Attorney General v Pang Cheng Lian and Others

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Wee Chong Jin CJ
• Judgment Date: 30 November 1974
• Neutral Citation: [1974] SGHC 17
• Docket Number: Motion in Originating Summons No 384
• Date: 30 November 1974
• Year: 1974
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Tan Boon Teik (Attorney General) and Glenn J Knight (State Counsel)
• Citation: [1974] SGHC 17
• Defendant Counsel: J Grimberg and Sat Pal Khattar (Sat Pal Khattar),HE Cashin (Murphy & Dunbar),Dr Thio Su Mien (Chor Pee & Hin Hiong)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Whether innocent dissemination a defence,Scandalising the court,Voluntarily providing information used in writing article scandalising the court,Whether contempt of court committed,Contempt of Court,Distributors had no knowledge of article scandalising the court,Criminal contempt

In these proceedings the Attorney General moves for orders of committal against Pang Cheng Lian, Victor Santhanam and CR Dasaratha Raj (Pte) Ltd for contempt of court by reason of the publication of an article entitled `Singapore - Selective Justice` in the 11 November 1974 issue of the International Edition of a weekly news magazine called Newsweek

The article related to two defamation actions, which were consolidated, instituted in the High Court by the Workers` Party, a political party in Singapore, against one Tay Boon Too a candidate of the People`s Action Party, another political party and against the Attorney General in his representative capacity representing the Department of Broadcasting, Ministry of Culture. These actions arose out of a speech by Tay Boon Too at an election rally during the 1972 general election. A summary of the speech was broadcast by the Department of Broadcasting.

The consolidated actions were tried at the High Court before a single judge. The trial took place in October 1974 and lasted seven days and judgment was reserved. The main issues contested at the trial were (i) publication; (ii) if publication was proved, whether the words were capable of a defamatory meaning; (iii) justification and (iv) qualified privilege. On 1 November 1974 the learned judge delivered judgment dismissing the actions against the defendants with costs. The learned judge held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove publication of the words complained of; that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had suffered special damage and that the words complained of were broadcast on a privileged occasion. The learned judge, however, found against the defendant Tay Boon Too on the plea of justification.

After the learned judge had delivered his judgment, counsel for the Workers` Party applied for a stay of execution of costs as his clients intended to appeal against the judgment. Counsel for the successful defendants objected to the application and offered an undertaking to refund the costs paid should the Workers` Party succeed on appeal. It being the normal practice of the court to refuse a stay where such an undertaking is offered, the learned judge refused the application.

I now turn to the article in the Newsweek magazine of 11 November 1974. It is related to the consolidated defamation actions I have earlier referred to.

Its title `Singapore - Selective Justice` and contents are beyond a shadow of doubt objectionable in the highest degree and it has not been contended by any of the respondents that the publication of this article did not amount to a contempt of court.

In my opinion the article contains matter which constitutes contempt of court of the most serious description. It alleges that the Singapore High Court by its decision in the Workers` Party defamation actions did little to dispel the notion long charged by critics that the courts of this country are little more than extensions of the one-party system. The statement that there is a one-party system in Singapore is patently false. There is in truth no one-party system in Singapore. Indeed the article itself speaks of the 1972 general election and of the Workers` Party as contesting it and nails that particular falsehood. The fact that one political party wins all the seats in a general election in Singapore in which there are candidates from many political parties does not by that fact create a one-party system here.

Next, the statement that critics have long charged the courts of this country as little more than extensions of the one-party system is also devoid of truth. No attempt has been made to justify this serious accusation against the independence and impartiality of the judiciary of this country.

Next, the statement in the article that the decision of the Singapore High Court in the Workers` Party defamation actions did little to dispel the notion that the courts here are little more than extensions of the one-party system here is wholly inaccurate. From a later paragraph in the same article, the statement appears to be based on `precedents established in two similar cases that grew out of the 1972 general election`. In fact there was only one such libel action in the High Court in which there were three defendants, a political party, its chairman and the editor of the newspaper in which the alleged libel was published. In that action the defendants admitted liability and the only issue the High Court had to deal with and decide was the quantum of damages to be awarded. It is accordingly plain that the decision in that earlier libel action did not establish anything which could be a precedent that could assist the High Court in the Workers` Party defamation actions.

Next, the allegation that the High Court by its decision in the Workers` Party defamation actions `chose to turn a blind eye to all precedents` is completely false. It is clear from what I have just said that there was no previous High Court decision which could serve as a precedent for the learned judge. I can only consider this allegation as a deliberate and unwarranted attack upon the impartiality of the learned judge hearing the Workers` Party defamation actions. But the attack upon the learned judge and thus upon the High Court itself does not end there. The article goes on to allege that the court added insult to injury by also decreeing that the Workers` Party must pay the costs of the action immediately despite the fact that its lawyers had already filed an appeal against the decision. As I have earlier stated, the learned judge refused an application for a stay of execution of costs pending an intended appeal in accordance with the normal practice of the High Court. It is thus clear that no appeal had yet been filed but the attack upon the learned judge and the High Court lies in the words `adding insult to injury` which impute that the learned judge of the High Court had unjustly and improperly not only caused injury or wrong to a party in an action before him but also had unjustly and improperly caused another injury or wrong to that party.

Finally, the article ends with a shocking allegation namely, that `in the courts in Singapore it makes a vital difference whether it is the government or the opposition that is in the dock`. This grossly offensive allegation imputes to the judiciary of this country a complete lack of impartiality in every in which the parties before the court are the government and a party in opposition to the party in power and that the courts of this country have been, and will always be biased and partial in favour of the government. In my opinion this allegation attacking the whole of the judiciary of this country is the worst form of `scandalising` of the court meriting the infliction of a severe penalty.

The present proceedings are for orders of committal for contempt of court. It is right that I should examine the foundation of the jurisdiction which this court exercises in contempt of court proceedings and to set out what kind of conduct is contempt of court. I propose to rely on certain passages in the judgment of Lord Diplock in the House of Lords in A-G v Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273. Lord Diplock begins his judgment in these words (p 307):

My Lords, in any civilised society it is a function of government to maintain courts of law to which its citizens can have access for the impartial decision of disputes as to their legal rights and obligations towards one another individually and towards the state as representing society as a whole. The provision of such a system for the administration of justice by courts of law and the maintenance of public confidence in it, are essential if citizens are to live together in peaceful association with one another. `Contempt of court` is a generic term descriptive of conduct in relation to particular proceedings in a court of law which tends to undermine that system or to inhibit citizens from availing themselves of it for the settlement of their disputes. Contempt of court may thus take many forms.

Later on Lord Diplock said (p 309):

The due administration of justice requires first that all citizens should have unhindered access to the constitutionally established courts of criminal or civil jurisdiction for the determination of disputes as to their legal rights and liabilities; secondly, that they should be able to rely upon obtaining in the courts the arbitrament of a tribunal which is free from bias against any party and whose decision will be based upon those facts only that have been proved in evidence adduced before it in accordance with the procedure adopted in courts of law; and thirdly, that, once the dispute has been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely upon there being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to law. Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine public confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court.

The last passage I will quote is at p 309 where Lord Diplock said:

Contempt of court is punishable because it undermines the confidence not only of the parties to the particular litigation but also of the public as potential suitors, in the due administration of justice by the established courts of law.

One kind of conduct which is punishable as a contempt of court is scandalising the court itself (per Lord Hardwicke LC in Re Read and Huggonson St James`s Evening Post (1742) 2 Atk 469). A case in which a court exercised its power to...