ASEAN, the declaration on conduct, and the South China Sea.

• Author: Buszynski, Leszek

Introduction

On 4 November 2002 ASEAN signed a declaration on conduct in the South China Sea with China, which within ASEAN was regarded as a milestone. China had previously insisted on bilateral negotiations with the claimant states and had avoided multilateralism. This declaration indicated a change in China's approach towards the dispute and vindication of ASEAN's efforts to engage China in dialogue over the issue. The declaration fell short of what ASEAN had been seeking, which was a commitment to a code of conduct but, when seen against the background of prior developments, it was symptomatic of a trend towards adoption of norms in the regulation of the dispute. This article will examine the development of the South China Sea issue in two phases; in the first phase from 1987-98, China's intentions were framed in terms of the recovery of "lost territories" and exclusive sovereignty over the area. In the second phase from 1999 to the present, China revealed greater interest in the regulation of the dispute and became more receptive to the negotiation of norms of behaviour with ASEAN. The article will identify the shift in China's approach towards the dispute in terms of the factors influencing its receptivity to norms. It will examine the relationship between norms and foreign policy and will seek an answer to the question as to why states in China's dominant position become receptive to norms.

The Importance of Norms

Norms can be understood as standards or patterns of expected behaviour in particular circumstances and indicate commonly accepted preferences. Norms and rules have been used interchangeably as their meanings overlap but a rule may be regarded as a subset of a norm and an explicit statement of a preference when behaviour becomes obligatory or compulsory. Norms are required before rules and regulations are formulated and indicate areas of common understanding but a rule makes that understanding explicit, clear and precise. Not all norms become explicit and signify expected behaviour in relation to circumstances or conditions where rules may be premature or inappropriate. Kratochwil stressed that norms serve as guides to action, and are "problem solving devices" for ordering interaction and behaviour. (1) The value of norms lies in the benefit of predictability and the constraint of unacceptable or potentially destructive action from which all would suffer.

Competition over scarce resources in international politics may result in a struggle for power and the resort to mutually destabilizing efforts to gain supremacy over others. Norms can reduce the bargaining costs of competition when they become excessive and may express common preferences for cooperation. Predictability, ordered behaviour, and the restraint of harmful action are in the interest of international actors as part of the taming of the Hobbesian state of nature. Norms are derived from the mutual expectations of the actors and offer a means to restrain behaviour to maintain the competition between them within certain tolerable parameters. Their acceptance may result in the exclusion of certain destabilizing methods of individual goal fulfilment which may rely upon force or threat. In this sense, norms may influence the conduct of foreign policy by limiting the choice of means to those considered acceptable, and which would maintain the reciprocity of ordered behaviour from which all benefit. Common norms are invoked and are often taken for granted in the joint development of scarce objects or resources and are inherent in any cooperative endeavour. An implicit or explicit agreement on norms of behaviour is the first step in the negotiation of international regimes regulating specific issue areas for which they serve as a foundation. Norms also will allow parties to negotiate their grievances and search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of common understanding, without the resort to destructive unilateral solutions. (2)

Norms are a product of an understanding that unrestrained competition in a state of nature may increase the costs of obtaining access to scarce resources. Small states are the beneficiaries of norms in that an ordered environment will protect their rights of access against stronger powers, which may otherwise be disposed towards the use of force. Why should dominant states abide by norms when they may obtain possession of contested resources by unilateral action? Norms may work to the benefit of dominant states as well, when unilateral action may raise the diplomatic and economic costs associated with the acquisition of those resources to a prohibitive level. When dominant states require the diplomatic and economic support of smaller states over other issues, they become more careful about alienating them. When smaller states are able to involve the international community by portraying the issue as one affecting regional or global stability, unilateral action becomes excessively risky. When dominant states themselves are dependent upon the international community for economic benefits unilateral action becomes irrational. Idealists imagine that the propagation of norms alone would result in positive changes in the behaviour of powerful states through an appeal to the consciences of those responsible for foreign policy. The reality is usually otherwise. The realization of the benefits of norms for these states comes as a product of the frustration of the desire for unilateral action, when periodic attempts to resort to unilateral solutions are perceived to have unacceptable consequences. Dominant states may wrestle with the temptation to impose their solutions over particular issues but once the destabilizing results of their actions are understood, they may realize that the adoption of norms of behaviour will bring a desired stability, that otherwise would be absent.

China, the "Lost Territories", and Exclusive Sovereignty

The South China Sea is an area of competing claims involving China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia in which the determination of sovereignty has become important for the ability to exploit oil, gas, and fishing resources. (3) From the realist perspective China could be expected to claim great power rights over the area to which the smaller ASEAN states would be compelled to subordinate themselves. As Samuel Huntington once explained, China's intention was to establish itself as the major power in East Asia, and to legitimize its control over the South China Sea. (4) China's claims to the area were initially motivated by the concern to recover the "lost territories" taken from China during its humiliation before the colonial powers in the 19th century. Within China, the idea of a Lebensraum or survival space was also raised, according to which China would seek living space for its population, as well as the energy and fish resources of the South China Sea. (5) Behind these claims was the figure of Liu Huaqing who had significant influence on the development of PLA-Naval strategic doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s. Appointed naval commander in 1982, Liu highlighted China's claims to the South China Sea based on the "lost territories" theme which he used to justify larger budgets and to define a strategic mission for the navy, requiring an ocean-going capability. (6) In May 1987 China sent patrols and survey crews to the South China Sea and on 14 March 1988 Chinese patrols clashed with Vietnamese vessels at Johnson Reef, after which seven reefs were occupied. (7) In March 1989 China's navy formed a South China Sea frontline headquarters and deputy commander Zhang Xusen announced the shift to offshore defence to protect China's territorial sovereignty and ocean rights. An expansion of naval capability was required to protect the four major seas and China's continental shelf, and to fight any localized war against China on the high seas. (8)

Subsequent statements from Chinese naval authorities revealed assertive support for naval expansion. Zhang Xusen claimed that China would develop advanced technology and would adjust its strategy to protect its claims in the South China Sea. (9) Vice Admiral Zhang Lianzhing predicted that China's navy would be strengthened to boost combat readiness and protect China's territorial waters. He opined that the struggle for ocean rights would intensify in the future as competition for oil deposits and fishing rights would become more severe. (10) In 1990 it was revealed that China had constructed a 2.6 km airstrip on Woody Island in the Paracels which would allow it to deploy SU 27s as air cover for its navy. Built in 1978 it would reduce the air distance to the Spratly Islands by half to 600 km allowing the SU 27s to fly there without refuelling. (11) China's naval activity in the area increased and regular patrols and naval manoeuvres were observed. Naval modernization was initiated in the early 1990s, which resulted in the introduction of new naval vessels such as the Luhu-class guided missile destroyer, and the Jiangwei-class guided missile frigate. In the early 1990s China was interested in purchasing an ex-Soviet aircraft carrier from the Ukraine or Russia and the interest in a carrier to provide air cover for distant naval operations remains. (12) There were also constant reports that China had acquired air refuelling technology from Iran or Israel. (13)

In this context China's National People's Congress on 25 February 1992 passed the controversial territorial law, which as Fu Ying (Deputy Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Asia department) explained had been long in preparation and was intended to support China's position on the United Nation's Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). (14) Article 2 of the law converted the South China Sea area into China's internal waters; naval vessels were to obtain Beijing's permission before proceeding through the South China Sea; submarines were to surface to fly their...