Chung Jia Hwa v Tan Chor Mui

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeSowaran Singh
Judgment Date02 May 2007
Neutral Citation[2007] SGDC 134
CourtDistrict Court (Singapore)
Year2007
Published date11 June 2007
Plaintiff CounselRaymond Yeo (Jen Koh & Partners)
Defendant CounselMark Yeo (Engelin Teh Practice LLC)
Citation[2007] SGDC 134

2 May 2007

District Judge Sowaran Singh:

Brief Background and Issues

1 The Petitioner (husband) and Respondent (wife) married on 3rd November 2000. The husband is an Executive Director of a local company earning more than $19,000 a month (inclusive of bonuses and commissions etc). She is a Flight Attendant with a North American airline earning a gross monthly basic salary of $1,481 (excluding allowances).

2 The husband commenced divorce proceedings on the 30 June 2005 citing unreasonable behaviour on her part. The wife cross-petitioned on the grounds of adultery and alternatively his unreasonable behaviour. An agreement was reached and the divorce was given on both the petition and cross petition. The decree nisi was granted on the 17 March 2006 and the ancillaries adjourned to chambers.

3 It was a childless marriage. The wife remained employed as a Flight Attendant before, during and after the marriage. The matrimonial home is a freehold private condominium unit at 300 Tanjong Katong Road #05-08 Chelsea Lodge, Singapore 437083 (the “condo”). It was purchased in 2001 after their marriage. The husband left the home in December 2004 and the wife continues to reside therein.

4 The husband subsequently applied for leave to extract the Certificate of Making the Decree Nisi Absolute (it was granted on the 11 August 2006) as the party cited was expecting his child and he wanted to formally marry her prior to the birth. Leave was granted for him to do so and he has since re-married with the child being now 7 months old.

5 One of the orders made by consent (paragraph 3(4)) was for the husband to pay for the wife’s psychiatrist’s fees amounting to $1,324.65. It was agreed that for the “… avoidance of doubt, these are one time payment and the Petitioner shall not be responsible for any other recurrent charges.

6 Although the twin issues of maintenance for the wife and the distribution of the matrimonial home and other assets were relatively straightforward, the hearing was specially scheduled for half a day as there was a wide gulf between the quantum and extent of their competing claims.

The Law

7 Judith Prakash, J in Wong Suit Kam v Tan Beng Wah Benny [2006] 2 SLR 601 had to consider the division of matrimonial assets (s 112 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353). Her Honour clarified that the court had to consider all the circumstances of the case when deciding what would be a just and equitable division between the parties of the matrimonial assets or the proceeds of their sale. The financial contributions made by each party to the acquisition of the assets constituted only one of the factors to be taken into account. Among the other factors were the extent of the contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family, the giving of assistance or support by one party to the other, the ages of the parties and the duration of the marriage and the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage had or was likely to have had in the foreseeable future as well as any physical disability that either party might be under.

8 In a more recent judgment delivered on behalf of the Court of Appeal, Judith Prakash, J in Koh Bee Choo v Choo Chai Huah [2007] SGCA 21 at paragraphs 46 and 49 reiterated that the division of matrimonial property involves the sound application of judicial discretion by the judge of first instance rather than any rigid mathematical formulae. Citing Lord Nicholas of Birkenhead in White v White, her Honour observed that the outcome ought to be fair as possible in all the circumstances. But everyone’s life is different. Features which are important when assessing fairness differ in each case.

9 Generally speaking, both parties to a marriage should be entitled to an equitable share of the assets that they had a hand in acquiring whether directly or indirectly. The Court of Appeal in Lim Choon Lai v Chew Kim Heng [2001] 3 SLR 225, observed that the division of matrimonial assets is not an exact science and each judge would have his own view as to what would be a just and equitable division in a particular case. LP Thean JA summed up the principles when ordering the division of matrimonial assets as follows, at [14]:

In determining a ‘just and equitable’ division of matrimonial assets under s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter, the court must, as directed by s 112(2), have regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case at hand … However, this does not mean that the court should engage in a meticulous investigation and take an account of every minute sum each party has paid or incurred in the acquisition of the matrimonial assets … and then make exact calculations of each party’s contributions. The court must necessarily take a broader view than that … At the end of the day, taking into account both the financial and non-financial contributions, the court would adopt a broad-brush approach to the issue and make a determination on the basis of what the court considers as a ‘just and equitable’ division.

10 On the issue of maintenance the court has to have regard to all the circumstances of the cases including the various factors laid down in section 114 of the Charter and on the facts of this case, to section 114(1) (c ) and (e) which state:

(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage.

(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage

and 114(2) which reads:

In exercising its powers under this section, the court shall endeavour so to place the parties as far as it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other.

The assets that were divided

11 The main asset was the condo. It was valued by the parties between $480.000 (by the wife) and $505,000 (by the husband). Both parties were agreed that this property ought to be sold in the open market. However, it was their common position that it would result in a negative equity.

12 The outstanding housing loan to the OCBC was about $295,000. The parties CPF contributions towards the purchase of the property were in round figures 60 % (59.64%) by the husband and 40% (40.36%) by the wife.

13 The wife wanted an equal division of the proceeds if there was no loss. However, if there was to be a loss, she wanted the husband to bear it entirely after her full share of the CPF funds used to purchase the condo had been topped up.

14 The husband claimed that, in addition, he had used the following sums towards the property:

(a) Cash upfront payment: $135,000

(b) Renovation: $15,000

(c) Furnishings: $15,870

(d) Conservancy charges: $11,700

(e) Property tax: $4,800

15 The Respondent disputed the quantum paid for items (b) and (c) above and suggested that an arbitrary sum of $15,000 should be allowed as there was no satisfactory evidence presented by the Petitioner to prove these expenses. Nevertheless, the court decided to accept the Petitioner’s claims in the interest of a broad-brush approach. The parties direct contributions to the condo would then be as follows: Petitioner 74.3% and the Respondent 25.7% if all these sums above were taken into account.

16 The husband claimed that he had the following other assets:

(a) Stocks and shares: $60,404

(b) DBS bank account (xxx): $174,000

The wife disputed the above two sums strenuously.

17 On the stocks and shares she took the position that the sum was $63,365 as of 30 September 2006. She also complained that the Petitioner's current holdings were never disclosed by the husband.

18 On the DBS account No: 003-02240-7, she again had a complaint and one which was a credible one. Initially the Petitioner claimed that this sum was only $164,206.73. Following disclosure orders made, it emerged that this sum was $414,737.77 on the 30 April 2005. The Petitioner averred on oath that the monies in this account also belonged to his sisters. At one stage the Petitioner claimed that he had withdrawn $10,000 per month for his own monthly expenses from this account to explain away a reduction of some $200,000. Subsequently further documents that were ordered to be produced by him revealed two cheque withdrawals of $100,000 and $150,000 which he now claimed were the return of monies placed by his sisters. However, no affidavit was filed by the sisters.

19 Fuller details of the attempts made by the husband to conceal and dissipate this asset are found in the Respondent's submissions D1 at pages 17 to 25 (paragraph 37 onwards to paragraph 66). Her submission is that the sum in this DBS account should have been $414,000. The court accepts this submission and draws an adverse inference against the husband in view of his attempts to conceal the details of this account and to dissipate the sums therein. It was not possible for the court to fully determine whether the Petitioner had in fact other assets that were not disclosed. However, given his conduct as noted above, this was something that could be not excluded.

20 Litigants like the Petitioner who seek to muddy the river of evidence by hiding or dissipating their matrimonial assets must expect the court to express its strong disapproval and reflect this censure when it comes to making an award for division. The court was of the view that the Petitioner’s conduct could not be allowed to go unnoticed. In addition, the court had also to assume that there was a strong likelihood that the Petitioner had other hidden assets which were as yet untraced and the quantum of which could not be determined with any precision. Hence, the court was of the view that a slightly higher share of these assets could be given to the Respondent as it was, in all the circumstances of the case, just and equitable to do so.

21 The wife asked for an equal division...

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