Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Court: Court of Three Judges (Singapore)
• Judge: Chan Sek Keong J
• Judgment Date: 30 March 1990
• Neutral Citation: [1990] SGCA 4
• Citation: [1990] SGCA 4
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,Pleadings,Applicable principles same as that for striking out amended pleadings,Application for leave to amend defence after close of pleadings,Amendment,Whether amendment discloses reasonable defence
• Plaintiff Counsel: Appellant in person (JB Jeyaretnam & Co)
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Tan Kok Quan and Lee Han Tiong (Lee & Lee)
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 65 of 1990,Civil Appeal No 39 of 1989,Motion in Civil Appeal No 65 of 1990,Civil Appeal No 99 of 1991
• Date: 30 November 1992

This appeal arose from the order of Lai Kew Chai J on 18 April 1989, dismissing an application made by the appellant, the defendant in the action, by way of a notice under summons for directions for leave to amend the defence. At the conclusion of the hearing, we dismissed the appeal. We now give our reasons.

The respondent`s claim against the appellant is for damages and an injunction in relation to an alleged slander published at an election rally of the Workers` Party held on 26 August 1988. Pleadings having closed, the respondent took out a summons for directions. By a notice under summons for directions, the appellant applied for leave to amend the defence by adding a new paragraph, to be renumbered as para 1 of the proposed amended defence in the following terms:

This action of the plaintiff seeks to restrict the defendant`s constitutional right given to him by art 14(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore and is therefore an unlawful interference of the defendant`s fundamental rights contained in thesaid article and for that reason not maintainable.

By an order dated 18 April 1989, the learned judge dismissed the application. In his judgment, the learned judge accepted the submissions put forward on behalf of the respondent that leave should not be granted as the proposed amendment did not disclose an arguable defence and that it was an immaterial and useless amendment.

In this appeal, the appellant submitted that the learned judge should have allowed the amendment as any prejudice could have been compensated by costs, leaving it to the respondent, if so desired, to take out the application to strike out the amendment. We disagree. In our view, in a contested interlocutory application for leave to amend pleadings, the principles to be applied are the same as if the application before the court had been an application to strike out the amended pleadings. The question involved is the same. The test is whether the part to be added by amendment ought to be struck out as...