Chinese naval strategy in the South China Sea: an abundance of noise and smoke, but little fire.

• Author: Goldstein, Lyle

South China Sea Naval Strategy

Since 2009, the South China Sea has become a focal point of tensions in East Asia. While perhaps not as dangerous as the explosive and unpredictable situation on the Korean Peninsula, tensions in the South China Sea now demonstrate a number of troubling characteristics, including but not limited to rapidly changing power dynamics, arms racing, multiple actors with widely divergent interests, heated rhetoric and popular nationalism, untapped energy resources and a panoply of historical grievances. However, the importance of the South China Sea question may stretch well beyond Southeast Asia. Indeed the South China Sea could be an essential bellwether for determining the future trajectory of the US-China relationship: a relationship that may well determine if the present century is more peaceful than the one that preceded it.

A major gap in understanding the South China Sea issue is the problem of understanding Beijing's strategy. Indeed, a certain amount of ambiguity appears to be intentionally built into present Chinese policies. At this point, regional analysts have little beyond a few rather vacuous official pronouncements to try to parse the nature of Chinese national interests, corresponding objectives and plans to realize those objectives. Moreover, given other competing national priorities, contending bureaucratic agendas in Beijing, and the rather unprecedented nature of China's new status as a global power, it may be foolish to even assume that the national leadership in Beijing has settled on a coherent, integrated Chinese strategy for the South China Sea.

Nevertheless, a key input to the Chinese strategic decisionmaking calculus with regard to the South China Sea will be the assessments of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) leadership and that of influential Chinese naval strategists. This is not to argue that Chinese naval opinion will necessarily be decisive. Certainly other bureaucratic players, for example the Foreign Ministry or alternatively energy industry leaders, could be as or more important. Still, in so far as the South China Sea is considered a national security issue, military and particularly naval opinion is likely to matter. The central goal of this paper, therefore, is to try to reveal the nature of Chinese naval opinion--among both PLAN senior officers and also civilian naval strategists as well--with respect to sovereignty and security issues in the South China Sea.

Conventional Wisdom: The Growing Shadow over the South China Sea

Assessments of China's military strategy with respect to the proximate sea areas including the South China Sea sound ever more frenetic.

An Australian analysis from early 2011, for example, opined: "Governments around the Pacific are preparing for war with China ... behind closed doors, [senior strategists] ... are all terrified of China ... not just wary, or suspicious, or hedging their bets ... but existentially terrified." (1) The Economist's Banyan columnist observed recently: "China has ... provoked the suspicion of its neighbours. Its ships treat the seas as a Chinese lake. Its mysterious maps show Chinese sovereignty extending over areas far bigger that would be justified merely by reference to its claim to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos." (2)

The beginning of the latest round of tensions concerning the South China Sea appears to date from a March 2010 visit by US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and National Security Council advisor Jeffrey Bader to Beijing. During this visit, a report in the New York Times relates that they were told that "China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, now part of China's 'core interest' of sovereignty." (3) Apparently, the Chinese officials making these assertions were Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai and State Councilor Dai Bingguo. (4) Though the claim has been made by Beijing that Steinberg and Bader misinterpreted these remarks, it is also suggested by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Dai repeated the assertion at the May 2010 meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. (5) Reacting directly to Secretary Clinton's speech at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi is said to have been surprised and furious. (6) Suggesting a possible ominous turn in the wake of the ARF meeting, PLA Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde was quoted as saying: "We must pay close attention to changes in [regional] situations and the development of our mission [and] prepare ourselves for military struggle." (7)

At the same time, it is essential to look at state action as well political rhetoric. Two major incidents that form the backdrop of recent tensions include the April 2001 EP-3 surveillance aircraft incident, in which one Chinese pilot was killed and an American flight crew was gravely endangered, and the more recent March 2009 "Impeccable incident", in which a US hydrographic vessel was surrounded and harassed by five Chinese vessels. Both incidents occurred in the international waters off Hainan Island in the northern part of the South China Sea. A PLAN military exercise of major significance did apparently take place in early August 2010. It was unusual to deploy elements of the North Sea Fleet and also the East Sea Fleet into the South China Sea. This exercise is clearly illustrative of growing regional tensions.

These strains increased during 2011. In the spring, incidents reportedly occurred between Chinese patrol vessels and survey ships from both the Philippines and Vietnam. In the latter instance, which took place in May, it was reported that Vietnamese survey equipment sustained damage. Following this event, significant anti-China protests took place in Hanoi and the Vietnamese Navy engaged in live-fire drills." The rhetoric from Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, visiting Hawaii for consultations with US officials in late June 2011, seemed to suggest an ominous turn: "I believe the individual countries are actually playing with fire, and I hope the fire will not be drawn to the United States." (9) This type of rhetoric is certainly a significant departure from the generally polite exchanges and largely positive tone characteristic US-China summitry. Indeed, the threat of possible military conflict between China and the United States, which is clearly implied by Cui's statement, appears to illustrate the seriousness of the situation in the South China Sea, at least from Beijing's point of view.

Having briefly surveyed above some of the rhetoric, military exercises and certain dangerous incidents in recent years, it is also critically important to review new Chinese capabilities in the South China Sea since actions (or investments) always speak louder than words. In this respect, the expansion of Chinese naval facilities on Hainan Island is the most significant. While a base has existed for decades at Yulin, a new, larger facility at Yalong Bay just to the east was constructed over the last decade. Some of China's newest and most potent naval platforms have appeared intermittently at this new base. Indeed, the basing of China's first pair of phased-array radar equipped 052C destroyers at the base has been taken as a sign of the fleet's priority focus on the southern flank. (10) Photos of China's new second-generation nuclear submarines, including the 093 Shang-class fast attack submarine and also the 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine docked at the new base have also made headlines in recent years. (11) Indeed, not all submarine bases are outfitted to handle nuclear submarines and China had previously not deployed nuclear submarines except from their traditional base at Qingdao, so this represents a new development in Chinese submarine strategy. The fact that the base apparently has a large tunnel visible in satellite photographs, has also set off rumours. (12) The size of the base and its amply large piers does hint at the possibility of an enlarged Chinese South Sea Fleet, perhaps eventually including an aircraft carrier battle group, in addition to numerous submarines.

Recent reporting on Chinese aircraft carrier development does suggest substantial tangible progress, including especially the near-term employment of the ex-Soviet carrier Varyag for research and training--a development highlighted by the vessels recent sea trials. It is often suggested that PLAN aircraft carriers operating in the South China Sea could, as major symbols of power, intimidate the other, smaller claimants. Moreover, Chinese aircraft carriers could be useful for extending PLA air control into the southern reaches of the South China Sea--a capability that China still seems to lack. Other new capabilities that have or are set to be revealed include the Type 2208 fast attack craft, which seem ideally suited for lethal, high-intensity combat in the "near seas", and likely in the near term the new Type 056 corvette. Concerning the latter, Jane's reported that well over two dozen units are expected and that in so doing, the PLAN had a "requirement to increase ship numbers to better enforce territorial and EEZ [exclusive economic zone] claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea". (13) Finally, in so far as China wields significant missile capabilities for use against targets ashore and perhaps also at sea, the apparent movement of two missile brigades into the Guangzhou Military Region during 2010, as well as a possible Second Artillery cruise missile brigade and a large over-the-horizon radar on Hainan, have been reported as a concern. (14)

Still, the sharpest spear in the Chinese navy's arsenal remains its conventional submarine fleet. In this area, there has been steady progress with thirteen Song-class submarines launched between 1994 and 2004. Five of the more advanced Yuan-class were said to be launched by mid-2010. (15) Advanced Kilo-class conventional...