Australia's 2015 defence white paper: seeking strategic opportunities in Southeast Asia to help manage China's peaceful rise.

• Author: Lee, John
• Position: Essay

The victory of the conservative Liberal Party led by Tony Abbott in the September 2013 general elections means that Australia is now committed to the preparation of a new defence white paper --the country's third in six years--to be released in early 2015. The timing was pre-determined on the back of public promises by Abbott and then shadow defence minister David Johnston during the campaign to deliver the new white paper within eighteen months of entering government. Plans are already underway to ensure that the document will be delivered on time. (1) While the top priority for defence planners over several decades has been to ensure the "defence of Australia" by acquiring military capabilities to repel any direct enemy advances against the mainland, the 2000, (2) 2009 (3) and 2013 (4) defence white papers delivered by the John Howard, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard governments, respectively, have all upheld the importance of "ensuring strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific" as a critical national security interest. This was reaffirmed in the pre-election policy document released by Senator Johnston who has now been sworn in as Australia's Defence Minister. (5)

Although the somewhat meaningless phrase "Asian Century" (6) is now widely used in Australian strategic, defence and economic discourse, some of Australia's neighbours suspect that Canberra focuses too heavily on large Northeast Asian powers such as China and Japan, and not enough on major Southeast Asian players, the latter region defined in this article as the subregion of Asia consisting of countries that are geographically south of China, east of India, west of Papua New Guinea and north of Australia. To be fair, Canberra's attention is appropriately directed towards its three largest trading partners in Asia--China, Japan and South Korea --which are all in Northeast Asia, while the structural causes of potential region-wide instability is primarily a Northeast Asian phenomenon as possible instability is primarily driven by China's re-emergence as a Great Power.

Even so, previous Australian defence white papers have tended to take a predominantly "risk management" approach to Southeast Asia in that they posit that Canberra should ensure that it has adequate military capabilities to manage and contain risks to its national interests should adverse developments occur in that region. While this is a sensible and prudent position to take, little ground has been made in terms of exploring the strategic possibilities of Southeast Asia, and in particular how Australian relationships in Southeast Asia and the capabilities that it brings to the table can contribute to the broader objective of ensuring strategic stability in Asia.

In other words, the strategic analysis underpinning the next defence white paper ought to do several things. Rather than treating Southeast Asia as a standalone strategic region, it needs to link bilateral and multilateral opportunities in Southeast Asia with the future shape of strategic decisions made by powerful players in East Asia, and China in particular. In addition, in conceiving of Australia's future place and role in Southeast Asia, Canberra needs to go beyond its risk management approach. Instead, Canberra should view Southeast Asia as a region filled with strategic opportunity, which directly feeds into the goal of ensuring greater stability throughout Asia. In making this argument, the paper comprises three parts. First, it offers a brief summary of recent Australian strategic and defence thinking on Southeast Asia. Second, it outlines why China is the key variable when it comes to strategic stability or instability in the region, and how China's strategy in achieving its objectives can be shaped and influenced by events and relationships in Southeast Asia. Finally, the paper offers some suggestions as to the role Australia can seek to play in Southeast Asia that will contribute to strategic stability in Asia more generally.

Southeast Asia as a Region of Risk

Although the focus of the 2009 and 2013 defence white papers centred on the military and strategic implications of China's rising power, Southeast Asia was not entirely neglected in these documents or in Australian strategic policy more generally. For example, the 2009 white paper recognized that "A stable and secure Southeast Asia is in Australia's strategic interests", (7) while the 2013 policy statement acknowledged that Southeast Asia is "in a geo-strategically central position between the Indian and Pacific Oceans" and that it acts as a "conduit for the intensifying exchange of goods, people and ideas between East, South and West Asia". Moreover, the region "straddles the Malacca Straits, the world's second busiest shipping channel" and is also "a key region where cooperative strategic arrangements are essential [since these] may well reflect how a rising China and its neighbours manage their relationships". (8)

These are all sound and sensible observations. Yet, there is little put forward to link Australia's strategic objectives in East Asia (and vis-a-vis China in particular) with the pursuit of objectives in Southeast Asia. The proffered argument that a deterioration in relationships between key Southeast Asian countries on the one hand, and China on the other will be indicative of whether the region is entering a period of stability or tense competition is surely correct. The failure by Beijing, Manila or Hanoi to peacefully manage their disputes in the South China Sea is clearly a bad omen for the prospects of stability in Asia.

Even so, there is little in either of the previous two white papers which explores the extent to which Australia's strategic relationships and decisions in Southeast Asia can help maintain and enhance stability and even cooperation in the face of China's rise and unresolved disputes with other countries. Beyond being an indicator of diplomatic health in the region, or else an early warning system of sorts indicating a darker turn in Chinese assertiveness and adventurism, Southeast Asia is largely seen as a region filled with its own dangers and pitfalls that must itself be managed.

For example, when it comes to managing risks in Southeast Asia, Indonesia dominates Australian attention in both white papers. The 2009 version acknowledges the "remarkable (Indonesian) gains in the past decade", that the country has "managed a successful transition to multiparty democracy" and that if these trends continue "Indonesia will continue to evolve as a stable democratic state with improved social cohesion." (9) Yet the very next paragraph goes on to warn that a "weak, fragmented Indonesia beset by intractable communal problems, poverty and failing state institutions, would potentially be a source of threat to our own security [while] an authoritarian or overly nationalistic regime in Jakarta would also create strategic risks for its neighbours". (10)

Indeed, a striking passage in the 2009 white paper under the sub-heading of "A Secure Immediate Neighbourhood" states categorically that Australia "has an enduring strategic interest in preventing or mitigating any attempt by nearby states to develop the capability to undertake sustained military operations within our approaches", and "maintaining military superiority would increase the threshold of military modernisation required by nearby states to be able to develop such a capacity". (11) A similar assessment is offered in the 2013 version which states that "Controlling the sea and air approaches to our continent is the key to defending Australia." This encompasses air and sea control "in places and at times of our choosing", the capacity to "deny or defeat adversary attacks and protect key sea lines of communication (SLOCs)", and the capabilities to "deny adversary forces access to forward operating bases or the freedom to conduct strikes against Australia from our maritime approaches". (12) Although the 2009 white paper explicitly identifies Indonesia as the most likely Southeast Asian nation to constitute this potential threat, the 2013 version is more subtle but still states clearly that the trajectory of Indonesia is of "singular importance" and is Australia's "most important relationship in the region". (13) When these passages are understood in the context that the section is about identifying possible sources of threat and instability in Australia's immediate region, it is clear that Canberra's approach is to hope for the best in its relationship with Indonesia but almost solely focus on preparing for the worst.

Even when more positive and constructive roles are ascribed to countries such as Indonesia, it is circumscribed within the context of maintaining stability primarily within Southeast Asia, with little consideration of the broader strategic benefits for wider Australian objectives. For example, in the 2009 white paper, the benefit of stability and prosperity in Southeast Asia is that this will reduce the prospect of the rise of a hostile Southeast Asian nation (i.e., Indonesia). (14) The 2013 version merely states that a prosperous and democratic Indonesia will play an increasingly important role in enhancing regional stability, and become more influential within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in regimes such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the G20. (15)

These arguments and observations are plausible and relevant. However, in an environment where managing China's rise is seen as the single most important factor for peace and stability in the Asia Pacific (or Indo-Pacific which is the preferred geo-strategic term in the 2013 white paper), viewing Southeast Asia as a region only containing countries that might constitute a strategic risk to Australia--and even a direct threat--is surely only one part of the equation of risk management and strategic analysis. Locating opportunities for...