Chin Ah Loy v Attorney General

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Date: 1978
• Docket Number: Privy Council Appeal No 7 of
• Year: 1978
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Chin Ah Loy

Plaintiff

and

Attorney-General

Defendant

[1978] SGHC 65

Choor Singh J

High Court

Landlord and Tenant–Termination of leases–Tenancy determinable by three months' notice in writing–Correspondence–Warranty that tenancy would be secure as long as rules and regulations of tenancy agreement observed–No evidence of such breach–Whether tenancy could be terminated–Whether damages should be awarded for breach of contract

The plaintiff (“Chin”) had a tenancy agreement with the Government for a duty-free shop in the Singapore Airport. The tenancy agreement contained a clause stating “either party may terminate the tenancy at any time by giving to the other three (3) months' previous notice in writing”. Chin was given assurance, via a letter from the Director of Civil Aviation, that so long as he carefully observed “the rules and regulations” of the tenancy agreement, he could consider his tenancy as secure for the period in question. Chin subsequently exercised an option to extend the tenancy agreement for a further three years, with effect from 1 February 1975. The Government purported to terminate the agreement on 31 January 1975, and gave Chin three months' notice to this effect. Chin claimed for damages for a breach of the tenancy agreement.

Held, allowing the claim:

(1) Chin had projected a 10% growth rate for his sales and a 12% net profit. His profits would have been halved due to competition from another shop set up in front of his. Therefore, he was entitled to damages to the amount of $604,890: at [4].

Colin Ross-Munroe QC and Stephen Nathan (Baker & Mckenzie) for the plaintiff

J S Colyer QC and Chao Hick Tin (Jaques & Co) for the defendant.

Choor Singh J

1 Ifind for the plaintiff. The evidence clearly shows that the Government of Singapore committed a breach of the tenancy agreement when they terminated the plaintiff's tenancy of the shop in question. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that if not for the assurance given by the Director of Civil Aviation in his letter of 27 June 1975, that so long as the plaintiff carefully observed “the rules and regulations” of the tenancy agreement he could consider his tenancy as secure for the period in question, he would not have entered into the said agreement. By giving this assurance the Director of Civil Aviation bound the Government of Singapore not to invoke the termination clause so long as the plaintiff carried out his obligations under the tenancy agreement. The effect of this assurance was that the Government of Singapore could invoke cl 4 (i) of the agreement only when the plaintiff had committed some breach of the tenancy agreement.

2 The Government, having accepted the plaintiff's exercise of his option, the tenancy agreement was renewed and was in force for a further period of three years as from 1 February 1975 but on 31 January 1975 the Government purported to terminate the tenancy by invoking cl 4 (i) and giving the plaintiff three months' notice. The tenancy was renewed with effect from 1 February 1975 on the same terms and conditions which applied to the first term of three years. This meant that the Government could terminate the second term of three years only when they found the plaintiff had committed some breach of the tenancy agreement. On 31 January 1975 when the Government purported to terminate the second term by invoking cl 4 (i), the plaintiff had not committed any breach of the tenancy agreement. In fact the second term had not yet commenced. It commenced on 1 February 1975, but the notice to terminate the second term was given on 31 January 1975. The Government had no valid grounds at all to terminate the second term and dispossess the plaintiff. In my judgment, on the factual evidence in this case, which is not in dispute, the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the loss suffered by him for not being allowed to operate his shop for a period of two years and nine months.

3 It is submitted that the plaintiff can only recover his personal loss and that as the shop operated by him was a partnership business he could not recover the loss suffered by his brother, the other partner. I am unable to accept this submission. The plaintiff is the party to the tenancy agreement. This claim is brought by him as the lessee. What arrangement he had in regard to the sharing of the profits with his brother who helped him to operate the shop is irrelevant on the question of liability.

4 The real difficulty in this case is the assessment of damages for the loss suffered by the plaintiff. If the...