Apex Energy International Pte Ltd v Wanxiang Resources (Singapore) Pte Ltd
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Hoo Sheau Peng J |
Judgment Date | 06 July 2020 |
Neutral Citation | [2020] SGHC 138 |
Court | High Court (Singapore) |
Docket Number | Suit No 178 of 2018 |
Published date | 14 July 2020 |
Year | 2020 |
Hearing Date | 14 February 2020,27 February 2020,13 February 2020,18 May 2020,11 February 2020,26 February 2020,12 February 2020,10 February 2020 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Sarbjit Singh Chopra, Lee Wen Rong Gabriel and Luis Inaki Duhart Gonzalez (Selvam LLC) |
Defendant Counsel | Eng Zixuan Edmund, Brinden Anandakumar, James Tan and Danica Gan (Fullerton Law Chambers LLC) |
Citation | [2020] SGHC 138 |
In this suit, the plaintiff, Apex Energy International Pte Ltd (“Apex”), claims against the defendant, Wanxiang Resources (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Wanxiang”), for breach of contract in refusing to proceed under a
On the strength of emails and text messages on handphones, Apex asserts that the parties entered into such a contract, and that Wanxiang is liable for the loss caused by its refusal to perform its obligations (including loss caused by mitigating steps taken by Apex). Wanxiang contends that the parties did not enter into any such contract, and that, in any case, Apex’s mitigating steps were unreasonable.
Having considered the evidence, and the closing and reply submissions of the parties, I now give my judgment.
Background The partiesApex and Wanxiang are both Singapore-incorporated companies engaged in the business of oil trading.
Mr Park Jaehwan (“Park”) and Mr Shin Bumjin (“Shin”) were traders employed by Apex and Wanxiang respectively who handled the disputed transaction. They communicated mainly by emails and text messages on their handphones. The text messages in the Korean language were exchanged via the KakaoTalk instant messaging platform.
The disputed transactionOn or around 16, 17 and 20 November 2017, Park and Shin engaged in a series of text messages about Apex participating in an anticipated tender by S-Oil Corporation (“S-Oil”).1 S-Oil, a major South Korean oil refinery, is a producer of LCO.2 On a monthly basis, S-Oil invites reputable companies to participate in its tenders for cargoes of LCO.3 Apex is one such company.4
On 22 November 2017, Apex received the S-Oil invitation to tender for cargoes for delivery in December 2017 (the “S-Oil tender”). On the same day, Park forwarded the S-Oil tender to Shin by email. This email formed Apex’s invitation to tender (“Apex’s tender”).5 The parties then discussed the possibility of back-to-back bids
The key portions of Apex’s tender (which incorporated the S-Oil tender) are as follows:7
Dear [Shin]
Please find below tender by
S-Oil .[Park]
[Apex]
…
Notice to invite LCO bidding for Dec 2017 (S-Oil) – Closing 15:00 (KST) Nov 23, 2017 This is to notify that
S-OIL shall offer LCO for Dec 2017 lifting , and please provide us with your bid idea, including the loading schedule / nomination vessel size /your best prices in each case by return.
…
…
…
[emphasis added]
On these key portions, I make a few points:
On 23 November 2016, at 1.46 pm, Shin sent Park an email containing Wanxiang’s “firm bid” for the LCO Cargoes (the “Firm Bid”).10 Wanxiang set its price premium for the First LCO Cargo at US$12 per barrel, and that for the Second LCO Cargo at US$11.50 per barrel. The other terms of the Firm Bid mirrored that of the Apex tender,
[emphasis added]
After Shin had sent the Firm Bid to Park, a series of text messages were exchanged at 2.03pm. Park asked Shin for his permission to increase Apex’s bid to US$12.30 per barrel as the price premium of the First LCO Cargo and US$11.70 per barrel as the price premium for the Second LCO Cargo. Apex contemplated making a US$0.10 profit per barrel for itself from on-selling the LCO Cargoes to Wanxiang.13 Shin assented to the increase.14 Effectively, this pushed up the price premium at which Apex would agree to sell the same to Wanxiang (
I shall now set out some critical text messages from 3.10pm to 3.17pm, which shall be referred to as the “Deal Done messages”:15
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According to Apex, the exchange meant that a deal was done with Apex having bid US$11.80 per barrel for the Second LCO Cargo. The cargo would be sold on to Wanxiang at US$11.90 per barrel. Park then asked Shin whether he was agreeable, and Shin agreed to the deal. Indeed, at 4.54pm, Shin instructed Park to keep “the deal that is done today” private and confidential. To this, Park readily replied “Certainly”.16 Wanxiang, however, disputes that any deal was reached in relation to the Second LCO Cargo only. The Firm Bid was in relation to both the LCO Cargoes. It had to be accepted in relation to the entire cargo.
At 5.49 pm, Park sent Shin a “Deal Recap” by email.17 He informed Shin by way of a text message that the email had been sent.18 The Deal Recap purported to set out the terms of the deal struck that day, for a cargo of “300KB +/-5% at Operational Tolerance” to be delivered “20-22 December 2017”. The demurrage cap stated in the Deal Recap had reverted back to the original sum of US$15,000 per day (as
At 5.56pm, Park asked Shin to formally confirm the Deal Recap, and Shin replied “yes”.20 Park sent nine text messages on 24 November 2017, as well as one on 27 November 2017, requesting for a formal confirmation of the Deal Recap. However, Shin did not respond to Park’s repeated requests to do so.
It appears that Wanxiang’s potential buyer was unwilling to purchase the Second LCO Cargo only.21 Both parties explored various ways of resolving the situation.22 On 28 November 2017, by way of an email at 5.15pm, Shin asked Park for his position on the modification of two terms relating to the laycan and the delivery deadline in the Firm Bid.23 By way of two emails on 29 November 2017 at 10.35am and 11.17am, Park responded to say that Apex was agreeable to these modifications. However, Park made further alterations to these modifications. I shall refer to these as the “28-29 November 2017 emails”.24
Subsequent events Shin, however, did not respond to any more of Park’s communications thereafter.25 Instead, on 29 November 2017, at 4.32pm, Mr Xu Zhiyu (“Xu”), Wanxiang’s General Manager of Petroleum Products, sent an email to Park, formally denying that Apex and Wanxiang had ever entered into any contract, and pointing out,
At 6.29pm, Park responded to Xu, stating that a deal was reached by way of communications with Shin. Apex would be holding Wanxiang responsible for all expenses and costs incurred in reselling the Second LCO Cargo.27
On 1 December 2017, at 3.17pm, Xu replied by email, stating that Wanxiang maintained “the same position in respect of the matter”.28
On 1 December 2017, Apex reached an agreement with Shanghai Rui Run Petrochemistry Pte Ltd (“Shanghai Rui Run”) for the Second LCO Cargo. The deal recap sent by email at 6.02pm from Apex to Shanghai Rui Run provided as follows:29
[emphasis added]
On 4 December 2017, Shanghai Rui Run confirmed the deal recap.30
On 5 December 2017, Shanghai Rui Run nominated the counterparty for the contract to be Ningbo Youngor International Trade and Transportation Co Ltd (“Youngor”).31 On 6 December 2017, the formal contract was entered into between Apex and Youngor at the Jan 2018 Indexed Price with a premium of US$9 per barrel32 (the “Alternative Sale”) with loading dates of 18 to 22 December 2017 in Onsan, South Korea for delivery “CFR to Zhoushan, China”.33
According to Apex, while the deal recap sent to Shanghai Rui Run mentioned the Dec 2017 Indexed Price
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