Epolar System Enterprise Pte Ltd and Others v Lee Hock Chuan and Others

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chao Hick Tin JA
• Judgment Date: 21 March 2003
• Neutral Citation: [2003] SGCA 10
• Date: 21 March 2003
• Subject Matter: Tort,Whether landlord liable in nuisance,Person(s) pleading as "occupying and carrying on business",Fire damage,Whether pleadings disclosed sufficient capacity to sue,Whether this disclosed sufficient standing to sue,Persons pleading as "owners",Private nuisance,Nuisance,Fire caused by faulty fuse on property,Standing to sue
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 109 of 2002
• Published date: 17 December 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Govinda Gopalan, Cheong Aik Chye (Lim & Gopalan),Cheong Yuen Hee (instructed)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Gn Chiang Soon (Gn & Co)

Delivered by Chao Hick Tin JA

1 This was an appeal against a decision of the High Court dismissing the appellants’ claims for damages on account of a fire which started in the premises owned by the respondents but let out to tenants and which spread to the adjoining premises occupied/belonging to the appellants. We heard the appeal on 18 February 2003 and dismissed it. These grounds are issued as certain pronouncements made by the court below, in relation to the tort of nuisance, require some clarification.

The facts

2 The first to third appellants were the occupiers of factory premises Nos 21, 35 and 37, Senang Crescent respectively (Nos 21, 35 and 37) and were carrying on their businesses therein. The fourth and fifth appellants were the owners of Nos 35 and 37. The owner of No. 21 was a party to the proceedings in the court below but had decided not to pursue the matter further. The respondents were the owners of No. 25 Senang Crescent (No. 25). The appellants sued in both negligence and nuisance.

3 On 20 February 1999, a fire broke out at No. 25. At the time, the property was leased out by the respondents to Great Wall Interior Décor Pte Ltd ("Great Wall"), which in turn had sublet the lower floor to Teamwood Decoration & Construction Pte Ltd ("Teamwood"). The cause of the fire would appear to be a short circuit in the wiring which generated sparks, igniting material in the front yard of No. 25. Three fuses in the fuse box of No. 25 were found to contain old copper wires (in Imperial measurement) not in use after 1978. These wires had a greater capacity than what was permitted for use and this had apparently resulted in the fuses not "blowing" to interrupt the flow of electricity. The fuse box was located in the front yard of No. 25 occupied by Teamwood.

4 We should mention that there was an earlier action, in relation to the same fire, which was commenced by the owners and tenants of No. 23 Senang Crescent against the respondents, as well as Great Wall and Teamwood (Suit No. 1777/1999). At the end of the trial of that action, the High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim against the owners of No. 25, the respondents herein, as well as their claim against Great Wall. But the court there held Teamwood liable in negligence for the damages caused by the fire. The decision was affirmed by this Court on appeal.

5 In the present action, the case as presented to the court below was that the three tampered fuses, with wire thickness greater than those in use after 1978, were installed sometime before 1978 or, at the latest, before 1991, i.e., before Great Wall commenced occupation of No. 25. The appellants alleged that the respondents, as the landlords of No. 25, upon resuming possession of the premises from the previous tenant, and before leasing the property out to Great Wall, should have ensured that all electrical fittings were in order. In letting out the premises to Great Wall with the tampered fuses, the respondents were negligent and were thus liable for damages suffered by the appellants.

6 The trial judge found that the appellants had failed to establish that the respondents had breached any duty of care owed to them and dismissed the action.

7 In order to prove that the old wires were installed in the tampered fuses before Great Wall took possession of No. 25, the appellants relied on the fact that the old wires were wires authorized before 1978 and such wires were no longer permitted to be in use after 1978. We did not think that this fact alone was sufficient proof that the tampered fuses must have been in place before 1978 or at any rate before 1991. We did not see how it necessarily followed that just because the wires were old, they must have been in place before 1991. While we accept that a licenced electrician would most likely have used wires currently authorized, a change of fuse wires could be undertaken by any handyman. Findings must be made based on evidence, and speculation does not constitute evidence. Great Wall and Teamwork should have been called to testify that they did not do anything with regard to the fuses.

8 In the light of the foregoing, the claim in nuisance could also not be sustained. At the relevant time No. 25 was in the exclusive possession of Great Wall and Teamwood. It was not established that the potentially dangerous situation, caused by the tampered fuses and the combustible material accumulated in the front yard of No. 25, was brought about by the respondents or that they knew about it and did nothing. There was nothing to link the respondents to that state of affairs.

Who may claim in nuisance

9 In dealing with the claim in nuisance, the trial judge, in his judgment, advanced the following propositions:-

"… a plaintiff who sues in private nuisance must first prove that he has an interest in land because nuisance is a tort against land. See The Law of Torts, Common Law Series, 2002 Ed, Ch 22 page 901 for a detailed historical background to this tort. Whatever the plaintiff may recover from the defendant depends on the interest that he (the plaintiff) has. Hence, the licensee in Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141 was held to have insufficient interest in land to sue the next door occupier in nuisance. It follows that the plaintiffs must plead and adduce evidence of their respective interests in land. The case for the first, second, and third plaintiffs in this case must fail from the outset because they claim as ‘occupiers’. That is clearly insufficient. The fourth, fifth, and sixth plaintiffs claim as owners. Not a single affidavit of evidence-in-chief was filed by any one of the six plaintiffs. If the owner is not in occupation, then he can only succeed if he can show that he had a right of immediate possession, or that he suffered damage in respect of his reversionary interest. See Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 CH 287, 312, per Lindley LJ. Nothing to this effect was pleaded nor proved. The certified true copies of title deeds produced by the solicitor’s clerk only prove ownership at best, but, as I said, mere ownership is...