Chiam Heng Hsien v Jurong Town Corp

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Lai Kew Chai J
• Judgment Date: 04 April 1985
• Neutral Citation: [1985] SGCA 5
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 48 of 1983
• Date: 04 April 1985
• Year: 1985
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: JB Jeyaretnam (JB Jeyaretnam & Co)
• Citation: [1985] SGCA 5
• Defendant Counsel: Harry Elias (Drew & Napier)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Breach of service conditions,Remedies available,Disciplinary tribunals,Termination,Disciplinary proceedings not carried out properly,Unfair dismissal,Question of appropriate relief,Administrative Law,Employment Law,Termination of service,Employee's breach of service conditions,Whether dismissal wrongful,Whether employment permanent,Probation and confirmation

By an agreement in writing made on 31 May 1971 the appellant was engaged by the respondent as the latter`s executive officer commencing from 1 June 1971. It was a term of the agreement that he was to be placed on probation for the first three years. However, after a year`s probation he was confirmed in his post with effect from 1 June 1972 and thereafter continued to serve as such executive officer. On 24 June 1976 the appellant received from the respondent a letter dated 23 June 1976 alleging that the appellant was in breach of r 111 of the terms and conditions of service of the respondent, in that the appellant had taken up part-time employment by becoming an active partner of the Mitre Hotel and also a partner of the Pavilion Restaurant. The appellant was immediately suspended from service. The appellant replied on 24 June 1979 explaining that he merely inherited his late father`s shares in the Mitre Hotel and Pavilion Restaurant business but was not an active partner as alleged. On 7 September 1976 the appellant was informed by the respondent that a formal hearing by the disciplinary committee of the respondent would be held on 15 September 1976. The appellant did not attend the hearing, having previously informed the secretary of the committee that he had nothing further to add to what he had said in his letter. Subsequently, the appellant received from the respondent a letter dated 5 November 1976 informing him that he had been found guilty of violation of r 111 of the terms and conditions of service and that his service with the respondent was terminated with effect from 23 June 1976. The appellant protested against the decision of the respondent.

On 13 October 1978 the appellant took out a writ against the respondent. In his statement of claim, as subsequently amended, the appellant alleged: (i) that the appellant was denied his right of appeal against the decision to dismiss him; (ii) that there was no evidence in law to warrant any finding that the appellant was guilty of any breach of r 111 of the terms and conditions of service of the respondent and the finding was wrong in law and (iii) that the proceedings against the appellant were conducted in breach of or alternatively contrary to the rules of natural justice or the duty to act fairly. On these grounds the appellant said that the decision to dismiss him was null and void and he claimed: (i) a declaration that the dismissal was null and void and a declaration that he had continued and was in the employment of the respondent in the position he held before 23 June 1976 and was entitled to be remunerated as such, or (ii) alternatively damages. The respondent initially in the defence denied that the dismissal of the appellant was wrongful, but at the commencement of the hearing in the High Court, the respondent with leave of the court amended the defence and conceded that the dismissal was wrongful and that the appellant was entitled to damages but not the declarations. So the issue before the court was one of appropriate relief to be given to the appellant.

The case was heard before FA Chua J and he held that the declarations sought for by the appellant ought not to be made and that his remedy lay in a claim for damages. He awarded to the appellant his salary for the period from 1 June 1976 to 5 November 1976 (the latter being the date the letter of dismissal was served on him) and a sum equivalent to three months` salary as damages. Not content with that decision the appellant appealed, contending that the learned judge erred in not granting the declarations sought and in holding that the appellant was only entitled to three months` salary as damages. At the conclusion of the appeal we dismissed it with costs to the respondent.

Mr Jeyaretnam on behalf of the appellant argued that upon a true construction of the terms and conditions of service under which the appellant was employed (terms and conditions of service) the respondent could not terminate his service except in circumstances where he had been found guilty, in accordance with the disciplinary procedure therein prescribed, of a breach of any provisions of rr 97 to 117 of the terms and conditions of service, and that the whole scheme of service as provided in the terms and conditions of service contemplated that an employee of the respondent such as the appellant upon confirmation would have permanence in his employment until he retired, unless either he resigned from his employment or was found guilty of misconduct which entitled the respondent to dismiss him summarily. As the appellant was wrongfully dismissed he was entitled to the declarations sought. This argument was not tenable and we were unable to accept it.

The terms of the appellant`s employment in so far as material are these. Under cl 2(f) of the agreement made on 31 May 1971 between the appellant and the respondent the appellant`s appointment was subject to the Employment Act (Cap 122) and to all the respondent`s `Regulations and Rules from time to time in force`. Section 10(1) of the Act provides that either party to a contract of service (employer or employee) may at any time give to the other party notice of his intention to terminate such contract. The length of notice shall be the same for both employer and employee and shall be determined by any provision made for such notice in the contract and in the absence of such a term shall be not less than the period as prescribed in s 10(3) of the Act; and the length of notice for determining a contract of service such as the appellant`s is not less than four weeks. Under s 11 of the Act, in force at the material time, either party to a contract may terminate the contract without notice or, if a notice has already been given in accordance with s 10 without waiting for the expiry of that notice, by paying to the other party a sum equal to the amount of salary which would have accrued to the employee during the term of such notice. The other terms pertaining to termination of the appellant`s employment are also found in cl 26 of the document headed `Memorandum of Terms and Conditions of Services Applicable to All Monthly Rated Permanent Officers of the Corporation` (the receipt of which the appellant had acknowledged), which clause stipulates as follows:

Unless otherwise provided, the appropriate notice period as prescribed in the `Terms and Conditions of Service` or a sum equivalent to the consolidated salary for the same period in lieu of notice must be given an Officer who desires to resign from the service of the Corporation. The Corporation itself is also governed by the same provision.

It was argued by Mr Jeyaretnam that this clause did not give to the respondent any right pertaining to termination of the appellant`s employment and the last sentence therefore merely meant that the respondent was bound to observe this term. Such an argument was plainly wrong; if that was the meaning intended, the sentence would be otiose. In our opinion full effect must be given to this sentence and it means that unless otherwise provided, the appropriate period of notice as prescribed in the terms and conditions of service or a sum equivalent to the `consolidated salary` for the same period in lieu of notice must also be given by the respondent should it wish to terminate the service of the appellant. We are reinforced in our view by the presence of r 66 of the terms and conditions of service, which reads as follows:

Subject to any provisions to the contrary in any agreement in writing with any particular employee, the Corporation in terminating the service of any employee without giving the requisite notice shall pay to the employee a sum

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