Chief Assessor, Singapore v Howe Yoon Chong

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chua F A J
• Judgment Date: 09 October 1984
• Neutral Citation: [1984] SGCA 21
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 1 of 1982
• Date: 09 October 1984
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1984
• Plaintiff Counsel: Lucy Hangchi (Inland Revenue)
• Citation: [1984] SGCA 21
• Defendant Counsel: P Selvadurai (Rodyk & Davidson)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Factors for consideration,Increase in annual value of property,Valuation,ss 17, 18(2), (4) & (7) Property Tax Act (Cap 140),art 12 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore,Revenue Law,Annual value,Property tax

This case has a long and chequered history. It started in October 1973, when the Chief Assessor, the appellant in this appeal, served a notice dated 1 October 1973 on Howe Yoon Chong, the respondent, under s 18(2) of the Property Tax Act (Cap 144) (`the Act`) proposing to amend the 1973 Valuation List by increasing the annual value of the property, Lot 61-134 or TSXXVII situate at Peck Hay Road, Singapore (the subject property) from $1,340 to $26,000 with effect from 4 April 1973. That proposed increase in the annual value arose from a notice of transfer dated 29 June 1973 given by the respondent to the appellant pursuant to s 17 of the Act informing the latter that an undivided one half share of the subject property had been transferred to the respondent on 4 April 1973 pursuant to a declaration of trust. The respondent objected to the proposed increase, but the objection was disallowed by the appellant. Thereupon the respondent appealed to the Valuation Review Board (`the Board`) under s 18(4) of the Act. Before the Board it was contended that (i) the 1973 Valuation List was invalid, (ii) since comparable properties, which had a much lower annual value than that proposed for the subject property, had not been revalued upwards, it would be unfair and unjust to increase the annual value of the subject property and to do so would be contrary to art 12 of our Constitution and (iii) the proposed annual value was manifestly excessive. All these arguments were rejected by the Board which confirmed the annual value proposed by the appellant.

Against the decision of the Board the respondent appealed to the High Court. Before the High Court the respondent contended that (i) the notice for the proposed increase under s 18(2) of the Act was invalid for the reason that the Appellant had no grounds under s 18(7) thereof which enabled him to issue the said notice and (ii) the 1973 Valuation List, in respect of which the appellant took action under s 18 of the Act, was in itself invalid for reasons that the preparation of the said Valuation List was contrary to the provisions of art 12 of our Constitution. The High Court accepted the first contention advanced and allowed the appeal.

The appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which held that (i) the notice of proposed increase in annual value of the subject property under s 18(2) of the Act was valid, (ii) the 1973 Valuation List was valid, (iii) there was no contravention of art 12 of the Constitution, (iv) under the Act a property must be assessed independently and correctly and once this was done it was immaterial that as a consequence other comparable properties were assessed incorrectly and (v) there was nothing to show that the Board erred in accepting the appellant`s proposed assessment of annual value of the subject property. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the decision of the Board.

Against that decision the respondent appealed to the Privy Council, where it was argued on behalf of the respondent that the 1973 Valuation List was defective and invalid, or alternatively that the subject property having been amended to its up-to-date value had not been fairly valued in comparison with similar properties which appeared on the Valuation List at values that were too low and hence the respondent`s rights under art 12 of our Constitution had been infringed. These arguments failed but the Privy Council held that the Court of Appeal did not consider the evidence on value which was before the High Court and that neither party addressed the Court of Appeal on the question of value which would be best determined by the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the case was sent back to the Court of Appeal for that court to remit it to the High Court to determine the question of value in the light of such evidence limited to value as the parties may put before it.

Pursuant to the judgment of the Privy Council, the case came before the High Court for determination of the question of value of the subject property. At the hearing further evidence was adduced by both parties pertaining to the question and the High Court determined the annual value of the subject property at $19,475 for the year 1973 with effect from 4 April 1973. Against that decision the appellant appealed and this case came before this court the second time. At the conclusion of the appeal we allowed the appeal with costs, here and below, to the appellants, set aside the order made by the High Court and confirmed the annual value of the subject property at $26,000 with effect from 4 April 1973.

The question before the High Court is essentially one of valuation of the subject property as at 4 April 1973. The subject property has an area of 1,381.9 sq m (14,875 sq ft) and is roughly squarish in shape with a 20 ft wide and 120 ft long finger-like projection leading to Peck Hay Road which obviously serves as an access to the property. Immediately adjoining the subject property on the north-eastern side thereof is Lot 61-126 which is fronting Peck Hay Road (the front lot), and the north-eastern side of the subject property is about 10 ft higher than the front lot and the finger-like projection slopes gently towards Peck Hay Road. From its north-east boundary the land rises gently to the south-west. However, at or near the south-west boundary thereof there is a steep slope to a height of about 15 ft above which is fronting a road reserve at Cairnhill Road. An earth drain of about one ft deep runs across the southern corner of the land.

According to the Master Plan the subject property is zone `residential` with a maximum density of 150 persons per acre. In the Microzoning Plan this property falls in an area where high rise development is permitted. As of April 1973 there were already erected high rise developments in the vicinity of the subject property.

The annual value of $26,000 as assessed by the appellant is computed in accordance with para (b) of the proviso to the definition of annual value under s 2 of the Act and represents 5% of the value of the subject property as at 4 April 1973 which is $520,625 calculated at the rate of $35 per sq ft. In arriving at this value the Appellant considered the sale of the front lot, namely: Lot 61-126, as the best guide. There is no dispute on this point: the respondent`s valuer, Tan Ah Bah, also expressed the view that the sale of the front lot is `the best guide in determining the value` of the subject property: see p 175 of the Record of Appeal. Coincidentally, that property was sold on 4 April 1973; the price paid by the purchaser was $41 per sq ft. The appellant therefore adopted this price of $41 per sq ft for the subject property, but he made two adjustments, namely:

(a) As the subject property is situate at the rear of the front lot with only a finger-like projection to Peck Hay Road, he gave a discount of 5% of the said value.

(b) In view of the steep slopes on the subject property and other physical features and the presence of the earth drain, he gave a further discount of 10% of the said value.

After deducting these two amounts he arrived at a value of approximately $35 per sq ft and the total value of the subject property came to $520,625.

The learned judge having accepted that the sale of the front...