Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ
• Judgment Date: 25 April 2013
• Neutral Citation: [2013] SGCA 31
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 167 of 2012/M (Summons No 71 of 2013)
• Published date: 29 May 2013
• Year: 2013
• Hearing Date: 25 February 2013
• Plaintiff Counsel: N Sreenivasan SC and Sujatha Selvakumar (Straits Law Practice LLC)
• Defendant Counsel: Deborah Barker SC and Ushan Premaratne (KhattarWong LLP)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure
• Citation: [2013] SGCA 31

Sundaresh Menon CJ (delivering the grounds of decision of the court): Introduction

This is an application by the respondent to strike out Civil Appeal No 167 of 2012/M (“CA 167/2012”). CA 167/2012 is an appeal from the decision of the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) in Registrar’s Appeal No 404 of 2012/C (“RA 404/2012”). By her decision, the Judge ordered that the respondent be at liberty to serve on the appellant the pre-action interrogatories set out in Schedule 1 of the Order of Court and that the appellant answer the same.

The principal ground relied upon by the respondent in its striking out application was that the order of the Judge in RA 404/2012 was not appealable to this court by reason of s 34(1)(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“the SCJA”), read with paragraph (i) of the Fourth Schedule to the SCJA.

At the close of the hearing, we dismissed the respondent’s application to strike out CA 167/2012. We gave a short oral judgment expressing the view that the legislative intent underlying the 2010 amendments to the SCJA was to restrict the right of appeal from orders made at the hearing of interlocutory applications. We also found that an application for leave to administer pre-action interrogatories was not an interlocutory application. Accordingly, we held that paragraph (i) of the Fourth Schedule to the SCJA did not exclude the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal where a judge made an order giving or refusing pre-action interrogatories. We now set out the grounds for our decision in full.

The background to the application

The respondent (ie, the plaintiff in the action below), World Sport Group Pte Ltd, commenced Originating Summons No 839 of 2012/H (“OS 839/2012) on 1 October 2012 seeking to administer pre-action interrogatories on, and obtain pre-action discovery of documents from, the appellant (ie, the defendant in the action below), pursuant to O 26A r 1 and O 24 r 6 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Rules of Court”) respectively.

OS 839/2012 was first heard before an assistant registrar on 28 September 2012. The assistant registrar allowed the application in part and ordered that the respondent be at liberty to administer on the appellant the interrogatories set out in Schedule 1 of OS 839/2012. No order was made on the respondent’s application for discovery of documents.

The appellant then filed RA 404/2012, appealing against the assistant registrar’s decision to a judge in chambers. The appeal was heard on 30 October 2012 and 19 November 2012. After hearing counsel for the appellant and respondent, the Judge ordered that the respondent be at liberty to administer on the appellant the interrogatories set out in Schedule 1 of the Order of Court. However, RA 404/2012 was allowed in part insofar as the Judge limited the scope of the interrogatories to be administered on the appellant.

On 18 December 2012, the appellant filed its Notice of Appeal in CA 167/2012. On 28 December 2012, the respondent filed Summons No 71 of 2013 (“SUM 71/2013”) to strike out the appellant’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that the order of the Judge giving pre-action interrogatories was not appealable to the Court of Appeal. SUM 71/2013 was heard by us on 25 February 2013.

Issue before this court

The only issue before this court was whether the order of the Judge giving leave to serve pre-action interrogatories was not appealable to the Court of Appeal by reason of s 34(1)(a) of the SCJA read with paragraph (i) of the Fourth Schedule to the SCJA.

For the avoidance of doubt, it bears emphasising at the outset that we made no finding as to the substantive merits of CA 167/2012 which, in any case, was not before us.

Our decision The respondent’s contentions

Before turning to consider the arguments made by the respondent in SUM 71/2013, we should briefly explain the jurisdiction of this court to hear appeals on civil matters. As the Court of Appeal is a creature of statute, it is only seised of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the statute which creates it: Blenwel Agencies Pte Ltd v Tan Lee King [2008] 2 SLR(R) 529 at [23]. In this regard, s 29A(1) of the SCJA provides:

29A.—(1) The civil jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal shall consist of appeals from any judgement or order of the High Court in any civil cause or matter whether made in the exercise of its original or of its appellate jurisdiction, subject nevertheless to the provisions of this Act or any other written law regulating the terms and conditions upon which such appeal may be brought.

The effect of s 29A(1) of the SCJA is that any judgment or order of the High Court is ordinarily appealable as of right. This however, is subject to any contrary provisions in the SCJA or any other written law. In this respect, the respondent in its striking out application relied on s 34(1)(a) of the SCJA, which provides:

34.—(1) No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases: (a) Where a Judge makes an order specified in the Fourth Schedule, except in such circumstances as may be specified in that Schedule. …

The relevant paragraph in the Fourth Schedule to the SCJA provides:

ORDERS MADE BY JUDGE THAT ARE NON-APPEALABLE No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases: ... (i) where a Judge makes an order giving or refusing interrogatories.

Counsel for the respondent, Ms Deborah Barker SC (“Ms Barker”) urged us to give the term “interrogatories” in paragraph (i) of the Fourth Schedule its plain and ordinary meaning. Ms Barker contended that the term was of very wide import and capable of encompassing interrogatories ordered under O 26 rr 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court after proceedings have commenced, as well as those ordered under O 26A r 1 of the Rules of Court before proceedings for any substantive relief have been commenced.

Ms Barker further contended that the statutory text is to be regarded as the primary indicator of legislative intent. On that view, recourse to the purpose of the enactment, as well as to extrinsic material capable of assisting in the ascertainment of that purpose would be unnecessary and indeed inappropriate save where the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory text was ambiguous or would lead to results which could not reasonably be supposed to have been Parliament’s intention. According to Ms Barker, this was not so in the case before us as the term “interrogatories” in paragraph (i) of the Fourth Schedule was capable of one meaning only.

In the alternative, Ms Barker contended that even on a purposive interpretation of s 34 read with paragraph (i) of the Fourth Schedule to the SCJA, the order of the Judge giving leave to serve pre-action interrogatories was not appealable to this Court.

Statutory Interpretation in Singapore

We first consider the respondent’s contentions as to the principles to be applied in the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. To the extent that the respondent’s contentions are rooted in the “plain meaning rule” of statutory interpretation at common law, we disagree with them. In Singapore, any discussion on statutory interpretation must take place against the backdrop of s 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the Interpretation Act”): see Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 803 (“Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995”) at [44]; Planmarine AG v Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [1999] 1 SLR(R) 669 (“Planmarine AG”) at [22]; Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 (“Low Kok Heng”) at [39].

Section 9A of the Interpretation Act provides as follows:

9A.—(1) In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpose or object.

(2) Subject to subsection (4), in the interpretation of a provision of a written law, if any material not forming part of the written law is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material – (a) to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law; or (b) to ascertain the meaning of the provision when– (i) the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or (ii) the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

...

Insofar as s 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act provides that an interpretation promoting the purpose or object underlying the statute “shall be preferred” to an interpretation which does not, it mandates that a purposive approach be taken in statutory interpretation. In Low Kok Heng at [56]–[57] V K Rajah JA stated that the purposive approach mandated by s 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act is paramount and must take precedence over any other common law principles of statutory interpretation including, as in the case before us, the plain meaning rule. We agree.

Moreover, and contrary to the respondent’s contentions, under the purposive approach mandated by s 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act, reference may be made to extrinsic materials such as parliamentary debates even if, on a plain reading, the words of the statutory provision are unambiguous or do not produce unreasonable or absurd results. In Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 at [47]–[48], Yong Pung How CJ, pronouncing the opinion of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore Tribunal, cited with approval the following...