Eng Poh Su (now known as Eddy Eng Poh Su) v Yap Ah Ho (now known as Yap Yujing Josephine)

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 27 March 2001
• Date: 27 March 2001
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 7001 of 2001
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Eng Poh Su (now known as Eddy Eng Poh Su)

Plaintiff

and

Yap Ah Ho (now known as Yap Yujing Josephine)

Defendant

[2001] SGHC 60

Tay Yong Kwang JC

Originating Summons No 7001 of 2001

High Court

Civil Procedure–Appeals–Leave–Appeal against interim maintenance order made by district judge–Whether leave of court required to appeal against district judge's decision in respect of matrimonial matters under Pt X Women's Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed)–Section 21 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed)–Section 137 Women's Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed)

The applicant was ordered by a district judge on 25 October 2000 to pay interim maintenance for his former wife and three children pursuant to ss 113 and 127 of the Women's Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed). The applicant lodged a notice of appeal against this order, but was advised by the Registrar of the Subordinate Courts that leave to appeal was required pursuant to s 21 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”). The applicant applied for leave but the district judge dismissed his application on 13 November 2000.

The applicant thus filed an originating summons asking the High Court to determine whether leave of court was required under s 21 of the SCJA to appeal from a decision of the Subordinate Courts in respect of matrimonial matters under Pt X of the Women's Charter, and if so required, for such leave to be granted.

Held, leave to appeal not required:

(1) Sections 113 and 127 were located in Pt X of the Women's Charter and thus appeals under these sections fell within the ambit of s 137 of the Women's Charter, which provided that all decrees and orders made under Pt X of the Women's Charter might be appealed from as if they were decrees or orders made by the court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. Section 137 did not state that it was subject to other written law while s 21 of the SCJA was so qualified. Section 137 could therefore be construed as conferring a right of appeal independently of and unaffected by s 21 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. Such a result would also avert the anomalous situation in which a maintenance order made under s 69 was appealable as of right while another made subsequently in divorce proceedings (which might very well adopt the earlier maintenance order) was appealable subject to a monetary limit: at [12], [22] and [23].

(2) This decision would not affect matters for which no monetary value could be attached (such as custody of and access to children) but would affect orders pertaining to division of matrimonial assets in that such orders were appealable as of right under s 137 of the Women's Charter as well. This was not necessarily undesirable nor likely to result in a deluge of appeals, given that most orders on division of matrimonial assets were likely to involve more than $50,000 anyway and would therefore be appealable as of right even if s 21 of the SCJA was applicable and many appeals on maintenance and/or division of matrimonial assets would involve the question of custody of and access to children (a matter appealable as of right): at [25].

(3) As leave to appeal was not required in this case, there was no need to determine if such leave ought to be granted. The applicant was granted an extension of one week to file his notice of appeal against the district judge's decision made on 25 October 2000 and leave to withdraw the appeal against the refusal of leave as it was no longer relevant: at [27].

Augustine Zacharia Norman v Goh Siam Yong [1992] 1 SLR (R) 746; [1992] 1 SLR 767 (refd)

Zaleha bte A Rahman v Chaytor Alan James [2000] 3 SLR (R) 612; [2001] 1 SLR 459 (folld)

Rules of Court (Cap 322,R 5, 1997 Rev Ed)O 55C, O 55D

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed)s 21 (consd);s 28A

Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Matrimonial, Divorce and Guardianship of Infants Proceedings to District Court) Order (Cap 322, O 1, 1997 Ed)paras 3, 6

Women's Charter (Cap 353,1997 Rev Ed)s 137, Pt X (consd);ss 59,69, 69 (1),69 (2), 76,77, 78, 79,92, 113, 127,127 (2), Pt VIII

Troy Yeo Siew Chye (Leo Fernando) for the petitioner

Raistlina Kwek (Rodyk & Davidson) for the respondent.

Tay Yong Kwang JC

1 This originating summons concerns the issue whether s 21 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Ed) applies to appeals arising from matrimonial proceedings in the Family Court of the Subordinate Courts. The said s 21 reads:

1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other written law, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a decision of a District Court or Magistrate's Court in any suit or action for the recovery of immovable property or in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter exceeds $50,000 or such other amount as may be specified by an order made under subsection (3) or with the leave of a District Court, a Magistrate's Court or the High Court if under that amount.

2 The applicant is the petitioner in DP 939/2000. In this originating summons, he seeks leave to appeal against the decision made by a district judge on 25 October 2000, whereby he was ordered:

(a) to pay $3,500 per month as interim maintenance for his three children and $100 per month for his former wife with effect from 1 October 2000;

(b) to continue paying the housing loan instalments; and

(c) to pay costs fixed at $800.

The district judge made no order for the payment of arrears of $4,500.

3 The originating summons has been worded incorrectly as one seeking leave to appeal against the district judge's decision on 13 November 2000 refusing the petitioner leave to appeal to the High Court against the said order of 25 October 2000.

The facts leading to this originating summons

4 The petitioner and the respondent were married in 1981. They have three children from their marriage.

5 On 3 October 2000, the petitioner was granted a decree nisi on the ground of the respondent's unreasonable...