to be a mere question of law or that the Court takes the view that a different interpretation of the facts could have been drawn. Only a substantial question of law will suffice.

Counsel for the Defendant, Mr Suppiah Thangaveloo (“Mr Thangaveloo”), took the position that there was no substantial question of law on the basis that the learned Assistant Commissioner had made a proper assessment on the requirements of the WICA in respect of: (a) whether a personal injury had been suffered; (b) whether the personal injury was caused by an accident; and (c) whether the accident arose out of and in the course of employment. Counsel for the Claimant, Mr Tan Hee Joek (“Mr Tan”), on the other hand, submitted that the appeal did raise substantial issues of law.

This requirement of a substantial issue of law has been canvassed before the Singapore courts in a number of occasions. In Karuppiah Ravichandran v GDS Engineering Pte Ltd and Another [2009] 3 SLR 1028, Kan Ting Chiu J observed (at [9]) that the requirement of a substantial issue of law reflects the policy that decisions of the Assistant Commissioner are “not to be examined as though they are decisions of a court of law”. The policy of WICA, as revealed in Parliamentary debates and recognised in Allianz Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd and others v Ma Shoudong and another [2011] 3 SLR 1167 (at [20]) (“Ma Shoudong”), is to “provide a simpler and quicker way to settle compensation claims by avoiding protracted legal proceedings”. In Pang Chew Kim (next of kin of Poon Wai Tong deceased) v Wartsila Singapore Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 15 (“Pang Chew Kim”), Tay Yong Kwang J (at [19]) observed that the range of errors of law recognised as being relevant for an appeal under s 29(2A) would include:

… misinterpretation of a statute or any other legal document or a rule of common law; asking oneself and answering the wrong question, taking irrelevant considerations into account or failing to take relevant considerations into account when purporting to apply the law to the facts; admitting inadmissible evidence or rejecting admissible and relevant evidence; exercising a discretion on the basis of incorrect legal principles; giving reasons which disclose faulty legal reasoning or which are inadequate to fulfil an express duty to give reasons and misdirecting oneself as to the burden of proof.

In addition, Tay J at [20] of Pang Chew Kim rightly referred to Lord Radcliffe’s statement in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Baristow [1956] AC 14 at 36, that a factual finding which was such that “no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination upon appeal” amounted to a misconception or error of law.

After hearing counsel’s submissions on the meaning of “accident” and “arising out of and in the course of employment” pursuant to ss 3(1) and 3(6) of the WICA respectively, and considering these issues in conjunction with the facts as found by the learned Assistant Commissioner, I was of the view that this appeal concerned a substantial issue of law. Accordingly, I found that the requirements for an appeal against the order made by the learned Assistant Commissioner to the...