Dephasing India's look East/Act east policy.

• Author: Bajpaee, Chietigj

India's "Look East" policy was launched in the early 1990s as part of a concerted effort to elevate the strategic importance of Southeast Asia in the country's foreign policy agenda. The policy has been described as going through various phases, with an accelerated pace and process of interaction in moving from one phase to the next, marked by a broadening and deepening of India's interaction with the region. This has culminated in the most recent "phase" under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which has rebranded the policy as "Act East" to signify a more pro-active and action-oriented approach towards the region. However, has there been any real and substantive change in India's engagement with Southeast Asia in moving from one "phase" to the next? Does this narrative of phases in India's post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia hold any substance? This article deconstructs the narrative of phases in India's Look East and now Act East policy and argues that India's eastward engagement has not been a process of simple linear progression. As such, while the concept of phases in India's Look East policy serves as a useful narrative device, it does not capture the nuances of India's post-Cold War re-engagement with Southeast Asia, which has been far more complex than this narrative suggests.

Keywords: Indian foreign policy, Look East, Act East, Southeast Asia, ASEAN.

The year 2017 marks twenty-five years of dialogue partnership, fifteen years of summit-level relations and five years of strategic partnership between India and ASEAN. The relationship between India and Southeast Asia has come a long way from the days of mutual mistrust rooted in concerns over India's naval ambitions in the 1980s; (1) New Delhi's support for Vietnam following its invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1978 and recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in 1980; (2) and Indian perceptions of ASEAN as "an instrument of neo-colonialism and a reincarnation of SEATO [South-East Asia Treaty Organization]" following its creation in 1967. (3) Undoubtedly, India's economic interactions, institutional linkages and security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries have grown in leaps and bounds in the post-Cold War period.

The "Look East" policy, which was launched in the early 1990s as part of an effort to re-engage with Southeast Asia, has been characterized by Indian scholars and policymakers as evolving through various "phases", with an accelerated pace and process of interaction in moving from one phase to the next. (4) This has been marked by a broadening and deepening of India's engagement with the region: broadening as the policy has expanded beyond its initial geographic focus on Southeast Asia to encapsulate the broader East Asia and now Indo-Pacific region; and deepening to expand beyond its initial focus on economic integration towards greater political interaction and security cooperation. This has culminated in the most recent "phase" under Prime Minister Narendra Modi who assumed power in 2014 and rebranded the policy as "Act East" to signify a shift towards a more pro-active and action-oriented approach to the region. (5)

However, is the recently rebranded Act East policy real? In other words, has there been any real and substantive change in India's engagement with Southeast Asia under its most recent "phase"? More broadly, does the narrative of phases in India's post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia hold any credence? One could argue that the various phases of the Look East policy are rooted in domestic political rhetoric rather than foreign policy shifts as new governments have sought to differentiate their policymaking approach from previous administrations. Notably, the first phase corresponds with the Congress (Indian National Congress) government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao that came to power in 1991, while the second phase was unveiled by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) government in the early 2000s after it assumed power in 1998-99 and continued under the Congress government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2004. Finally, the rebranded Act East policy emerged under the BJP government of Narendra Modi in 2014. Thus, each so-called phase of the Look East policy can be regarded as a mere rebranding exercise as new governments seek to rhetorically distinguish themselves from their predecessors.

This article separates rhetoric from reality by seeking empirical evidence of the various phases of India's Look East/Act East policy. In doing so, it seeks to validate the basis for the evolution of India's post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia. In deconstructing the narrative of phases, the article argues that India's relationship with Southeast Asia has not been a process of simple linear development. Rather, exogenous factors such as the 1997-99 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) and India's nuclear tests in 1998 have contributed to a non-linear progression in India's eastward engagement. In this context, India's Look East policy has been subject to peaks and troughs with some elements of the so-called later phases--such as the expanding geographic scope of the policy and focus on security cooperation--evident from the very inception of the policy while other elements --such as the expanded Indo-Pacific orientation under the current Act East policy--remain a work in progress. This alludes to the fact that much of the rhetoric regarding the Look East policy is aspirational rather than reflecting the reality of India's post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia.

As such, while the concept of phases in India's Look East policy serves as a useful narrative device, it does not capture the nuances of India's post-Cold War re-engagement with Southeast Asia, which has been far more complex than this narrative suggests. In other words, although there is some evidence to posit a qualitative change between the various so-called phases of the Look East policy, the narrative of distinct phases is not as definite and clear-cut as the literature represents it to be. After a brief overview on the origins of the Look East policy, this article first identifies and then challenges the basis for the various phases of the policy, culminating in the most recent Act East policy under the Modi administration.

Launching Look East

India launched its Look East policy in the early 1990s as part of a concerted effort to elevate the strategic importance of Southeast Asia in the country's foreign policy agenda. (6) What distinguished India's post-Cold War re-engagement with Southeast Asia from previous periods of engagement was the fact that it was operating on multiple fronts by complementing the country's longstanding historical, cultural and ideological links with the region with growing economic interdependence, political engagement and shared security interests. In this context, the Look East policy was seen as a "recalibration rather than a reincarnation" of India's engagement with Southeast Asia, which placed greater emphasis on substantive engagement over rhetorical claims of "third world solidarity". (7)

Although there is some dispute over the exact origins of the policy, the establishment of India's sectoral dialogue status with ASEAN in 1992 is most frequently cited as the start of the policy. The policy itself was enunciated during a speech by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao during a visit to Singapore in 1994 when he called for "forging a new relationship" with the region (though there was no mention of the term "Look East"). (8) In its annual report in 1992-93, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs noted that "India has decided to give a special policy thrust to its relations with the ASEAN", although the term "Look East Policy" was first mentioned in the 1995-96 report. (9) However, a precursor to the policy, known as the "Look East Destiny" was unveiled in the 1980s. (10)

At a bureaucratic level, Southeast Asia's increased importance in India's foreign policy priorities was reflected in relations with ASEAN being elevated from the Secretary (East) to the Foreign Secretary-level in 1992 and the Economic Cell of the Ministry of External Affairs identifying ASEAN as one of its "thrust regions". (11) This came amid a broader reorientation of India's foreign policymaking process with greater emphasis on its economic dimension, which was facilitated by the creation of the Economic Division as a separate cell within the Ministry of External Affairs. In this context, despite being launched by Rao's Congress government, the Look East policy maintained a non-partisan consensus as it became institutionalized in the country's foreign policy architecture. (12)

Externally, Singapore played a prominent role in facilitating New Delhi's renewed engagement with Southeast Asia by serving as a key proponent of India's sectoral partner and later dialogue partner status with ASEAN. (13) The expansion of ASEAN in the 1990s through granting membership to the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) gave impetus to deepening India's bond with ASEAN, given the geographic proximity of these countries to India. Notably, Vietnam's entry into ASEAN in 1995 turned India's longstanding relationship with that country from a source of mistrust in the India-ASEAN relationship into a source of strength. Myanmar also occupies a special place in the evolution of India's Look East policy given the country's geostrategic position at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia. (14) Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia are also important partners for India in the region: Indonesia as the region's largest country that straddles the Indian Ocean and South China Sea; Thailand as a gateway to the Indochina subregion; and Malaysia as the initial advocate for India's dialogue partnership with ASEAN in the 1970s. (15)

From Phase One to Phase Two

Several policymakers and scholars have drawn the distinction...