Extortion: Cutting the Gordian Knot

• Citation: (1993) 5 SAcLJ 132
• Published date: 01 December 1993
• Date: 01 December 1993

P.P. v. Tham Chien Tin 1

On 29 June 1988, the respondent and three unknown persons, who posed as “government officers” (but were in fact ordinary members of the public), told one Tay Tian Leng (“Tay”) the consequences of employing seven Malaysian workers without work permits. The respondent subsequently invited Tay to his office. Tay asked him for a chance to free the illegal workers and the respondent replied saying, “Anything in this world can be solved, just depends on how you solve it.”2 They finally settled the matter when Tay gave the respondent $50,000.

The respondent was charged with extortion under section 383 of the Penal Code,3 which states:

Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ‘extortion’.

The District Court acquitted the respondent without his defence being called as it held that one of the essential ingredients of section 383, i.e., fear of injury” had not been established.

On appeal by the prosecution to the High Court, his Honour, Chief Justice Yong Pung How allowed the appeal and ordered that the case be remitted to the District Court for the respondent’s defence to be called. He held that the present case “is really on all fours with P.P. v. Johar.”4

Johar’s case needs closer scrutiny. In that case it was alleged that the respondent, Johar, an acting Superintendent of Police in the then Federation of Malaya had put one Lee Seng Chwee in fear of injury in that he had threatened to arrest one Lee Seng Kee for having illegally entered Malaya. As a result, Lee Seng Chwee was induced to pay him $50,000 as otherwise Lee Seng Kee would be arrested. It is to be noted that the implied threat took place in Singapore. The learned Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal by the District Court, and the case was remitted to the trial court.

Wee Chong Jin C.J. assumed as correct Vincent Lee v. P.P.5 and Abu Hassan v. P.P.6 which held that if a person (e.g., a police officer) is invested with certain legal powers he cannot be liable for the offence of extortion as the “injury”, defined in sections 44 and 43 of the Penal Code, is caused when exercising his legal powers. However, Johar’s case was distinguished on the basis that the respondent had no legal powers in Singapore (where the alleged extortion was committed).

In Vincent Lee’s case, the appellant, a volunteer special constable duly vested with all the powers and privileges of a police officer, had threatened various persons who were smoking chandu with arrest. He was convicted of the offence of extortion but on appeal to the High Court of Singapore, Murray - Aynsley C.J. allowed the appeal. He said:

The offence of extortion is defined in section 383 of the Penal Code, It will be seen that an essential part of the offence is putting a person in fear of ‘injury’. In turn ‘injury’ is defined in section 44 of the same code. There ‘injury’ is harm illegally caused. It appears to me to follow from this that the exercise of legal powers however done can never constitute harm7

Murray-Aynsley C.J. merged the question of “harm” and the “illegal” causing of that harm. There are two aspects of injury within the meaning of section 44 read with section 43. First, there must be harm. Second, the harm must be illegally caused. Both aspects are separate, though linked, and must be satisfied before there can be injury.

Even assuming that the accused in Vincent Lee was vested with the legal powers of arrest in the circumstances of the case, the question is, can a victim who has committed a wrongful act be heard to say that he is harmed if the ‘extortioner’ threatens to bring him to justice?

What constitutes an injury for the purpose of extortion can be gleaned from the four illustrations to section 383, which are set out below:

(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z, unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.

(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z’s child in wrongful confinement, unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain moneys to A. Z signs and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.

(c) A threatens to send men to plough up Z’s field, unless Z will sign and deliver to B a bond, binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain

produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.

(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z signs and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security, A has committed extortion.

“Injury” is defined in section 44 of the Penal Code as denoting “any harm whatever illegally caused … in body, mind, reputation or property”, and “illegal” is defined in section 43 as “applicable to everything which is an offence, or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action”.

In each of the illustrations to section 383, there is both harm and the harm is illegally caused, apart from the other element of extortion, i.e., inducement - that the person so put in fear must deliver property.

In illustration (a) a threat by A to publish a defamatory libel concernin Z is a harm to Z’s reputation; the harm is illegally caused because the publication would give rise to a civil action by Z against A, if the threat was carried out. The illustration presupposes that Z has not said or done anything which would justify the publication by A, nor is there any truth in the libel. In illustration (d), A puts Z in fear of grievous hurt - Z is under potential harm to his body. The threatened injury, if executed, would be illegal...