Chen Aun-Li Andrew v Ha Chi Kut (suing as the sole executrix of the estate of Khoo Ee Liam, deceased)
Judge | Kannan Ramesh JAD |
Judgment Date | 01 December 2022 |
Neutral Citation | [2022] SGHC(A) 41 |
Citation | [2022] SGHC(A) 41 |
Published date | 06 December 2022 |
Docket Number | Civil Appeal No 31 of 2022 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Soo Ziyang Daniel (Selvam LLC) |
Defendant Counsel | Tan Kai Liang, Mak Sushan Melissa and Jonathan Kenric Trachsel (Allen & Gledhill LLP) |
Subject Matter | Conflict of Laws,Foreign judgments,Enforcement |
Hearing Date | 01 December 2022 |
Court | High Court Appellate Division (Singapore) |
This is an appeal against the decision of the Judge of the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) in
The appellant, Mr Chen Aun-Li Andrew, was the director and sole shareholder of Aachen (Asia Pacific) Consultants Limited (the “ACL”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong.2 ACL commenced legal proceedings in Hong Kong against Mr Khoo in Action 4354; Mr Khoo filed a counterclaim against ACL. The HKCFI dismissed ACL’s claims and found in favour of Mr Khoo’s counterclaim.3 Mr Khoo then successfully applied to join the appellant as a party to Action 4354 for the purpose of costs. This was granted as part of the Cost Order.4 As the parties were unable to agree on costs, the matter was set down for taxation. Thereafter, Mr Khoo passed away and the respondent, Mdm Ha Chi Kut, obtained an order to be made a party to Action 4354 in her capacity as the sole executrix of Mr Khoo’s estate.5 The costs of Action 4354 and the counterclaim were then taxed, and the Cost Certificate was issued.6
Pursuant to s 4(1) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed) (the “REFJA” or “Act”), the respondent applied to register the Collective Judgment in Singapore on 21 June 2021.7 The Collective Judgment was registered on 22 June 2021.8 The appellant subsequently applied to set aside the registration of the Collective Judgment pursuant to s 5(1) of the REFJA.9 The assistant registrar dismissed the application and the appellant appealed against this decision.10 In the General Division of the High Court, the Judge dismissed the appeal. A judgment creditor may apply to have the judgment to which the REFJA applies registered at any time “within 6 years after the date of the judgment”: s 4(1)(
The appellant submits that the “sole issue on appeal is whether the date of the “
In this appeal, the appellant submits that the Judge erred in relying on the legislative history of the REFJA prior to the 2019 amendments to the Act. The REFJA was amended by the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Amendment) Act 2019 (Act 25 of 2019) (the “2019 Amendment”), which took effect on 3 October 2019. He argues that “Parliament clearly intended to depart from the common law position in relation to the enforcement of foreign judgments when enacting the [2019 Amendment]”, which amended the REFJA.12 He contends that the purpose and legislative object of the REFJA had changed because of the 2019 Amendment, and the REFJA should be construed on its own terms without reference to the meaning borne by the words prior to 2019.13 He further submits that the Cost Order was a “money judgment” as it obliged him to pay a sum of money although the quantum was not defined.14 His submission is therefore that the relevant judgment for the purposes of s 4(1) is the Cost Order which application for registration must be made within six years of the date of its issue,
The respondent contends that the judgment which may be registered under the REFJA is a “final money judgment” and the Cost Order was not such a judgment.16 She submits that the Collective Judgment only became final and conclusive as to the amount payable at the point when the Cost Certificate was issued.17 Since the relevant judgment is the Collective Judgment and not the Cost Order, the date of the judgment must be 13 May 2020, as it was only at this point that the Collective Judgment came into being.18
DecisionThe appellant gives hardly any reasons or evidence to support his argument that the 2019 Amendment changed the legislative object and purpose of the REFJA. There is no explanation or evidence, such as material from the Parliamentary debates, supporting his contention that Parliament intended to depart from the common law position in relation to the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Contrary to the appellant’s argument, we observe that the Parliamentary debates show that the 2019 Amendment to the REFJA in fact sought to “supplement the existing regime, to further strengthen Singapore’s value proposition for litigants considering where to resolve their disputes”: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (2 September 2019) vol 94, (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Senior Minister of State for Law (for the Minister of Law)).19 A reading of the Parliamentary debates affirms that it was not the aim of Parliament by way of the 2019 Amendment to replace or oust the common law regime but to “expand and modernise the framework by adding … four more types of judgments in civil proceedings into the fold recognised by REFJA”: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (2 September 2019) vol 94, (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Senior Minister of State for Law (for the Minister of Law)).20
The enforcement regime under the REFJA was based on and intended to replace the common law action on a foreign judgment. Hence...
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