Commercial Union Assurance Co plc v Lee Siew Khuan

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chan Sek Keong J
• Judgment Date: 29 November 1990
• Neutral Citation: [1990] SGHC 96
• Docket Number: District Court Appeal No 35 of
• Date: 29 November 1990
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1990
• Plaintiff Counsel: Gan Hiang Chye (Allen & Gledhill)
• Citation: [1990] SGHC 96
• Defendant Counsel: David Hew (Cooma Lau & Loh)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,Valuation of diamond gold ring by an advocate and solicitor,Qualification of expert witness,Insurance,No finding as to when and where property was lost,Words and Phrases,Experts,Whether plaintiff failed to prove his claim,'All Risks' policy,Loss of personal property,Property insurance,'Expert',Whether qualified as expert witness

Cur Adv Vult

This is an appeal by the defendants against the decision of the district judge ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $24,000 for the loss of a diamond gold ring (the diamond ring) and $400 for the loss of a Dupont diamond-studded ball-pen (the Dupont pen), and interest thereon.

The plaintiff` s claim was made under an ` All Risks` insurance policy issued by the defendants and was for the value of lost property covered by the said policy. The plaintiff had claimed the sum of $44,000 ($14,400 for a Rolex watch with diamonds and $30,000 for the ring) and damages to be assessed for the Dupont pen, cash of A$1,000 and cash of $600. The cash claims were withdrawn at the commencement of the hearing. The claim for the loss of the Rolex watch failed for lack of evidence of value.

The plaintiff` s case, as pleaded in the statement of claim, was as follows:

2 During the currency of the policy, namely, between 30 Nov ember 1986 to 3 December 1986 whilst on a visit to Perth, Australia, the plaintiff lost the insured property together with [the pen and the said cash].

(3) On the plaintiff` s return to Singapore, a police report was immediately lodged on 4 December 1986. The defendants were also notified of the loss by the plaintiff verbally on the telephone on or about 4 December 1986. Subsequently, on 15 Decem ber 1986, the plaintiff completed and returned the defendant` s proclaim form.

The defendants filed a defence in which they pleaded various defences. That which is relevant to this appeal was that the plaintiff was put to strict proof of his claim.

The plaintiff gave evidence of how he came to lose the insured property. In essence, he could not account for how and when they were lost except that he could not find them when he opened his briefcase the second day after he came back from Perth on 2 December 1986. The night before he had opened his briefcase at home but found nothing a miss. He made a police report in which he stated the value of the ring as $34,000 and that of the Rolex watch as $14,000. He was cross-examined severely by counsel for the defendants during which he admitted a number of discrepancies in his account of when or how the properties were lost.

The district judge, in his grounds of decision, made a comprehensive examination of the plaintiff` s evidence, discrepancies and all. He found as a fact the plaintiff had lost the insured property but made no finding on when and where the articles were lost. He concluded thus:

All the abovementioned matters [the discrepancies], however, are not of crucial importance. What was of utmost importance was whether the plaintiff` s evidence that the items were lost could be accepted as true. The defendants had not alleged fraud on the part of the plaintiff. I heard the plaintiff` s evidence in court. I scrutinized his evidence. I was more than satisfied that he was telling the truth when he said he had lost the items.

Counsel for the appellants has urged me to find to the contrary on the ground that the plaintiff` s account of the loss was inherently incredible or incomprehensible. I do not agree that the plaintiff` s account was of this character. If a person, after coming home from office, finds missing an article, say a Parker pen, which he has put in his briefcase earlier in the morning, it is unlikely that he can tell when or how that thing became missing. He may be able to account for his own movements with his briefcase, but that would be all. Accounting becomes even more difficult after a five-day trip abroad. It would be wrong for me to disagree with the district judge`s finding that the plaintiff did lose the insured articles as his finding was based on an assessment of the plaintiff` s credibility as a witness.

Counsel also contended that since the district judge failed to make a finding on when and where the articles were lost, the plaintiff had failed to prove his claim on the pleadings . He further submitted that on the evidence, the articles could have been lost in Singapore as the plaintiff did not discover the loss until the second day after his return to Singapore. He cited the following authorities: Bullen and Leake and Jacob ` s Precedents of Pleadings (12th Ed) at p 71; Blay v Pollard [1930] 1 KB 628 and Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corp [1956] AC 218 at p 241.

Counsel placed particular reliance on Regina Fur Co Ltd v Bossom [1958] 2 Lloyd` s Rep 425. In that case, RF had insured their furs with the defendant, an underwriter, under a Lloyd` s ` All Risks ` policy. The claim was pleaded as follows:

On or about 23 August 1956 a quantity of furs and/or skins was stolen from the plaintiff`s place of business at 190,

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