Ng Chong Sing & Anor v Ng Meng Leang

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Ng Peng Hong
• Judgment Date: 06 February 2002
• Neutral Citation: [2002] SGDC 15
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Court: District Court (Singapore)

Judgment

GROUNDS OF DECISION

1. This was an appeal against the deputy registrar’s decision in setting aside the order of court dated 20^th June 2001 extending the validity of the writ of summons and dismissing the action against the defendant. I dismissed the appeal and now give the reasons for my decision.

Brief Facts

2. On 19.5.98, the deceased, a Malaysian, was riding a bicycle in Singapore. Unfortunately, she died as a result of a collision between her bicycle and a bus driven by the defendant. The present action is a dependency claim arising from the death of the deceased. Under s24A of the Limitation Act, the limitation period for the commencement of the action would have set in on 18.5.2001.
It is not disputed that the plaintiffs’ lawyers informed the defendant’s insurers that their clients intended to commence an action against their insured. On 6.10.99, solicitors for the defendant’s insurers wrote to the plaintiffs’ solicitors informing them that they had instructions to accept service on the defendant’s behalf.

3. On 4.9.2000, the writ of summons was issued. But the writ was not served during its validity. It had expired on 3.3.2001. Soon thereafter, the limitation period for the plaintiffs’ claim set in on 18.5.2001. It was after the validity of the writ for service had expired and after the limitation period had set in that the plaintiffs applied by way of an ex-parte application on 19.6.2001 to extend the validity of the writ. The ex-parte application was supported by an affidavit deposed by the plaintiffs’ solicitor, Mr Ronnie Tan Siew Bin. The affidavit did not disclose the fact that the action had been time-barred. But he alleged inter alia, that there was difficulty in getting full instructions as to the particulars of the claim. In these circumstances, the court extended the validity of the writ. After the extension, the generally endorsed writ was served on the defendant’s solicitors on the 25.6.2001. Consequently, the defendant applied to set aside the order extending the validity of the writ and to have the action dismissed. The application was granted by the deputy registrar. In my judgment, the deputy registrar was perfectly right to set aside the order extending the validity of the writ.

Good reason

4. In The Ching Ho [2001] 4SLR 285, involving the renewal of an admiralty writ, her Honour Judith Prakash J said that "the principles that have to be applied when a judge considers whether or not to extend the validity of a writ have been settled since 1987. They were clearly spelt out by Amarjeet Singh JC in The Lircay [1997] 2 SLR 669 and I can do no better than to quote the relevant passages of this judgment.

Principles

5. 11.1 Order 6 r 4(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (S 274/70) states: `Where a writ has not been served on a defendant, the Court may by order extend the validity of the writ from time to time for such period, not exceeding 12 months at any one time, beginning with the day next following that on which it would otherwise expire, as May be specified in the order, if an application for extension is made to the Court before that day or such later day (if any) as the Court may allow.` 11.2 The Court of Appeal in Lim Hong Kan & Ors v Mohd Sainudin bin Ahmad [1992] 1 SLR 353 in interpreting the above rule following The Myrto; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Barbrak Ltd (No 3) [1987] 2 All ER 289 laid down the principles to be considered in the exercise of the power. One of the principles was that the power of extension should only be exercised for good reason. Lord Brandon in Kleinwort Benson had observed that it is not possible to either define or circumscribe the scope of the expression good reason and much depended on all the circumstances of the case and hence the application of the phrase must be left to the judge dealing with the matter. There would be good reason for instance where there was an agreement between the parties, express or implied to defer service of the writ or where the delay concerning the application to extend the validity of the writ was induced or contributed by the defendant or his representative. Another salient consideration would be the difficulty in effecting service more particularly if a defendant was evading service. In the end, it was the exercise of discretion by the court which determined whether the writ was to be extended. In the exercise of that discretion - discretion that was undefined - the judge was entitled to have regard to the balance of hardship between the parties as a relevant matter to be taken into account in extending the writ`s validity on an ex parte application and further that in doing so, the court may well...