Indonesia's rising regional and global profile: does size really matter?

• Author: Laksmana, Evan A.
• Position: Report

Scholars have long regarded Indonesia as among the world's most important regional powers and a "pivotal" one at that. (1) Indeed, in the decades following independence in 1945, many Indonesian leaders felt that the country's size, resources and revolutionary history entitled Jakarta to a leadership role in Southeast Asia. (2) While the subsequent history of the country's trajectory in world affairs has not always reflected such self-conceptions, many now argue that Indonesia's

regional and global profile is rising. (3) Since 2003, Indonesia has been the driving force behind political and security community building in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), even as it strengthens bilateral partnerships with major powers such as the United States, Russia, India, China and Australia. Indonesia has also been actively engaged on many global issues such as climate change and been an ardent supporter of global institutions including the G20 and the UN Security Council. Indonesia's economic growth rates in recent years of between 4 to 6 per cent annually have also been impressive, especially given the difficulties faced by other countries during the global financial crisis. Finally, the consolidation of democracy has increased domestic resilience and earned the country international approbation. (4)

This turn of events is quite remarkable given that a little over a decade ago some analysts were predicting the "Balkanization" of Indonesia following a series of economic and political crises which accompanied the fall of President Soeharto, including an upsurge in separatist activity and the violent separation of East Timor in 1999. (5) While it is clearly difficult to isolate the single most important reason behind Indonesia's recovery and increasing regional and global profile, some observers have cited the country's land and population size as providing it with the capital to play a regional and even global leadership role. (6) Indonesia is not only the largest country in Southeast Asia in terms of land size and population, but also the world's largest archipelagic state and is rich in natural resources. An economist at Morgan Stanley has noted that together with improved government finances and political stability, the "natural advantage from demography and commodity resources is likely to unleash Indonesia's growth potential". (7)

This line of reasoning seems to echo the Realist school of International Relations which favours material factors--such as economy, natural resources, population size and geography--as the primary indicators of national power. As such, when a country such as Indonesia possesses these material factors, and if it can manage its domestic political affairs and maintain cohesion, its rise is more likely to occur. Thus, some would argue that Indonesia's rising profile is due to its potential material powers, mainly, though not exclusively, its size. Although this line of reasoning can be persuasive, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, it only tells half the story. Indonesia's complex history, domestic political system and threat perceptions suggests that what is required is a more nuanced assessment of the country's rising regional and global profile.

Understanding Indonesia as a rising power is important because it is one of Southeast Asia's key leaders and is also an active participant in Asia's emerging regional security architecture. At the theoretical level, explaining why rising powers rise the way they do is also significant if we are to understand the future of regional stability and order. While there is no commonly accepted definition of "power" in International Relations--let alone what definitively constitutes a rising power (8)--there seems to be several "middle powers", such as Turkey, South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia that not only possess growing economic and political might, but also have the potential as well as aspiration to challenge the legitimacy of the post-Second World War order. Some of these countries have been pushing for more pluralist conceptions of global architecture in various international forums and have been deepening relations between and among themselves, perhaps even with a view to creating a bloc of their own. (9)

However, this paper does not seek to elaborate on the implications of rising powers such as Indonesia for regional stability and global order, or whether or not Indonesia has truly risen. Instead, it accepts the emerging consensus among scholars and observers that Indonesia's regional and global profile has been on the rise in recent years and seeks to provide a more nuanced assessment behind the country's rise. It also aims to challenge the prevailing view that "size matters" in explaining Indonesia's foreign policy outlook and regional and global leadership. Using Indonesia's rising regional and global security profile as a case study, it argues instead that normative values, domestic politics and its strategic environment better explain Indonesia's current profile in regional and global affairs. Specifically, this paper submits three inter-related arguments.

First, despite its "material sources of power" (especially its large land and population size), the manifestations of Indonesia's foreign policy and regional and global profile have always been based on its ability to harness the country's normative and moral authority in global affairs, especially in international institutions. This is reflected in both the country's "independent and active" foreign policy doctrine as well as the continued focus on addressing domestic problems. Second, democratization since 1998 has created two paradoxical trends. On the one hand, Indonesia's consolidation of democracy has allowed it to regain its reputation in world affairs and provided it with a new source of "soft power". On the other hand, democracy has also complicated foreign policy-making because of the proliferation of interested parties and stakeholders, and the importance of public opinion. Under the image-conscious presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, these factors obfuscate the country's foreign policy coherence and rationality.

Finally, instead of boosting the country's regional and global profile, Indonesia's large geographical space and population have been a source of persistent internal security threats. And as the government has been unable to meet national defence requirements, Indonesia's growing defence diplomatic activities may be more a reflection of the country's continuing strategic weakness rather than its strength. In International Relations parlance, this is Indonesia's own version of "soft balancing"--as a recovering power, not necessarily a rising one. (10) While these arguments are not entirely novel in themselves --scholars of Third World countries in the 1960s made similar claims--it seeks to highlight the persistence of Indonesia's foreign policy principles and strategies.

Indonesia's Foreign Policy: Why Norms (Still) Matter

Observers of Indonesia often cite the country's size as among the primary modalities for its regional and global role. In 2009, the population of Indonesia stood at 230 million (the fourth largest in the world). The country's land area amounts to 1.9 million square kilometres (placing it 16th in the world in terms of land mass). (11) At over 18,000 islands, the Indonesian archipelago is the largest in the world, covering an area of 2.8 million square kilometres, expanding to 7.9 million square kilometres including its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). (12) Indonesia has the world's largest Muslim population, though it is not an Islamic theocratic state. Indonesia also occupies a geo-strategically important location between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, forming a bridge between Asia and Australia and controlling strategic sea lanes of communications vital to military and commercial activities between the Pacific Basin, Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. (13) Indonesia also has sovereign rights in the Straits of Malacca, one of the world's busiest waterways.

Since the 1940s, successive Indonesian foreign policy-makers, political elites and observers have invoked these material assets as evidence that Indonesia is entitled to play the role of a regional leader and global player. Observers of contemporary Indonesia have made similar assumptions about Indonesia's foreign policy and global status. Anthony Smith, for instance, has argued that Indonesia's stature as a regional and global leader "has hitherto been determined by its large population, geographical position, and its economic potential". (14) John Haseman has posited that Indonesia's large and predominantly moderate Muslim population, strategic location and abundant resources make it a regional power of great importance to the United States. (15) Conversely, however, these material assets, when coupled with Indonesia's aggressive policies in the past (such as during Konfrontasi in the 1960s and the 1975 invasion of East Timor), have created unease among its neighbours.

These concerns notwithstanding, when placed within the overall historical trajectory of Indonesia's foreign policy, it appears that instead of hard realpolitik based on material powers, international and regional institutions dominate the country's foreign policy, especially since it rejoined the UN in 1966 and became a founding member of ASEAN in 1967. Membership of ASEAN has been particularly important, and one of the constant themes in the foreign ministry's pronouncements has been that ASEAN is the "cornerstone" of Indonesia's foreign policy. In addition, many of Indonesia's major regional and global achievements are often executed or proposed through various international institutions such as the UN, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and others. In the main...