Ding Si Yang v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chao Hick Tin JA
• Judgment Date: 02 February 2015
• Neutral Citation: [2015] SGHC 34
• Plaintiff Counsel: Hamidul Haq, Thong Chee Kun, Ho Lifen, Michelle Lee (Rajah & Tann LLP)
• Docket Number: Criminal Motion No 58 of 2014
• Date: 02 February 2015
• Hearing Date: 08 August 2014,05 August 2014
• Subject Matter: Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Bail,Bail pending appeal
• Published date: 04 February 2015
• Citation: [2015] SGHC 34
• Defendant Counsel: Tan Ken Hwee, Alan Loh, Asoka Markandu and Grace Lim (Attorney-General's Chambers)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Year: 2015

Chao Hick Tin JA: Introduction

This was a motion brought by Ding Si Yang (“the Applicant”) praying for bail pending appeal after a similar application had been denied by the District Judge after trial. The Applicant had claimed trial to three charges of corruption and was sentenced to a total of 36 months’ imprisonment. On 8 August 2014, I dismissed the Applicant’s motion and instead ordered that his appeals against conviction and sentence be heard on an expedited basis.

I now set out the grounds for my decision in refusing him bail.

Background facts and decision below

On 1 July 2014, the Applicant, a 32 year old Singaporean male, was convicted of three charges of corruption under s 5(b)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) (“PCA”).

On 24 July 2014, the Applicant was sentenced by District Judge Toh Yung Cheong (“the District Judge”) to a term of 18 months’ imprisonment for each charge. Two of the charges were ordered to run consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment.

The District Judge’s reasons for convicting the Applicant of the charges can be summarised as follows: The Applicant gave gratification by providing three Lebanese match officials with social escorts who were to render free sexual services to them on request. There was a corrupt object as the purpose of giving the gratification was to induce the three officials to agree to being involved in match-fixing. This was a transaction which fell within the scope of s 5(b)(ii) of the PCA. There was a corrupt match-fixing element given that the ultimate objective was to get the three officials to make decisions on the pitch that were incorrect in order to benefit the match-fixers. There was a corrupt intent as the Applicant had previously written newspaper articles about football and he must have known that match-fixing was illegal.

After the sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment was imposed, the Applicant immediately applied on the same day for bail pending appeal under s 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). The District Judge refused bail, being persuaded by the Prosecution that there was a risk that the Applicant would abscond. In particular, the District Judge cited the following reasons for denying bail: The Applicant’s wife and child lived in Thailand. Match-fixers who were part of an organised group would have considerable resources to facilitate the Applicant to effect an escape from Singapore. A number of other match-fixers had in fact absconded. The potential harm to Singapore’s reputation, as a country with a low level of corruption and a fair and effective criminal justice system, if the Applicant were to also abscond and avoid punishment for his crimes. The lack of technological measures such as electronic tagging which could reduce flight risk.

Since bail was refused, the Applicant commenced his sentence on 24 July 2014.

The parties’ submissions

The Applicant submitted that bail pending appeal ought to be granted to him because he had no intention to flee the jurisdiction nor has he shown any propensity to do so. His main arguments can be summarised as follows: The Applicant has faithfully complied with prior bail conditions, has made no attempt to flee the jurisdiction, and has no intention of doing so. The Applicant has scheduled an appointment for surgery on his left knee which would take place on 6 August 2014 and which will leave him with limited mobility. The Applicant has substantial ties with Singapore. He is a Singapore citizen, is very close to his father and sister, and lives in a landed property in Singapore that is registered in his name. The alleged financial resources available to the Appellant to assist him in absconding were hugely exaggerated.

In response, the Respondent argued that: A second application for bail pending appeal must be accompanied by a material change of circumstances or new facts. The Applicant has not furnished special reasons why bail pending appeal was appropriate and that the scheduled knee surgery was too much of a coincidence and did not amount to a special reason. There was really no way of ensuring that the Applicant would not abscond. The likelihood of the Applicant absconding was high, as he has shown disdain for authority. The bail monies would not be adequate to ensure that the Applicant did not abscond. The Applicant’s appeals against conviction and sentence could be heard expeditiously.

My decision Principles governing applications for bail pending appeal

The starting point in determining whether bail should be granted is to ascertain whether the offence in question is a bailable offence under the 1st Schedule to the CPC. Here, the Applicant was convicted of the offence of corruption which, under s 5 of the PCA, attracted a maximum imprisonment term of five years. Accordingly, the Applicant was convicted of a non-bailable offence (see the 1st Schedule to the CPC). This meant that bail was not available to the Applicant as of right although the court could, in its discretion, decide to offer bail (see Fatimah bte Kumin Lim v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 547 at [24]).

In the Applicant’s first application for bail pending appeal before the District Judge, the usual bail principles were considered and were applied to the factual matrix of this case. This included a consideration of the Applicant’s flight risk, his ties with Singapore, the resources available to the Applicant, and whether the security imposed would be sufficient to secure his attendance before the appellate court (see Public Prosecutor v Ding Si Yang [2014] SGDC 295 at [128]–[129]; see also Public Prosecutor v Adith s/o Sarvotham [2014] 3 SLR 649 (“Adith”) at [29]). As mentioned above at [6], the District Judge denied this application.

The first question which I had to address was what principles this court should apply in a case such as this which was a renewed application for bail pending appeal after an earlier...