Chen Cheng and Another v Central Christian Church and another appeal

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Lai Kew Chai J
• Judgment Date: 29 August 1994
• Neutral Citation: [1994] SGHC 220
• Citation: [1994] SGHC 220
• Date: 29 August 1994
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Cheong Yuen Hee and Christopher Bridges (Bridges Dhillon & Pnrs)
• Docket Number: Suits Nos 846 and 848 of 1992
• Defendant Counsel: Tan Chee Meng (Harry Elias & Pnrs)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Year: 1994

Cur Adv Vult

This case has to do with what is in law regarded as a legal entity with legal attributes under which rights are held and liabilities are owed. Such an entity is sometimes referred to as a legal person. It may be said that a person in law is any being or entity who or which in the eyes of the law is capable of enjoying rights or is subject to duties, both of which are enforceable at law. The paradigmatic example of a legal person is a natural person or a human being, though even in this obvious example this has not always been the case because in many ancient, and indeed not so ancient, legal systems, for instance, under Roman law at one time, slaves or foreigners were not recognized as having rights. Slaves were in law treated as property of other masters or objects of rights. Foreigners and their property were liable to be seized by a Roman citizen as though they were without owners. At the same time, in our legal system, companies incorporated under our Companies Act (Cap 50, 1994 Ed) and the many and varied corporations which are incorporated by a series of statutes, are recognized by law as legal persons with all the rights, liabilities and, sometimes, certain immunities.

While it is commonplace that such companies and statutory corporations are legal persons, societies registered under the Societies Act (Cap 311) are not incorporated and the extent of its legal personality has, for the first time, been questioned in this case. The question for determination in this case is whether a society registered under the Societies Act has a legal personality which is capable in law of being defamed. If it does not have the necessary legal attributes, this action must fail in limine. If it does, the action shall proceed to trial.

In my view, the answer to the question depends on a true and natural interpretation of the provisions of the Societies Act and also on a review of the English case law which had to grapple with the legal personality of associations such as trade unions and friendly societies. Such associations were and are registered under English statutes which have analogous, though not exactly similar, provisions nor analogous statutory framework as those of our Societies Act. The underlying principles of the law of status and of persons, however, are the same.

The legislative history of the Societies Act should be appreciated against the social matrix of Singapore in early 1889 and the indecisiveness of the then legislative council of the Straits Settlements. In spite of the existence of a large number of secret societies, 1,122 officers and 62,376 members enrolled in the registration book (see App 22 to Minutes of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements 1888, laid before the council on 12 December 1888), the passage of the first Societies Ordinance in 1889 met with strong and emotional opposition. Mr Shelford, in voting against the Bill, castigated it as a `despotic measure`. He was obviously a firm believer in the absolute freedom of association. The Ordinance had to be passed as one of the measures to suppress the unlawful activities of secret societies.

The 1889 Ordinance and the present Societies Act (Cap 311) provide that every society as defined which was not registered...