Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew

• Judge: Chan Sek Keong J
• Judgment Date: 30 March 1990
• Neutral Citation: [1990] SGCA 4
• Citation: [1990] SGCA 4
• Defendant Counsel: Tan Kok Quan and Lee Han Tiong (Lee & Lee)
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Appellant in person (JB Jeyaretnam & Co)
• Date: 30 November 1992
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 65 of 1990,Civil Appeal No 39 of 1989,Motion in Civil Appeal No 65 of 1990,Civil Appeal No 99 of 1991
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,Pleadings,Applicable principles same as that for striking out amended pleadings,Application for leave to amend defence after close of pleadings,Amendment,Whether amendment discloses reasonable defence

This appeal arose from the order of Lai Kew Chai J on 18 April 1989, dismissing an application made by the appellant, the defendant in the action, by way of a notice under summons for directions for leave to amend the defence. At the conclusion of the hearing, we dismissed the appeal. We now give our reasons.

The respondent`s claim against the appellant is for damages and an injunction in relation to an alleged slander published at an election rally of the Workers` Party held on 26 August 1988. Pleadings having closed, the respondent took out a summons for directions. By a notice under summons for directions, the appellant applied for leave to amend the defence by adding a new paragraph, to be renumbered as para 1 of the proposed amended defence in the following terms:

This action of the plaintiff seeks to restrict the defendant`s constitutional right given to him by art 14(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore and is therefore an unlawful interference of the defendant`s fundamental rights contained in thesaid article and for that reason not maintainable.

By an order dated 18 April 1989, the learned judge dismissed the application. In his judgment, the learned judge accepted the submissions put forward on behalf of the respondent that leave should not be granted as the proposed amendment did not disclose an arguable defence and that it was an immaterial and useless amendment.

In this appeal, the appellant submitted that the learned judge should have allowed the amendment as any prejudice could have been compensated by costs, leaving it to the respondent, if so desired, to take out the application to strike out the amendment. We disagree. In our view, in a contested interlocutory application for leave to amend pleadings, the principles to be applied are the same as if the application before the court had been an application to strike out the amended pleadings. The question involved is the same. The test is whether the part to be added by amendment ought to be struck out as disclosing no reasonable defence to the claim.

By the proposed amendment, the appellant was in effect contending that the right of freedom of speech and expression conferred by art 14(1)(a) is unrestricted and wholly free of any restraint. In our judgment, this contention is clearly untenable. The constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression is unarguably restricted by the laws of defamation. Article 14(1)(a) is subject to cl (2), which...