Wong Poon Kay v PP

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ
• Judgment Date: 28 March 2024
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeal No 9141 of 2023
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Wong Poon Kay

and

Public Prosecutor

[2024] SGHC 91

Sundaresh Menon CJ

Magistrate's Appeal No 9141 of 2023

General Division of the High Court

Criminal Law — Offences — Property — Receiving stolen property — Appellant pleading guilty to abetting by engaging in conspiracy to dishonestly receive stolen property — Whether “multiple starting points” or “sentencing matrix” sentencing framework should be adopted — Section 411 Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed)

Criminal Law — Statutory offences — Companies Act — Appellant pleading guilty to failing to exercise reasonable diligence in discharge of his duties — Whether appellant's conduct was more serious than accused person in Abdul Ghani bin Tahir v PP[2017] 4 SLR 1153 — Section 157 Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed)

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing — Sentencing — Appeals — Eleven years having elapsed between when appellant's first statement was taken and when appellant was charged — Whether there was inordinate delay in prosecution that justified lower sentence

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) A “sentencing matrix” framework modelled on the two-stage, five-step framework in Logachev Vladislav v PP[2018] 4 SLR 609 was adopted for s 411 PC offences to provide a clearer and more systematic method of analysis that was likely to promote consistency between cases. Such offences manifested in a myriad of ways and the danger of the “multiple starting points” approach was that the initial focus on the amount of stolen property involved might dilute the significance of the different degrees of harm and culpability of the offender: at [46] to [53].

(2) In the first step of the framework, apart from the offence-specific factors listed in Huang Ying-Chun v PP[2019] 3 SLR 606, a relevant offence-specific factor going towards culpability was whether the offender's method of operation made it easier to evade detection by the authorities. In the second step of the framework, an indicative sentencing range that differed from the court's decision in PP v Pham Van Ban[2020] SGDC 96 was adopted: at [55] to [57].

(3) Only inordinate delay would warrant considering leniency in sentencing. This meant that the delay had to have been unusually long and not explicable by reasonable grounds. Whether there was an inordinate delay was not measured in terms of the absolute length of time that had transpired, but had to always be assessed in the context of the nature of investigations: at [66] to [68].

(4) The period of around six and a half years taken for the investigation of the offences was reasonable due to the complexity of the operation and the fact that the very essence of the offences committed by Wong was to hide the criminal behaviour. Even though one reason for the gap in time between 2012 and 2015 was due to the change of personnel working on the matter in the CAD, this did not render the delay inordinate. Such occurrences were part of the normal operational realities of an organisation like the CAD, and such delays should be reasonably anticipated in the course of an extended investigation: at [77].

(5) It was reasonable for the Prosecution to have awaited guidance from the courts in Abdul Ghani bin Tahir v PP[2017] 4 SLR 1153 (“Abdul Ghani”) and Yap Chen Hsiang Osborn v PP[2019] 2 SLR 319 (“Osborn Yap”) before charging Wong, especially since these decisions were potentially relevant to the present case to the extent that they both raised questions of law concerning money-laundering offences: at [82] and [83].

(6) Any delay in reviewing the matter after Abdul Ghani was decided in the High Court was not inordinate because it would have accounted for at most one to two years in the context of the long period that the process had taken largely on account of the appellant's own actions. It would also have taken time for the Prosecution to determine the approach to be taken for the present case, and it would have been reasonable for the Prosecution to wait for the proceedings in Osborn Yap to conclude after the questions of law in Osborn Yap were first raised: at [84] and [85].

[Observation: While it was ordinarily for the defendant to show an inordinate delay in prosecution, when dealing with matters that had occurred some time ago in the past, it would promote the expeditious conduct of proceedings if the Prosecution provided such information to the Defence and the court at an earlier stage of the proceedings: at [77].]

Case(s) referred to

A Karthik v PP[2018] 5 SLR 1289 (refd)

Abdul Ghani bin Tahir v PP[2017] 4 SLR 1153 (refd)

Ang Jeanette v PP[2011] 4 SLR 1 (refd)

Ang Peng Tiam v Singapore Medical Council[2017] 5 SLR 356 (folld)

Chai Chung Hoong v PP[2023] 4 SLR 1195 (refd)

Chan Kum Hong Randy v PP[2008] 2 SLR(R) 1019; [2008] 2 SLR 1019 (refd)

Chen Weixiong Jerriek v PP[2003] 2 SLR(R) 334; [2003] 2 SLR 334 (folld)

Ching Hwa Ming v PP[2024] 3 SLR 1547 (refd)

Huang Ying-Chun v PP[2019] 3 SLR 606 (folld)

Logachev Vladislav v PP[2018] 4 SLR 609 (refd)

Ng Kean Meng Terence v PP[2017] 2 SLR 449 (folld)

PP v Alfonso Low Eng Choon[2023] SGDC 37 (refd)

PP v Ambrose Dionysius[2018] SGDC 35 (refd)

PP v Dorj Enkhmunkh[2018] SGDC 75 (refd)

PP v Karunanithi s/o Alagasamy[2020] SGDC 134 (refd)

PP v Lim Chih Ming John[2018] SGDC 103 (refd)

PP v Muhammad Nazir bin Abdul Rahman[2018] SGDC 150 (refd)

PP v Ngiam Kok Min[2012] SGDC 438 (refd)

PP v Ng Koon Lay[2020] SGDC 196 (refd)

PP v Ong Kim Chuan[2016] SGDC 58 (refd)

PP v Pham Van Ban[2020] SGDC 96 (refd)

PP v Robin Lim Wee Teck[2016] SGDC 236 (refd)

PP v Soh Chee Wen[2023] SGHC 299 (refd)

PP v Wong Poon Kay[2023] SGDC 187 (refd)

Salwant Singh s/o Amer Singh, Re[2019] 5 SLR 1037 (folld)

Tan Kiang Kwang v PP[1995] 3 SLR(R) 746; [1996] 1 SLR 280 (refd)

Tan Siew Chye Nicholas v PP[2023] 4 SLR 1223 (refd)

Wong Kai Chuen Philip v PP[1990] 2 SLR(R) 361; [1990] SLR 1011 (folld)

Yap Chen Hsiang Osborn v PP[2019] 2 SLR 319 (refd)

Facts

The appellant, Wong Poon Kay (“Wong”) was employed in companies that provided corporate and secretarial services. He became acquainted with a British national, Kassem Mohammad Chehab (“Chehab”), in this context sometime in or about November 2008. Wong helped Chehab set up a total of six companies in Singapore, and two companies in Belize. He also helped to set up their bank accounts in Singapore. These companies were shell companies used by Chehab to receive the proceeds of criminal activities from foreign jurisdictions.

Wong helped Chehab incorporate two companies in Singapore, Russneft Pte Ltd (“Russneft”) and Areba Pte Ltd (“Areba”) on 1 December 2008, and became a director of these companies. Wong received two letters from United Overseas Bank (“UOB”) in June and July 2009, stating that the remitters of moneys into Russneft's and Areba's UOB accounts wished to cancel the transfers in question. The second letter stated that the remitter wished to cancel the transfer because it was fraudulent. In both instances, Chehab instructed Wong not to permit the cancellation of the transfers and Wong complied. Wong assisted Chehab in incorporating four more Singapore companies in 2009 and became a director of those companies. This was despite his suspicions that the bank accounts of Russneft and Areba were being used to receive criminal proceeds.

The Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) of the Singapore Police Force took Wong's first statement on 2 March 2010. On that same day and on 3 March 2010, Wong alerted Chehab that the authorities were investigating Russneft and Areba and intimated that he would resign as a director of the other four Singapore companies. He also told Chehab not to be active with these other Singapore companies even though the police had not yet connected them with Russneft and Areba. On 4 March 2010, Wong resigned from his directorships in Russneft and Areba, but remained a director of the other four Singapore companies. Wong also assisted Chehab in incorporating two Belize companies in June 2010 and October 2010.

Between 9 February 2010 and 10 February 2011, 11 victims from seven jurisdictions were cheated into remitting a total sum of $640,537.79 into the bank accounts of the companies Wong incorporated for Chehab. Wong profited personally by receiving an amount of between $57,500 and $69,000.

Wong pleaded guilty on 12 April 2023 to one charge of failing to exercise reasonable diligence in the discharge of his duties as a director of one of the Singapore companies, Manford Pte Ltd, under s 157 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“CA”), and six charges of abetting by engaging in a conspiracy with Chehab to dishonestly receive stolen property under s 411 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“PC”). Fifteen other related charges were taken into consideration, and the district judge below (“DJ”) sentenced Wong to an aggregate sentence of 24 months' imprisonment.

Wong appealed against the decision of the DJ on the basis that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive, and contended instead that an appropriate sentence was a sentence of two months' and one day imprisonment.

Legislation referred to

Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) ss 157, 157(1), 157(3)(b)

Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A, 2000 Rev Ed) ss 44(1), 47(1), 47(1)(b), 47(2), 48C, 59(1)

Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) ss 109, 411, 411(1), 420

Mato Kotwani, Chua Ze XuanandWong Min Hui (PDLegal LLC) for the appellant;

Edwin Soh (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the respondent.

28 March 2024

Sundaresh Menon CJ:

1 The appellant, Wong Poon Kay (“Wong”), pleaded guilty to one charge of failing to exercise reasonable diligence in the discharge of his duties as a director of Manford Pte Ltd under s 157(1) and punishable under s 157(3)(b) of the Companies Act (Cap 50,...