Chen Hua v Tan Chee Heong

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Toh Yung Cheong
• Judgment Date: 30 January 2023
• Neutral Citation: [2023] SGDC 12
• Court: District Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: District Court Suit No 2808 of 2020, District Court Assessment of Damages No. 344 of 2021, District Court Registrar’s Appeal No.83 of 2022
• Hearing Date: 05 January 2023,30 January 2023
• Citation: [2023] SGDC 12
• Year: 2023
• Plaintiff Counsel: N Srinivasan and Tan Jianhong Joseph (Hoh Law Corporation)
• Defendant Counsel: Lee Whye Tuck, Ambrose (Just Law LLC)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,Jurisdiction,State Courts Act 1970,District Court limit
• Published date: 27 August 2023

District Judge Toh Yung Cheong: Introduction

This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the decision of the Deputy Registrar in respect of a preliminary issue at an interlocutory hearing for DC/AD 344/2021. The issue in dispute is the District Court’s civil jurisdiction where a claim in excess of the District Court limit (“DC limit”) of $250,000 is filed by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff invokes s.22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970 to abandon the excess amount, what is the maximum amount the plaintiff can be awarded if damages are to be reduced on account of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence?

While this issue appeared to have been decided by the Court of Appeal in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd v Ng Chan Teng [2008] 2 SLR(R) 839, the Deputy Registrar hearing the assessment of damages¹ agreed with the decision in Au Eong Poh Choo, Serene v Singapore Swimming Club [2022] SGDC 226 (“Serene Au”) that the legal position in Keppel was no longer applicable as s.19 of the State Courts Act was different from the provision considered by the Court of Appeal. In particular, it lacked the words “whether on balance of account or otherwise” which the Deputy Registrar felt was crucial to the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Deputy Registrar agreed with the decision in Serene Au and found that the removal of those key words meant that the legal position had changed.

During the hearing of this appeal, the plaintiff urged the Court to find that the legal position in Keppel had not changed as a result of this amendment.

Procedural History

The plaintiff was a pedestrian who was injured by a motor car driven by the defendant on 8 December 2019. The writ was filed on 30 November 2020. On 3 May 2021, a consent interlocutory judgment was entered for the plaintiff against the defendant for 80% of the damages to be assessed. The matter was then set down for an assessment of damages hearing.

In the Joint Opening Statement (“JOS”) for Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury Claims² prepared for the Assessment of Damages hearing, the plaintiff put forward a total claim of $734,168.31. After taking into account the 20% reduction agreed upon, the claim was $587,334.65. The plaintiff took the position that it was sufficient for the Court to record that he was abandoning the excess claim under s.22(1) and that the maximum amount that he could recover was $250,000.

Identification of Issues Issues framed by the Deputy Registrar and her decision on the issues

At the hearing below, the Deputy Registrar framed the following two issues: First Issue: If the Plaintiff is relying on s.22 of the State Courts Act, whether the Plaintiff has to first abandon the excess (i.e. by effectively re-quantifying the claim). Second Issue: Whether the “amount claimed” in s.19(4) of the State Courts Act 1970 refers to the amount claimed on a 100% basis or the amount claimed after taking contributory negligence into account.

In respect of the first issue, Deputy held that the plaintiff was required to re-quantify the claim by amending the claim amount of $734,168.31 in the JOS to the DC limit of $250,000.

In respect of the second issue, the Deputy Registrar held that the “amount claimed” refers to the amount claimed on a 100% basis and any reduction for contributory negligence would be from the DC limit rather than the damages actually assessed. This meant that any reduction due to contributory negligence would be from the re-quantified claim of $250,000.

Issues to be dealt with at this appeal

I agreed with the Plaintiff that the issue of whether the plaintiff’s share of contributory negligence must be reduced from the DC limit has to be considered separately.³ Therefore, I approached this appeal on the basis that there were three separate issues: First Issue : Whether the words “amount claimed” refer to the amount claimed on a 100% basis. Second Issue: Does the plaintiff have to re-quantify his claim in order to “abandon the excess amount” under s.22 of the Act? Third Issue: Third Issue: Is the reduction for contributory negligence made from damages assessed or from the DC limit?

Keppel Singmarine and the Legislative Provisions

Before I begin my analysis of the issues, I will deal with the applicability of the Court of Appeal decision in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd v Ng Chan Teng [2008] 2 SLR(R) 839 (“Keppel”). In Keppel, the plaintiff was injured in an industrial accident and commenced proceedings in the District Court. Parties later entered into a consent interlocutory judgment with the defendant accepting 70% liability with damages to be assessed. A dispute arose as to the maximum amount the District Court could award on the basis of 70% liability.

The applicable provisions before the Court of Appeal in Keppel were sections 20(1) and s.22(1) of the Subordinate Courts Act (Chapter 321, 1999 Revised Edition) which I reproduce below for ease of reference: 20.—(1) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action founded on contract or tort where — Singapore Statutes Online Revised Edition published on 01 Aug 1999 PDF created date on: 24 Jan 2023 (a) the debt, demand or damage claimed does not exceed the DC limit, whether on balance of account or otherwise; 22.—(1) Where a plaintiff has a cause of action which exceeds the DC limit in which, if it did not exceed the DC limit, a District Court would have jurisdiction under section 20(1) (a) or (2) or 21, the plaintiff may abandon the excess and thereupon a District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try the action, provided that the plaintiff shall not recover in the action an amount exceeding the DC limit.

The Court of Appeal explained that the disposal of the appeal rested on the interpretation of the words “or otherwise” in s.20(1)(a) of the Subordinate Courts Act and that these words were wide enough to include a situation where any reduction of the damages awarded due to the plaintiff’s contributory negligence would operate on the damages actually assessed and not on the DC limit.⁴ If the legal position in Keppel was applicable to the present case, it would effectively dispose of this appeal.

However, as the Deputy Registrar in Au Eong Poh Choo, Serene v Singapore Swimming Club [2022] SGDC 226 noted, the words “or otherwise” are not present in s.19(4) of the State Courts Act. For ease of reference, I reproduce s.19(4) and s.22(1): 19 (4) Subject to sections 22 and 23, a District Court’s jurisdiction under subsection (2) does not include jurisdiction to hear and try any action where — (a) the amount claimed in the action exceeds the DC limit; or (b) any remedy or relief sought in the action is in respect of a subject matter the value of which exceeds the DC limit. 22 (1) Where — (a) the amount claimed in an action exceeds the DC limit, or any remedy or relief sought in an action is in respect of a subject matter the value of which exceeds the DC limit; and (b) a District Court would have jurisdiction under section 19(2) to hear and try the action if the amount or value (as the case may be) did not exceed the DC limit,

the claimant may abandon the excess amount or that remedy or relief, as the case may be, and thereupon a District Court has jurisdiction under section 19(2) to hear and try the action, except that the claimant cannot in that action — (c) recover an amount exceeding the DC limit; and (d) obtain any remedy or relief in respect of the subject matter the value of which exceeds the DC limit.

The judgment of Serene Au also traces the legislative history of the amendments and concluded that while there was no indication that Parliament had intended to legislatively overrule Keppel, there was equally no indication that Parliament had intended to maintain the legal position in Keppel. As I agree with the conclusion in Serene Au that the Parliamentary records are inconclusive, I did not make reference to them in this judgment.

In conclusion, the words “or otherwise” appear to form the basis of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Keppel. As the words “or otherwise” are not found in the present State Courts Act, the legal position in Keppel Singmarine is not applicable to the present case and the issue has to be considered afresh. I will now begin my analysis of the three issues.

First Issue: Whether the words “amount claimed” refer to the amount claimed on a 100% basis Decision on first issue

I agree with the interpretation adopted by the Deputy Registrar (who agreed with the reasoning in Serene Au) that the words “amount claimed” in s.19(4)(a) of the Act refer to the amount claimed on a 100% basis and not the amount claimed after taking contributory negligence into account. Therefore, s.19(4)(a) operates to exclude the District Court’s jurisdiction when the amount claimed exceeds the DC limit and this is on 100% basis and before any reduction for contributory negligence.

Plaintiff’s submission on the first issue

The Plaintiff urged the Court to adopt a purposive interpretation to s.19(4). As there was no evidence that Parliament intended to legislatively overrule Keppel, s.19(4) should be interpreted in a manner that preserves the legal position in Keppel. In addition, the Plaintiff pointed out that the Deputy Registrar’s decision would lead to higher costs for claimants and encourage cases to be needlessly commenced in the High Court.

The decision in Serene Au

In Serene Au four main factors were put forward in support of the interpretation of “amount claimed” as referring to amount claimed on a 100% basis: First Factor: There is a distinction between the Court’s jurisdiction and its powers. Section 19(4) of the Act deals with the District Court’s jurisdiction and this has to be determined at the outset of the matter.⁵ Second Factor: The interpretation ensures coherence with the operation of paras 2 and 2A of the Supreme Court of...