Chai Mei Leng (m w) v William Cheng
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Judith Prakash J |
Judgment Date | 06 October 1998 |
Neutral Citation | [1998] SGHC 334 |
Published date | 27 February 2013 |
Court | High Court (Singapore) |
Plaintiff Counsel | K S Chung (Chung & Co) |
Defendant Counsel | Ann Tan with Audrey Wong (Ann Tan & Associates) |
Judgment :
GROUNDS OF DECISION
1. This appeal arose out of a divorce petition which was presented by the respondent husband in the Family Court in January 1997. The petition was opposed by the appellant wife but, after five days of hearing, the learned district judge hearing the case granted the husband a decree nisi. The wife then appealed to the High Court and I allowed her appeal.
2. The case is unusual in that both parties agreed that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. The wife’s contention was that notwithstanding that fact it would be wrong for the court to grant the decree. She relied on the court’s powers under ss 95(2) and (4) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353) (the Charter) which read as follows:
‘(2) The court hearing such petition shall, so far as it reasonably can, inquire into the facts alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage and, if satisfied that the circumstances make it just and reasonable
to do so, make a decree for its dissolution.
(3) ...
(4) In considering whether it would be just and reasonable to make a decree, the court shall consider all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties and how the interests of any child or children of the marriage or of either party may be affected if the marriage is dissolved, and it may make a decree nisi subject to such terms and conditions as the court may think fit to attach; but if it should appear to the court that in all the circumstances it would be wrong to dissolve the marriage, the court shall dismiss the petition.’
3. These sections (then numbered 88(2) and 88(4)) were considered by Karthigesu J (as he then was) in Cheong Kim Seah v Lim Poh Choo
‘Notwithstanding the lack of specificity in the Singapore legislation I am of the view that a respondent can oppose a petition on the general ground that it would be unjust and unreasonable to make a decree in all the circumstances including, inter alia, the conduct of the parties. In the result, the exercise of discretion by a Singapore court is wider in scope and ambit than that of an English court.’ (at p 180)
After comparing the position in England as disclosed by case authority, Karthigesu J went on to conclude (at pg 181):
‘Applying these principles to the Singapore context, caution has to be exercised with regard to the statutory defence provided by s 88(4) [now 95(4)] of the Charter. The statutory defence as I conceive it is that it would not be just and reasonable to make a decree as in all the circumstances, including, inter alia, the conduct of the parties, it would be wrong to dissolve the marriage.’
4. The learned district judge accepted the above analysis as the correct statement of the law and binding on her, as did the parties. They did not challenge it in this court either. The issue that arose below and which was repeated before me was whether the wife had managed to satisfy the court that it would not be just and reasonable to make a decree and that in all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, it would be wrong to dissolve the marriage. This was an issue of fact and it should be noted at the outset that as the general policy and philosophy of the Charter is, as pointed out by Karthigesu J in Cheong Kim Seah, to ensure that where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, it should be dissolved as quickly and as painlessly as possible, it is only in very extraordinary circumstances that the court would be able to find it that it would be wrong to grant a divorce decree in the face of such a breakdown. The circumstances of this case must therefore be explored.
The facts
5. The husband and wife were married in December 1955. By the time the petition was presented they had been married for some 42 years and were both in their sixties. The husband in fact was almost 70. They had three children, one son and two daughters, who were all grown up and self-supporting.
6. Throughout the marriage, the wife had been a housewife devoting herself to the care of the family. The husband had had a successful career, first in the police force and then in the administrative service. At the time he retired in February 1979, he was the full time chairman of the Central Provident Fund Board. After leaving the civil service, the husband went to work in Taiwan. At first he was Singapore’s Trade Representative there but subsequently he obtained well-paid jobs in the private sector.
7. From 1979 onwards, the husband lived mainly in Taiwan but whenever he returned to Singapore he went to stay with the wife in the matrimonial home at No. 10 Grove Lane. This was despite the fact that since the 1970s the husband had been having an affair with another woman by whom he had had a daughter in 1977. In 1983, the husband bought an apartment in Siglap to house his mistress and her child but he did not live with her, preferring to visit and thereafter to return to the matrimonial home. At some stage, the wife became aware of the situation but she did not make a fuss. Instead she acquiesced in it and when the husband asked in 1985 whether she would agree to a divorce, she said no.
8. The break in the matrimonial consortium took place in May 1990. One of the daughters of the marriage was herself getting married and there was a quarrel between her and the wife. The husband took the daughter’s part and he and the wife also quarrelled. He then left the matrimonial home (he alleged the wife drove him out) and never returned there thereafter. Instead, on his visits to Singapore he lived with his mistress. From May 1990 onwards, the parties had no direct contact with each other. The husband, however, continued to maintain the wife as he had done throughout the marriage, paying her a monthly sum which increased from time to time. By November 1996, the wife’s monthly maintenance was $3,500.
9. By May 1994 the parties had lived separately and apart for four years. The husband, however,...
To continue reading
Request your trial