Goh Ang Huat v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Yong Pung How CJ
• Judgment Date: 10 September 1996
• Neutral Citation: [1996] SGHC 197
• Citation: [1996] SGHC 197
• Date: 10 September 1996
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Winston Mok and Khoo Guan Chuan (Khoo Aeria & Partners)
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 73 of 1996
• Defendant Counsel: Lau Wing Yum (Deputy Public Prosecutor)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Year: 1996

The charge

The appellant was charged in the court below with two offences:

First charge

You,

Goh Ang Huat, M/35 YRS

NRIC No: S1441297B

are charged that you, on 9 October 1995, at or about 3.30pm, at Bukit Batok Road, Singapore, did use criminal force to one Hashim Bin Hussein, a CISCO Police Corporal 10329, a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public person, to wit, by grabbing his shirt (uniform), and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under s 353 of the Penal Code (Cap 224).

Second charge

You,

Goh Ang Huat, M/35 Yrs

NRIC No: S1441297B

are charged that you, on 9 October 1995, at or about 3.30pm, at Bukit Batok, Singapore, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, did use abusive words to one Hashim Bin Hussein, a CISCO Police Corporal 10329, a public servant, to wit, Okan ni na boo chau chee bai`, and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under s 13(f) of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act (Cap 184).

At the end of the trial, the appellant was convicted on both charges.

After hearing the appeal, I affirmed the conviction under the first charge but allowed the appeal on the second charge. I now give my reasons.

The facts

The facts of this case were as follows. The complainant was one Hashim bin Hussein, PW1, who is a CISCO corporal (the complainant). On 9 October 1995, he was detailed to drive a CISCO van bearing the CISCO crest to transport CISCO officers to and from the Woodlands checkpoint. At about 3.30pm, as the complainant was driving the vehicle together with ten other uniformed CISCO personnel along Bukit Batok Road, a bus driven by the appellant apparently overtook the van from the front from the right lane without giving any signals. To avoid the collision, the complainant had to jam his brakes, but the bus went on and sped off.

The complainant gave chase because he wanted to warn the appellant that his actions in driving the bus were dangerous to other road users. He turned on the blinkers and sounded the horn several times to indicate to the appellant to stop, but the appellant continued to speed off. The appellant, however, denied driving dangerously and speeding off. He claimed that he was in fact concentrating on the road ahead and did not hear or see any indication to stop. Finally, at a traffic light junction of Bukit Batok Road and Bukit Batok Avenue 3, the complainant managed to stop the appellant`s bus by cutting into its path from the front.

The prosecution case was that the appellant became verbally abusive when the complainant asked him to show his driving licence. There was a barrage of vulgarities from the appellant which was directed at the complainant. This culminated in the appellant trying to snatch the complainant`s pen, and a little fracas ensued, when the complainant was about to leave after jotting down the appellant`s bus number and model. The appellant denied being vulgar and claimed that he had merely wanted to borrow the complainant`s pen to write down the latter`s particulars. In any event, the incident ended quickly when one Cpl Ismail bin Sabtu (Cpl Ismail), PW2, got out from the front passenger seat of the CISCO van, and told the appellant to get his own pen. The appellant walked back to his bus to find a pen. But before he could return to the CISCO van, the complainant drove off.

The decision below

The trial judge accepted the prosecution`s version that the appellant did not use his indicators when overtaking the CISCO van, hence causing the complainant to apply his brakes. She also found that the complainant had turned on his siren and sounded his horn several times to indicate to the appellant to stop. But the latter continued speeding off. She thought that it was improbable that the appellant did not notice the siren or hear the horn. He was in fact trying to avoid the complainant when he failed to stop his bus when signalled to do so by the complainant, and this refusal triggered the chase that finally resulted in the appellant`s bus being stopped by the complainant at the traffic light junction of Bukit Batok Road and Bukit Batok Avenue 3.

The trial judge also found that the appellant had uttered vulgarities with the intention of causing a breach of the peace. She found that this was why the complainant did not have further conversations with the appellant but walked back to the CISCO van after having taken down the particulars of the bus. Thus, she was of the view that the appellant was not only annoyed but confrontational at the time of the incident.

As to the use of criminal force, the trial judge found that there was no need for the appellant to attempt to take the complainant`s pen in order to take down the latter`s particulars since the appellant had admitted that he had a pen in the tool box inside his bus. Thus, she found that the appellant did use criminal force by grabbing the complainant`s shirt. She also entertained no doubt that, at the relevant time, the complainant was in the act of executing his duties, and he was acting within the powers conferred upon him as a CISCO officer.

Accordingly, she found the appellant guilty of the two offences charged. As for the sentence, she took into account that the appellant was unremorseful since he did not instruct his counsel to mitigate. In the circumstances, she imposed an imprisonment term of four weeks for the s 353 Penal Code offence and a fine of $800 for the offence under s 13(f) of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act.

The appeal

First charge ~ s 353 of the Penal Code

Section 353 of the Penal Code states as follows:

Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such a public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years, or with fine, or with both.

To convict on a s 353 charge, the following ingredients must be proved:

(a) that the victim of the criminal force was a public servant;

(b) ) that the accused used criminal force to such public servant;

(c) ) that the accused used criminal force on the public servant when the latter was in the execution of his duty as such public servant.

Dealing with the first and third ingredients of the offence together, the question was whether, at the time of the incident, the complainant was a public servant in the execution of his duty. In this regard, it was also significant whether, at the relevant time, the complainant was acting lawfully in stopping the appellant.

The appellant`s counsel contended that the trial judge had erred in applying s 12(3) of the Commercial and Industrial Security Corporation Act (Cap 47) (CISCO Act) which states:

Every such officer or employee [of CISCO] shall, until his warrant card is cancelled by the Commissioner, have the same powers and immunities as a police officer.

He argued that the abovesaid section does not state expressly or otherwise whether a CISCO officer is a public servant or not. Further, the section does not state when or in what manner a CISCO officer can be considered to be executing his duty as such a public servant.

From the account of the complainant who said that the appellant had Ozig-zagged`, there was at least some ground to suspect that the appellant was not driving with due care and attention. Thus, s 127(3) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276) (RTA) empowers a police officer to stop such a vehicle. Section 127(3) of the RTA states:

A police officer in uniform may stop any motor vehicle the driver of which has committed or is suspected of having committed an offence under this Act or the rules.

Read together with s 127(3) of the CISCO Act as stated above, I had no doubt that such a Opolice officer in uniform` includes a CISCO officer who consequently has the same power conferred by s 127(3) of the RTA. Besides, s 11 of the CISCO Act also states:

The members, officers and employees of the Corporation of every description shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of the Penal Code.

The complainant, who at the relevant time was in uniform, was thus a public servant lawfully executing his duty.

I had only to consider the second ingredient. In this respect, I noted the definition of criminal force as laid down in s 350 Penal Code:

Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person`s consent , in order to cause the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force illegally to cause , or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will illegally cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other. [Emphasis added.]

And Oforce`, as defined under s 349 Penal Code, is said to be used by a person on another if:

[H]e causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other`s body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other`s sense of feeling:

Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion, causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in one of the following three ways:

(a) by his own bodily power;

É

Thus, the definition of criminal force is so wide as to include force of almost every description of which a person is the ultimate object.

Reverting to the instant case, counsel for the appellant argued that there was no intention to use criminal force ~ the appellant had merely asked to borrow the complainant`s pen, and it would indeed be foolhardy for the appellant to use force in the...