Collector of Land Revenue v Ang Thian Soo

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chan Sek Keong J
• Judgment Date: 09 February 1990
• Neutral Citation: [1990] SGCA 1
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 87 of 1988
• Date: 09 February 1990
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1990
• Plaintiff Counsel: Woo Tchi Chu and Philip Jeyaretnam (Robert WH Wang & Woo)
• Citation: [1990] SGCA 1
• Defendant Counsel: Michael Khoo and Josephine Low (Michael Khoo & BB Ong)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: s 33(1)(a) Land Acquisition Act (Cap 152),Date for determination of market value of land,Market value as affected by improvements to land,Compensation payable,Compulsory acquisitions,Land

Cur Adv Vult

This is an appeal by the Collector of Land Revenue (the Collector) against the decision of the Land Appeals Board (the Board) in respect of an award of compensation made under s 33(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition Act (Cap 152) (the Act) for the acquisition of a dwelling house on 25 March 1985 (the date of acquisition).

The acquired property was a two and a half storey detached house built on 11,325 sq ft of land and known as 25-A, Track 24, Punggol Road. Prior to February 1971, when permission was granted to the previous owner to build the house with a septic tank, the land on which it was to be erected was vacant land. Construction of the house was completed by October 1973, except for the septic tank and the access road, drains and culvert which had not been completed. These outstanding works were completed during 1974-1975 and the certificate of fitness was issued on 6 May 1975. The respondent in this appeal (the owner) bought the house at a mortgagees` sale on 24 July 1980 at the price of $335,000.

The statutory provision for assessing compensation payable for acquired land applicable to these proceedings was s 33(1)(a) of the Act before it was amended in 1988. It then provided as follows:

In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Board shall, subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), take into consideration the following matters and no others:

(a) the market value as at 30 November 1973, or the market value as at the date of the publication of the notification under section 3(1) if the notification is within 6 months from the date thereof followed by a notification under section 5 in respect of the same land or part thereof, or the market value as at the date of the publication of the notification made under section 5, whichever is the lowest;

A plain reading of the above section would require the Board to determine the market value of the acquired property as at the dates prescribed therein (the prescribed dates), viz (1) 30 November 1973 (the earlier date) and (2) the date of acquisition (which expression is used herein to refer to either of the relevant prescribed dates other than the earlier date), and then to award compensation based on the lower market value so determined.

The Collector determined the lower market value as at the earlier date and awarded $236,450 ($28.88 psf). The owner appealed and the Board decided that the only market value applicable to the house was that to be determined as at the date of acquisition. On that ruling, the Board awarded compensation therefor in the amount of $670,000 ($59.16 psf) as the market value at the date of acquisition.

The Board, in its oral decision, said, without elaboration:

As regards the law, we are of the view that the material date in this case must be the date of acquisition.

In this appeal, the Collector has contended that the decision of the Board was wrong and that the compensation payable is the lower of the market values of the house determined as at each of the prescribed dates by reference to the state and condition of the house existing at the date of acquisition , using the expression `state and condition` in the widest sense to include its physical state as well as its permitted or actual use.

The Collector has also appealed against the quantum of compensation on the ground that the Board was wrong in using the property price index to determine the market value when there was evidence of comparable sales. However, this part of the appeal will become unnecessary if the Collector succeeds against the first decision of the Board. In such event, the parties have agreed that the market value of the house as at 30 November 1973 would be $260,000.

Although the Board has not explained how it arrived at its decision on the material date of evaluation, the basis is set out in the following passages in the record of the proceedings (at pp 433-434):

Commissioner: Now we come to the difficult one in our case. At the date of acquisition, there was a property used as a residential property in every respect. At the date that is provided in the Act, November 1973, there was a building on this land, it was meant for residential use, but was it a residential property ?

Mr Woo: I think the real question is whether this Board can give a market value to it as at 1973 and if the answer is yes, then you must apply 1973 value.

Commissioner: That is a point. The answer is that the Board can give a value to that residential property in that state it was without a septic tank, without culvert, without a certificate.

Mr Woo: Except in this case we have agreed ...

Commissioner: It is an uncompleted building.

Mr Woo: We have agreed on the figure as at 1973.

Commissioner: We know you have agreed.

Mr Woo: That has simplified it a bit.

Commissioner: Quantum doesn`t come in. The question is was property the same as the property that was acquired in 1985. That is the difficulty isn`t it? You say yes, and if we look at it from the point of view of what is fair, the popular concept now, is it fair to value it in the same way - one is completed, the other is not completed.

Mr Woo: I think we can look at the Act.

Commissioner: The Robinson`s case comes in. We are dealing with acquisition. If there is any doubt in interpretation, an interpretation favourable to the appellant must be given. Firstly, one has to be fair. Secondly, if there is a doubt, an interpretation favourable to the appellant has to be given.

Mr Woo: My interpretation is very clear. My Lord, it is at market value as at November 1973.

Commissioner: I think we have got your point. I will discuss it with the assessors on the legal issue. Now, we come to valuation.

The observations of the Commissioner formed the basis of the Board`s decision that the house at the date of acquisition was not the same as it was on 30 November 1973: it was not the same as it had no septic tank, culverts and a certificate of fitness at the earlier date. The house in 1973 was not only, physically, an uncompleted building but it was also, legally, not habitable. It seems clear from the above passages that when the Board decided that the house in its acquired state was not the same as it was in 1973, it meant that the additional works had changed the character of the house.

It is also apparent from the record of the proceedings that the Board`s decision followed its previous decision made in July 1987 in the case of Lee Suat Hong v Collector of Land Revenue (Appeal No AB413 of 1982) (unreported). In that case, the Board decided that the acquired flat, being one in a block of flats erected after 1973 on the acquired land, could not be evaluated as at the earlier date on the ground that it had not existed on such date. That decision was founded on the Board`s understanding of what was decided by the Court of Appeal in O fficial Assignee of the property of Prabhaker Chandulal Shah v Collector of Land Revenue [1984] 1 MLJ 155 (hereinafter called `HM Forces`).

In this appeal, counsel for the owner contended that the decision of the Board was correct, having regard to its decision in Lee Suat Hong and that of the Court of Appeal in HM Forces . He submitted further that the acquired house should be treated as vacant land in 1973 on the ground that it was so treated by the Comptroller of Property Tax for the purpose of property tax prior to the issue of the certificate of fitness in 1975: on this basis, the acquired land was not the same as it was in 1973.

Counsel for the Collector contended that the decisions of the Board in the present case and in Lee Suat Hong were both wrong, that the Board misinterpreted the decision in HM Forces which properly understood, was not inconsistent with...