Au Eong Poh Choo, Serene v Singapore Swimming Club

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeJonathan Ng Pang Ern
Judgment Date28 September 2022
Neutral Citation[2022] SGDC 226
CourtDistrict Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberDistrict Court Suit No 1483 of 2015 (Assessment of Damages No 248 of 2022)
Published date05 October 2022
Year2022
Hearing Date26 September 2022,29 August 2022
Plaintiff CounselCecilia Hendrick (Cecilia Hendrick LLC) (instructed) and Leong De Shun Kevin (Tan & Au LLP)
Defendant CounselAppoo Ramesh and Ellice Kuah Jin Yu (Just Law LLC)
Subject MatterCourts and Jurisdiction,District Court
Citation[2022] SGDC 226
Deputy Registrar Jonathan Ng Pang Ern:

This was an assessment of damages pursuant to an interlocutory judgment which was entered at 50% against the Defendant. The amount claimed was initially $327,052.15 on a 50% basis, which clearly exceeded the District Court limit of $250,000. When confronted with this, the Plaintiff was willing to cap her claim at $250,000 or, alternatively, reduce it to $235,640.13. But were these sufficient to give the District Court jurisdiction to hear and try the action?

After considering parties’ submissions, I took the view that: (a) it suffices, for the purposes of s 22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970, for a claimant to cap his claim at $250,000; and (b) “the amount claimed” in s 19(4) of the State Courts Act 1970 refers to the amount claimed on a 100% basis, and not the amount claimed after taking contributory negligence into account. Taken together, these meant that, unless the Plaintiff was willing to cap her claim at $125,000, I did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the assessment of damages.

When I rendered my decision on 26 September 2022, I indicated to parties that full written grounds would soon follow. Pursuant to that, these are the grounds of my decision.

Background

The Plaintiff commenced this suit against the Defendant on 15 May 2015. The suit arose out of an accident that occurred on the Defendant’s premises. Parties entered consent interlocutory judgment on 15 May 2019. Under this interlocutory judgment, liability was apportioned against the Defendant at 50%.

The first tranche of the assessment of damages was fixed for a full-day hearing before me on 29 August 2022. In the Joint Opening Statement filed on 22 August 2022, the Plaintiff quantified her claim at $327,052.15 on a 50% basis (and $654,104.30 on a 100% basis). The heads of claim comprised: (a) pain and suffering/loss of amenities; (b) loss of future earnings/loss of earning capacity; (c) future medical expenses and treatments; and (d) special damages (for medical expenses, transport expenses, purchase of wheelchair and crutches and pre-trial loss of income).

At the hearing on 29 August 2022, I highlighted to parties that the Plaintiff’s claim appeared to exceed the District Court’s jurisdiction. Counsel for the Defendant, Mr Appoo Ramesh, informed me that he had brought this issue to the attention of Counsel for the Plaintiff, Ms Cecilia Hendrick, when the Joint Opening Statement was served on him on 22 August 2022. He subsequently received a draft memorandum under s 23 of the State Courts Act 1970 from Ms Hendrick on 26 August 2022. While he had no instructions on this draft memorandum, he candidly informed me that he would not be advising his client to agree to enlarge the District Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to s 23 of the State Courts Act 1970.

In response, Ms Hendrick indicated that the Plaintiff was willing to submit to the District Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to s 22 of the State Courts Act 1970. I understood this to mean that the Plaintiff would be willing to cap her claim at $250,000. However, Mr Ramesh, relying on the District Court’s decision in K Jeyakumar Naikar v Huationg Contractor Pte Ltd and another [2021] SGDC 146 (“Jeyakumar”), submitted that this was insufficient, and that the Plaintiff had to positively identify the specific parts of her claim which she was abandoning. Ms Hendrick maintained that s 22 of the State Courts Act 1970 allowed the Plaintiff to simply cap her claim at $250,000, but she was prepared go along with Mr Ramesh’s interpretation so that the hearing could proceed. To this end, the multiplier for the Plaintiff’s loss of future earnings/loss of earning capacity claim was halved, bringing the overall claim to $235,640.13 on a 50% basis (and $471,280.25 on a 100% basis).

At this juncture, a further issue emerged: was it sufficient that the Plaintiff’s claim fell within the District Court’s jurisdiction on a 50% basis, or did the Plaintiff’s claim also have to fall within the District Court’s jurisdiction on a 100% basis? Ms Hendrick argued, on the authority of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd v Ng Chan Teng [2008] 2 SLR(R) 839 (“Keppel”), that the former sufficed. Mr Ramesh, on the other hand, pointed out that Keppel appeared to be based on a provision in the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) which was worded differently. As things stood, he was not prepared to accept that Keppel provided an answer to this issue.

It appeared to me that these jurisdictional issues were not clear cut. It was also apparent to me that parties were not fully prepared to argue these issues (the two cases cited were identified during two brief stand-downs in the course of the morning). For these reasons, I was not prepared to render a decision on the fly. As a practical matter, I was prepared to proceed with the taking of evidence if parties were agreeable to deferring these issues to be decided at a later juncture. Indeed, Ms Hendrick made it very clear that she wanted the hearing to proceed. However, Mr Appoo was adamant that these issues be determined first.

I was mindful that s 19(4) of the State Courts Act 1970 provides that a District Court does not have jurisdiction to “hear and try” any action which falls outside its jurisdiction. In these circumstances, I was not prepared to proceed with the hearing without Mr Appoo’s agreement. I therefore vacated the hearing in the afternoon, and gave directions for the filing and exchange of written submissions.

Issues

The issues I had to determine were: whether it suffices, for the purposes of s 22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970, for a claimant to cap his claim at $250,000; and whether “the amount claimed” in s 19(4) of the State Courts Act 1970 refers to the amount claimed on a 100% basis or the amount claimed after taking contributory negligence into account.

Parties’ submissions

Parties subsequently filed their written submissions on 12 September 2022.

On the first issue, the Plaintiff submitted that she only needed to state that she abandoned any award in excess of the District Court limit.1 According to the Plaintiff, this approach was followed by a string of District Court decisions.2

On its part, the Defendant, relying on Jeyakumar, submitted that, for the purposes of s 22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970, a claimant had to positively abandon the excess of his claim and could not merely confirm at the commencement of the hearing that the claim was limited to $250,000.3 Thus, the Plaintiff had to state categorically in writing, by either amending the Statement of Claim or the Joint Opening Statement, which parts of her claim she was abandoning.4

On the second issue, the Plaintiff submitted that Keppel stood for the proposition that the maximum sum the District Court could award was after apportionment of liability was applied.5 Reliance was also placed on s 3(3) of the Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act 1953 (which was referred to in Keppel at [30])6 and two District Court decisions which supposedly continued to apply the legal position in Keppel even after the 2010 amendments to the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed).7

On the other hand, the Defendant submitted that Keppel was premised on the specific words of s 20(1)(a) of the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed),8 which were no longer present in s 19(4) of the State Courts Act 1970.9Keppel had therefore been overtaken by legislative amendments and could not be taken to represent the law.10 Turning to first principles, the Defendant submitted that the words “the amount claimed” in s 19(4) of the State Courts Act 1970 should consistently refer to the amount claimed on a 100% basis, and should not bear a different meaning depending on whether liability had been resolved.11 Moreover, the Plaintiff’s interpretation would result in uncertainty as to where a claim ought to be commenced in.12 Finally, it was also said that the Defendant’s interpretation was consistent with a number of other legislative provisions.13

Decision The first issue: abandonment of excess

The first issue was whether it suffices, for the purposes of s 22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970, for a claimant to cap his claim at $250,000.

In its present form, s 22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970 provides as follows:

Abandonment of part of claim to give District Court jurisdiction

Where — the amount claimed in an action exceeds the District Court limit, or any remedy or relief sought in an action is in respect of a subject matter the value of which exceeds the District Court limit; and a District Court would have jurisdiction under section 19(2) to hear and try the action if the amount or value (as the case may be) did not exceed the District Court limit,

the claimant may abandon the excess amount or that remedy or relief, as the case may be, and thereupon a District Court has jurisdiction under section 19(2) to hear and try the action, except that the claimant cannot in that action — recover an amount exceeding the District Court limit; and obtain any remedy or relief in respect of the subject matter the value of which exceeds the District Court limit.

[emphasis added]

I pause to note that this current version of s 22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970 was introduced by s 50(c) of the Courts (Civil and Criminal Justice) Reform Act 2021. It appears that, by virtue of s 224(1) and (2) of the Courts (Civil and Criminal Justice) Reform Act 2021, the version of s 22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970 that governs this suit is the version of s 22(1) of the State Courts Act 1970 that was in force on 31 March 2022. However, nothing turns on this as the only amendment brought about by s 50(c) of the Courts (Civil and Criminal Justice) Reform Act 2021 was the change in the reference from “plaintiff” to...

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