Cheong Yoke Ling @ Zhang Yuling and another v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 508 and others

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sheik Umar Bin Mohamed Bagushair
• Judgment Date: 28 December 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] SGDC 295
• Court: District Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 3 of 2020, Registrar’s Appeal Nos 32 and 36 of 2020
• Year: 2020
• Published date: 05 January 2021
• Hearing Date: 22 December 2020,24 November 2020,16 October 2020,27 October 2020
• Plaintiff Counsel: Yeo Teng Yung Christopher and Jason Yan Zixiang (Legal Solutions LLC)
• Defendant Counsel: Kang Hui Lin, Jasmin and Subir Singh Grewal (Aequitas Law LLP)
• Subject Matter: Land,Strata Titles,Meetings,Probate and Administration,Devolution on Legal Representatives
• Citation: [2020] SGDC 295

Ditrict Judge Sheik Umar Bin Mohamed Bagushair:

The Applicants are the executors of the estate (“Estate”) of Cheong Kim Koek, deceased (“Deceased”). The Deceased passed away on 19 July 2013. His will provided for the Applicants to be executors of the Estate. Probate was obtained on 28 October 2013. The Deceased owned Unit 53 (“Property”) located in a mixed 2-storey residential and commercial development (“Development”) at Upper East Coast Road managed by the 1st Respondent (“MCST”). The Development consists of four commercial units on the ground floor and four residential units on the second floor. At the material times, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents were the only council members of the MCST.

The Applicants commenced the OS seeking a number of reliefs. Broadly speaking, the reliefs related to two issues: the Applicants’ right to represent the Estate in matters relating to the Property, in particular to represent the Estate in general meetings of the MCST and in obtaining documents from the MCST; and the MCST’s right to remove certain fixtures on the Property and surrounding common property. The specific reliefs sought in the OS were: That the annual general meeting (“AGM”) held on 13 December 2019 (“2019 AGM”) along with all motions purportedly passed during the 2019 AGM be invalidated pursuant to Sections 103 and 104 of the Building and Maintenance and Strata Management Act (Cap 30C, 2008 Rev Ed) (“BMSMA”) for failure to provide sufficient notice and/or on the basis that the Applicants’ right to vote at the 2019 AGM has been improperly denied; That the court declares that the Applicants, as executors and trustees of the Estate, be entitled to act for and represent the Estate on all matters pertaining to the Estate’s assets including but not limited to the Property; That the court declares that all amounts claimed by the MCST against the Applicants for legal costs, costs of removing fixtures and installations belonging to the Estate and the late payment interest, is wrongful, along with an order that all monies paid under protest be repaid to the Applicants; That the court declares that the late payment interest of 30% per annum imposed by the MCST is exorbitant and unconscionable; That the MCST produces to the Applicants all records and/or documents under the MCST’s control pursuant to Sections 47 and 113 of BMSMA; Damages; and Costs of the application to be paid by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents personally to the Applicants on an indemnity basis.

The Respondents have several counterclaims. They seek a declaration that certain minutes of the MCST’s council meeting held on 23 April 2004 and 24 May 2004 (collectively, the “2004 Minutes”) are forged, a mandatory injunction that the Applicants remove and rectify certain fixtures from the Property and a declaration that the Applicants are not entitled to do any works in respect of the Property until a transmission of the Property is done. This last counterclaim in effect raises the same issues in the OS in that it requires a consideration of the Applicants’ right to represent the Estate in matters relating to the Property.

It is fair to say that the OS was in large part precipitated by the contentious 2019 AGM. The Respondents did not allow the Applicants to vote in the 2019 AGM, on the basis that the Property has not been properly transmitted from the Deceased to the Applicants, pursuant to the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 2004 Rev Ed) (“LTA”). There was also an important extraordinary general meeting (“EOGM”) held on 23 November 2018 (“2018 EOGM”). There are several other events of note, specifically the MCST’s removal of certain fixtures from the Property and surrounding common property in January and February 2019 (“2019 Fixtures Removal”). I will also need to refer to other ancillary proceedings, namely DC/OSS 232/2018, which was converted to DC/DC 2809/2019 (“DC 2809”), DC/DC 1511/2019 (“DC 1511”) and HC/OS 682/2029 (“OS 682”). DC 2809 has been withdrawn. OS 682 was dismissed, but an appeal has been filed.

Parties have filed a total of 18 affidavits. Where necessary I will discuss the facts when I discuss the specific issues.

I consider the following to be the issues that I have to determine: Whether I possessed the jurisdiction to grant the reliefs in the OS; Whether the court’s finding on standing in OS 682 is binding on me; Whether the Applicants had standing to attend, vote and appoint a proxy at the 2019 AGM, and if so, whether the 2019 AGM along with all motions passed at the AGM should be invalidated; Whether the Applicants had standing to request inspection of documents in the MCST’s custody or control pursuant to Section 47(1) of BMSMA; Whether the MSCT was wrong to have undertaken the 2019 Fixtures Removal and if so, whether the sum of $6,276 paid by the Applicants to the MCST under protest should be repaid; Whether the late payment interest of 30% levied by the MCST is unenforceable; and Whether a mandatory injunction should be granted for the removal of the rest of the Fixtures.

On 24 November 2020, I issued oral grounds, broadly in the manner set out in these grounds of decision. I granted the OS in part, but also found that the adjudication of several claims and counterclaims required the resolution of intensely factual matters that were not suited for adjudication via an originating summons action, and that they were to proceed via writ action. After issuing my oral grounds, I asked parties to submit on the specific orders that I should make in relation to the resolution of those claims and counterclaims. As parties were broadly of the view that no specific orders were required, I did not grant any specific directions, save that the claims and counterclaims are to be resolved via writ action otherwise than through the OS.

I also asked parties for costs submissions after I issued my oral grounds. After hearing parties, I fixed costs at $8,000 (all in) to be paid by the Respondents to the Appellants. The Respondents are liable jointly and severally for the costs. Pursuant to Section 87 of BMSMA, I also ordered that in respect of costs which the MCST will be paying, if the MCST is levying contributions on the subsidiary proprietors to pay those costs, the contributions are to be levied on all subsidiary proprietors save for the Applicants.

The Respondents have filed HC/RAS 32/2020 and HC/RAS 36/2020 and appealed against my decision.

Whether I possessed the jurisdiction to grant the reliefs in the OS

In its written submissions and at the hearing before me on 16 October 2020, the Respondents raised, for the first time, that I did not possess jurisdiction to grant the reliefs in the OS. The Respondents argued that the value of the Property likely exceeded $250,000. Since the OS seeks relief in respect of the Property (amongst other things), the Respondents argued that the OS sought relief in respect of a subject matter (the Property) that exceeded the District Court monetary jurisdiction.

I did not agree with the Respondents’ submission. Sections 2 and 19(4) of the State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCA”) provide for the following:

Interpretation

2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires —

“District Court limit” means $250,000 or such other amount as may be specified by an order under section 30;

…

General civil jurisdiction

19.—(1) A District Court exercising civil jurisdiction shall be a court of record.

…

(4) Subject to sections 22 and 23, a District Court’s jurisdiction under subsection (2) shall not include jurisdiction to hear and try any action where — (a) the amount claimed in the action exceeds the District Court limit; or (b) any remedy or relief sought in the action is in respect of a subject-matter the value of which exceeds the District Court limit. [emphasis in bold added]

In the first place, the different reliefs in the OS have to be considered separately, and they cannot be lumped together which was the approach the Respondents took. Looking at the reliefs, only the second relief explicitly refers to the Property. The other substantive reliefs deal with the nullification of the motions passed in the 2019 AGM, the recovery of certain sums paid by the Applicants to the MCST (which can be quantified and does not exceed $250,000) and a declaration that the imposition of late interest at 30% per annum was unenforceable (again, a sum that can be quantified and does not exceed $250,000).

In my view, the “subject-matter” of the second relief sought in the OS is not the Property. Just because the Property is referred to in the second relief, it does not follow that the Property is the subject matter. Rather, the “subject-matter” is the Applicants’ right to represent the Estate in matters concerning the Property. Whilst it is hard to quantify the value of such a right, there is no evidence before me that suggests that the right is worth more than $250,000.

I consider my interpretation of “subject-matter” in Section 19(4)(b) of the SCA to be in line with the approach taken by the court in Tuan Kong Beo (Teochew) Temple v Tian Kong Buddhist Temple [2018] SGDC 99. In that case, the plaintiff wanted the defendant to comply with an agreement parties had signed regulating the use of a property used for religious services. The land was leased by the Government to an association run by both parties for a 30-year period at the cost of $650,000. The plaintiff sought an order compelling the defendant not to obstruct the use of the land. The defendant argued that since the value of the lease was $650,000, that exceeded the District Court’s monetary jurisdiction. Deputy Registrar Patrick Tay had to consider whether this was correct. He reviewed Section 19(4) of the SCA and a number of analogous authorities (since it appeared there were no reported cases that had interpreted this...