Xi Jinping's foreign policy dilemma: one belt, one road or the South China Sea?

AuthorNie, Wenjuan

Since Xi Jinping became President, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and head of the Central Military Commission in 2012-13, a significant amount of attention has been devoted to his leadership style and foreign policy initiatives. (1) Under his leadership, several significant foreign policy initiatives have been undertaken, including a more stringent policy towards North Korea and the establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. Moreover, during the US-China presidential summit in June 2013, Xi called for a "new type of major-power relationship", in which China and the United States would strive to avoid conflict, increase cooperation and develop a mutually advantageous relationship. (2) Arguably, since Xi's ascent to power, China's foreign policy has moved decisively away from the two-decade old taoguang yanghui (keeping a low profile) to fenfa youwei (striving for achievement). (3)

With regard to Southeast Asia, and in particular the South China Sea dispute, Xi has made some bold policy decisions. For example, in May 2014 China deployed the HYSY-981 drilling platform into Vietnam's claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) triggering a major crisis in Sino-Vietnamese relations. More significantly, from late 2013, China began transforming seven atolls under its control in the Spratly Islands into massive artificial islands, leading to accusations that Beijing was "militarizing" the dispute. (4) And in January 2013, China refused to participate in a legal case brought against it by the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which challenged Beijing's maritime jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea, and subsequently rejected the final verdict when it was announced in July 2016. (5)

At the same time as China has been pursuing a more assertive policy in the South China Sea, Xi has also telegraphed clear signals of goodwill and cooperation towards the countries of Southeast Asia. Perhaps the most important of these is Xi's proposed "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road" announced in October 2013--together known as the "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) initiative--which aims to promote joint development, common prosperity and cooperation between China and many countries across Asia. OBOR aims to reorient China's domestic economic structure by enhancing connectivity and cooperation between China and the rest of Eurasia. OBOR is also a useful tool for China to shape international rules and norms, as well as influence the global economic order, all of which are crucial to achieving President Xi's domestic "China dream" and international "national rejuvenation". (6)

But are Xi's assertive policies in the South China Sea and OBOR contradictory? It is extremely difficult for Xi to promote cooperation via the OBOR while simultaneously pursuing an assertive posture in the South China Sea. China's territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea are highly contentious, and over the past decade have led to rising tensions between Beijing and the Southeast Asian claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and even Indonesia), as well as between China and other stakeholders such as the United States and Japan. Some scholars have even warned of the dangers of war in the South China Sea. (7) Such a war, especially between China and the United States, would be devastating for the entire region. It would also spell the end of China's grand cooperative initiative, the OBOR.

Within China, opinions vary as to what the country's priorities should be. Some scholars tend to place less value on the OBOR and believe that upholding China's claims in the South China Sea should take priority. (8) Other experts in China believe that OBOR is more important than the South China Sea, and that pursuing a hardline policy towards the dispute will undermine the initiative. They argue that China should not allow the situation in the South China Sea to deteriorate further, and that war should be avoided at all costs. (9) To ensure OBOR's success, proponents have suggested that the Chinese government should heed former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's dictum that China should shelve the dispute and engage in the joint development of maritime resources, expedite a Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and lower the tone of state-sponsored propaganda so as to reduce tensions and create an environment conducive to a peaceful resolution. (10)

These differing opinions within China all have their own merits. However, they suffer from the same shortcomings: the lack of theoretical rigour when analysts discuss the relative importance of the South China Sea and the OBOR. Additionally, many approach the issue from the standpoint of China's national interests to argue for future policy choices. Despite this conventional method of analysis, some issues need to be explored in practice. For instance, who defines the national interest? If the decision is left to politicians, problems may arise as to what he or she would choose if the perceived national interests are in conflict with party or individual interests, as perhaps is the case with China.

As a theoretical framework, this article utilizes the supreme leadership's perception of political performance to analyze China's future foreign policy choices. This framework is important, both theoretically and in practical terms, because in a highly centralized authoritarian system such as China's, the supreme leader is often the primary arbiter in foreign policy decision-making. Such leaders are at the forefront of the country's diplomacy and regularly announce important foreign policy decisions. (11) As with other politicians around the world, the leader's priority is more often than not dominated by his own interests rather than the interests of the state.

The first section of this article illustrates Xi's personality through the lens of diplomatic political performance, mainly through his foreign policy activities following his inauguration. The second section explores the ways in which political performance can be enhanced with reference to three dimensions. The comparison between the OBOR and the South China Sea issue in the third section will consider the dimensions of feasibility, significance and morality. The final section concludes this article with a brief summary of the results of the comparison and the possible implications for future trends in China's foreign policy.

Xi's Pursuit of Political Performance

Political performance is a concept that is closely associated with political legitimacy. For Max Weber, legitimacy primarily refers to an "immediate relation of command and obedience" resting on the credence in its validity. (12) Weber further outlined three types of legitimate authority as the inner justifications of subject obedience and the external means of domination: traditional authority; charismatic authority; and legal authority. Despite the fact that Weber's definition remains contentious, the concept of legitimacy is an important part of modern political philosophy and has been central to many empirical studies on politics. (13)

Studies on China cannot escape the theoretical paradigm of legitimacy. For instance, Zhao Dingxin replaces Weber's three ideal-typical sources of legitimacy--tradition, charisma and legality--with a modified schema comprising ideology, legal-electoral legitimation and performance, to analyze Chinese politics. (14) Meanwhile, some empirical studies have argued that since the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s, China has adopted a pragmatic strategy of "performance legitimacy" in which the government has relied on accomplishing concrete goals such as economic growth, social stability, strengthening national power and "good governance" (governing competence and accountability) to retain its domestic legitimacy. (15) It can be argued that performance legitimacy is key to understanding China's domestic politics. The article is distinguished from previous studies by further exploring the international dimensions of performance legitimacy, i.e., how to utilize foreign policy performance to enhance domestic legitimacy. (16)

Aside from the issue of legitimacy, there are other reasons to explore Xi's pursuit of political performance on the international scene. First, Xi, who embodies the latest generation of leadership, is facing an unprecedented historical opportunity during his expected two terms in office. In 2021, the CCP will celebrate its centennial, by which time China could have emerged as the world's largest economy. Such a position will in turn require major diplomatic initiatives as China moves to shoulder more global responsibilities. Second, both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping bequeathed to China far-reaching foreign policy legacies. During Mao's era, Premier Zhou Enlai proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which, from the Chinese perspective, is seen as a major initiative in the history of international relations and a historic contribution to the establishment of a new type of just and equitable international order. (17) During his time in office, Deng proposed the strategic policy of taoguang yanghui (hiding oneself and keeping a low profile) and gezhi zhengyi gongtong kaifa (shelving disputes and joint development), which, until Xi's accession to power, provided the foundation for China's foreign policy for more than two decades. The foreign policy initiatives of Mao and Deng set excellent examples for Xi, who was promoted as the third generation leader following Mao and Deng. (18)

President Xi appears determined to leave a strong foreign policy legacy. Xi has exercised far greater political strength than his predecessor, Hu Jintao, illustrated by his wide-ranging and hard-hitting anti-corruption campaign...

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