Democracy in Cambodia--one decade, US$5 billion later: what went wrong?

• Author: St John, Ronald Bruce

Introduction: Great Expectations

After more than two decades of civil war, the opposing factions in Cambodia concluded in October 1991 the Paris peace accords, four separate but related agreements. One of those pacts, the "Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict", called for the United Nations to create a transitional authority in Cambodia to serve as an interim force to run government ministries, verify disarmament, and organize elections for a constituent assembly. A second, the "Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia", called for international assistance for Cambodia's economic reconstruction. Collectively, the Paris agreements "constituted the institutionalisation of democratisation, providing the key ingredients and the mechanism for super-imposing them on the subject country: Cambodia" (Roberts 2001, p. xv). (1) Donor nations later met in Tokyo in June 1992, pledging US$880 million towards the reconstruction of Cambodia. At the same time, they agreed to form an International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) to assist in planning and managing reconstruction programmes once a new Cambodian government had been formed [Sanger 1992; Heininger 1994, pp. 56-57).

As provided in the 1991 agreements, the forces of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) were in operation by early 1993 in what became the largest, most sophisticated post-Cold War UN intervention to that time. UNTAC forces subsequently proved generally successful in resettling refugees and organizing nationwide elections (Brown and Zasloff 1998, pp. 91-161; Shenon 1993). They were far less successful in implementing a ceasefire and disarming competing political forces, most especially the Khmer Rouge. In a harbinger of things to come, UNTAC also experienced problems in containing violence and promoting human rights [Mallet 1993; Hughes 1996, pp. 43-71).

Given the pervasive atmosphere of threat and intimidation during the campaign, the actual conduct of elections was a huge success, largely free of violence. On the first day of balloting, voters lined up in driving monsoon rains, often hours before the polls opened. In the course of the six-day polling period (23-28 May 1993), more than 89 per cent of registered voters, an estimated 97 per cent of Cambodians eligible to vote, cast their ballots in Cambodia's first national election in 21 years. When the votes were counted, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia [FUNCINPEC) won 45 per cent of the ballots and 58 of 120 Constituent Assembly seats; the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), 38 per cent and 51 seats; the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), 4 per cent and ten seats; and the Moulinaka Party, 1 per cent and one seat. The remaining 16 political parties contesting the election won only a handful of votes and no assembly seats (United Nations 1993; Hughes 2003, pp. 115-16).

Exactly what Cambodians voted for in 1993 has remained a highly controversial subject. In Cambodia, the Western concept of a loyal opposition was an imported idea alien to traditional political culture in a country where no government had ever given up power without fighting. In this context, observations by journalist John Brown in the immediate aftermath of the 1993 elections proved both thoughtful and clairvoyant: "There is evidence that Hun Sen and the CPP understand power only in absolutist terms. It is possible that for them, power is not shared, it is accumulated and protected. Governments are not transformed, they are over-thrown" (Brown 1993). William Shawcross, a veteran Cambodia watcher, best captured the atmosphere prevailing in the summer of 1993. "Over most of the country, people had voted for peace, for reconciliation, for [Prince] Sihanouk, and, perhaps above all, for change". He concluded "it was a lot to hope for" (Shawcross 1994, pp. 20-23, quote p. 23). In the end it proved far too much to hope for.

FUNCINPEC, launched by King (then Prince) Sihanouk in the 1980s, emerged from the elections as the largest and most successful political party; but its plurality in the Constituent Assembly was three seats short of a majority. Second in the balloting, the CPP retained the largest armed force and the most effective administrative structure in Cambodia. Since neither party commanded the two-thirds majority necessary to pass a new constitution, FUNCINPEC and the CPP were forced to cooperate. After tough negotiations, the two parties in late June 1993 reached agreement on a power-sharing arrangement, forming the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC). Prince Ranariddh, the head of FUNCINPEC, and Hun Sen, the CPP head, designated themselves co-chairmen as well as co-ministers of defence, interior, and public security, with the remainder of the Cabinet providing 13 places for FUNCINPEC, including the important ministries of finance and foreign affairs, 16 places for CPP, three for the BLDP, and one for Moulinaka. The power-sharing arrangement also provided for each CPP minister to have a FUNCINPEC deputy and vice versa, strengthening Ranariddh's capacity to be a patron and distributor of largesse and helping to explain his acceptance of the deal. In addition, the formation of the PNGC had the benefit of stabilizing the immediate post-election period, leading to the adoption by the Constituent Assembly of a new constitution which restored King Sihanouk to the throne, an event viewed with considerable nostalgia by war-weary Cambodians. The constitution transformed the Constituent Assembly into a National Assembly and opened the way in October 1993 for the formation of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) (Jennar 1995, pp. 5-31; Thayer 1993; Roberts 2001, pp. 126-49; Hughes 2003, pp. 117-18).

Even though the CPP lost the 1993 election, it still demanded equal power in the coalition; and in theory, the ensuing power-sharing agreement was a 50:50 arrangement. In practice, the CPP used its power and reach at lower levels of government, deeply ingrained after 1979, to outmanoeuvre FUNCINPEC, progressively accumulating a disproportionate share of political power after 1993. In so doing, it soon became apparent the Cambodian political elite was not as committed to democracy as the Cambodian people. The power-sharing arrangement in 1993 was the first in a series of such agreements between the two parties over the next decade. Increasingly dominated by CPP, the cumulative impact of these agreements soon made oxymoronic the very thought of power-sharing in Cambodia (Roberts 2001, pp. 122, 124, 164-65, 207).

Noble Vision

Following approval of the new constitution, the Royal Government of Cambodia in March 1994 presented a national development plan to the International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC). The vision articulated in the National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia included reform of the state, its institutions, and its public service in order to attain political and socio-economic priorities; reliance on private entrepreneurship and the free market as engines of growth; and strengthened self-reliance to reduce dependence on external financial and technical assistance. In turn, the overriding objective of the plan, as articulated by the RGC, was "to achieve a fair, just and peaceful society and, through accelerating the rate of economic growth, to raise the living standards of all Cambodia people" (Royal Government of Cambodia 1994, p. 2). (2)

To accomplish these targets, the plan outlined five reinforcing strategies. First, the RGC planned to promote economic stabilization and growth through policies promoting long-term economic management, foreign investment, and private entrepreneurship. Second, it intended to reform the administrative and judicial institutions of the state through a clarification of the roles and responsibilities of administrators, together with the creation of fair and effective legal institutions. Third, the government sought to ensure structural adjustment and sectoral reform through the creation of codes of commerce and investment. Fourth, it planned to encourage and support sustained development by addressing infrastructure needs, expanding access to social services, and upgrading human skills. Finally, the RGC hoped to optimize the utilization of natural resources through conservation management and the effective protection of the environment (Royal Government of Cambodia 1994, pp. ii-iv).

The goals outlined in the National Programme were highly ambitious given Cambodia's recent history. Under Democratic Kampuchea (1975-79), the country was subjected to a radical economic, political, and social revolution in which the cities were emptied, the economy dismembered, and a large number of citizens killed (Twining 1989, pp. 109-50; Kiernan 1996, pp. 36-119; Short 2004). The economy slowly improved over the next decade; however, Cambodia remained largely isolated, suffering from the combined impact of civil war and an international embargo (Gottesman 2003; Slocomb 2003; Nepote and de Vienne 1993, pp. 85-186).

Given this background, Cambodia's revised strategy for development, with its emphasis on social justice, national reconciliation, and economic growth, was exactly what international donors wanted to see and largely explains their early support for the power-sharing arrangement embodied in the Royal Government of Cambodia. Responding enthusiastically to the coalition government's plan, representatives from 30 nations and 12 multinational bodies pledged US$773 million in emergency aid to Cambodia in March 1994, lauding its progress in curbing inflation, boosting tax revenues, and stabilizing the currency (St John 1995a, p. 679).

Brutal Reality

The ruling coalition experienced regular crises after 1993 but remained intact for almost four years. The leading parties in the coalition...