Wong Juan Swee v The Law Society of Singapore

JudgeGoh Joon Seng J
Judgment Date22 September 1994
Neutral Citation[1994] SGCA 114
Citation[1994] SGCA 114
Defendant CounselRaymond Tan and Ling Tien Wah (Robert WH Wang & Woo)
Published date19 September 2003
Plaintiff CounselMichael Khoo (Michael Khoo & BB Ong)
Date18 October 1994
Docket NumberCivil Appeal No 39 of 1993
CourtCourt of Appeal (Singapore)
Subject MatterWhether inquiry committee identified precise nature of misconduct committed by appellant,Whether High Court decision final,Disciplinary procedures,Misconduct,Solicitor giving complainant wrongful reference vis-a-vis third party,Whether inquiry committee's report disclosed any other misconduct by appellant,Findings of inquiry committee,Whether Council of Law Society bound by findings of inquiry committee as expressed in its report,Legal Profession,Whether Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear appeal against High Court decision affirming order of penalty,Appeal,Professional conduct,Procedure,ss 86(7), 87(1) & (2)(a) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1990 Ed),s 95 Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1990 Ed),Whether Council's determination of penalty sustainable on basis of any other misconduct by appellant

Cur Adv Vult

This appeal arises from a judgment of Lai Siu Chiu JC in which she dismissed the appellant`s application in Originating Summons No 395 of 1991 to set aside an order made by the Council of the Law Society of Singapore (`the Law Society`) that the appellant pays a penalty of $500 under the provision of s 88(1) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1990 Ed)(`the Act`). The facts leading to the imposition of the penalty by the Council have been set out in detail in the judgment of the learned judicial commissioner, and we need only to repeat them briefly here.

The facts

On 13 June 1990, the Law Society received a complaint from one Christine Lim Sok Choo (`the complainant`), a remisier with Lee & Co (Stocks & Shares Brokers) Pte Ltd (`Lee & Co`), against the appellant, a practising advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore. In brief, the complaint was as follows. The appellant previously acted for the complainant`s mother in a property transaction. Subsequently, the appellant engaged the complainant`s professional services in which the appellant`s brother, one Henry Wong gave the complainant instructions. Subsequently, Henry Wong gave to one Francis Tan Hak Miang (`Francis Tan`) the complainant`s business card. Early in February 1990, the complainant received a telephone call from Francis Tan who was interested in opening an account with her. Following that, on 7 February 1990, Francis Tan gave the complainant his first order for purchase of some shares. According to the complainant, she keyed in Francis Tan`s order at 10am on the same day and then attempted to get in touch with the appellant to check on his creditworthiness. The appellant could not be reached until the afternoon after some of the shares ordered had been bought. The complainant spoke to the appellant and the latter confirmed that she knew Francis Tan, that he was a very rich man, that the complainant would make a lot of money from dealing for him but the complainant should be careful as Francis Tan would give her (the complainant) a lot of problems. The complainant informed the appellant that Francis Tan had placed some orders with her. In reliance on the assurance given by the appellant, the complainant executed the balance of Francis Tan`s orders that day and continued to purchase shares for him on subsequent occasions. Francis Tan failed to pay for and take delivery of all the shares when due despite the complainant`s reminders. Finally, on 22 February 1990, the complainant informed Francis Tan that unless he paid for the shares, her company would exercise their right to sell them. Francis Tan then told her to withhold doing so and obtained a letter from the appellant in her capacity as solicitor. The letter was addressed to Lee & Co and stated as follows:

Mr Tan Hak Miang has instructed us to write to inform you that he undertakes to collect the shares bought through your company between 26 February and 27 February 1990.



The letter was accepted by the deputy general manager of Lee & Co.

The complainant further said that on 23 February 1990 Lee & Co conducted a bankruptcy search and discovered that Francis Tan was an undischarged bankrupt since November 1983.
Upon discovery of this, the complainant immediately called the appellant, and the appellant was apparently surprised and asked the complainant how she found out. When asked why she had not revealed the fact of Francis Tan`s bankruptcy, the appellant said that Francis Tan had asked her (the appellant) not to say anything, although she was the solicitor who had, on the instruction of the petitioning creditor, obtained the receiving and adjudication orders against Francis Tan. The appellant apparently continued to reassure the complainant that despite this, Francis Tan would still be able to pay. In conclusion, the complainant alleged that the appellant in the knowledge of the bankruptcy of Francis Tan had misconducted herself as follows:

(i) by representing and reassuring the complainant that Francis Tan was in a position to participate in the sale and purchase of securities;

(ii) by allowing the complainant to trade for Francis Tan, and

(iii) in her capacity as a solicitor, by reassuring the complainant`s company in her letter dated 22 February 1990 that Francis Tan would collect his shares.



On receipt of this complaint, the Council of the Law Society, in accordance with s 85(1) of the Act, referred it to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel who then constituted an inquiry committee to inquire into the complaint.
The appellant, by her letter of 29 August 1990, gave an explanation to the Chairman of the Inquiry Committee. She denied that she spoke to the complainant on 7 February 1990, but admitted that she did speak to the complainant some time later. Her brother had informed her that Francis Tan was using the complainant`s services, and when she heard this, she immediately called and told the complainant `to be careful in her business dealings` with Francis Tan. The appellant further said thus:

This was a clear message to her to back off ... The warning was the best I could do for her. I did not feel that it was right for me to discuss Mr Tan in detail with her by volunteering the information that he was a bankrupt. I felt that I had done enough without overstepping the bounds of decency and propriety by giving her the warning.



Findings of inquiry committee

The inquiry committee, after having inquired into the complaint, made its report to the Council of the Law Society on 22 November 1990. In the report, the committee expressed its doubt that the complainant`s version was completely true, but found that the appellant had a telephone conversation with the respondent in which she had attempted to `warn` the complainant about Francis Tan, and in that connection had withheld the vital information that Francis Tan was an undischarged bankrupt. The inquiry committee was of the opinion that what the appellant did could amount to giving the complainant a reference on Francis Tan and that the appellant was quite unaware of the extent of her professional duty to third parties in the matter of giving references. In the circumstances, the committee was of the view that no formal investigation by a disciplinary committee was required and recommended a fine of $1,000 be imposed under s 86(7) of the Act. The Council of the Law Society considered the report and, pursuant to s 87(1) of the Act, determined that no cause of sufficient gravity existed for a formal investigation but that the appellant should be ordered to pay a penalty under s 88, and subsequently, after hearing the appellant, ordered her to pay a penalty of $500.

Decision below

The appellant disputed the determination of the Council that a penalty be imposed on her and, pursuant to s 95 of the Act, applied to a judge to set aside the order. The application was heard before Lai Siu Chiu JC. She considered whether the Council of the Law Society was entitled to act on the inquiry committee`s recommendation or impose a penalty. She examined the complaint and the appellant`s reply in some detail. She did not accept the explanation of the appellant that disclosing Francis Tan`s bankruptcy amounted to an invasion of his privacy and expressed the view that by virtue of ss 111(m)(i) and 116(2) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20), the appellant `assisted Francis Tan to perpetuate a fraud if not to commit an illegal act`. In particular, the letter of 22 February 1990 was written by the appellant as a solicitor and such a letter should never have been written by a solicitor for a bankrupt in view of s 111(m)(i) of the Bankruptcy Act. Had the appellant informed the complainant of Francis Tan`s bankruptcy, the complainant would not have continued to buy shares for his account. The learned judicial commissioner held that the third limb of the complaint was substantiated by the findings of the inquiry committee. On the other hand, she found that it might be stretching the meaning of reference to say that the appellant`s warning amounted to a giving of a reference, but the appellant`s own letter of 29 August 1990 reflected her misguided sense of loyalty to Francis Tan and showed her complete ignorance of her professional duty to a third party such as the complainant and such ignorance was inexcusable. She concluded that as there were sufficient grounds for the inquiry committee to arrive at its findings based on the complainant`s letter of 13 June 1990, the Council of the Law Society was entitled to accept the findings.

The appeal

Against her decision, this appeal has been brought. Before us, counsel for the Law Society raised a preliminary objection to the appeal and submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and in support relied on the decision of this court in H ilborne v Law Society of Singapore . In that case, the Council of the Law Society, after considering the report of the inquiry committee on the conduct of the advocate and solicitor concerned, ordered him to pay a penalty of $250. The advocate and solicitor thereupon applied to a judge under s 95 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 217, 1970 Ed) to set aside the penalty. That application was dismissed. On appeal, this court affirmed the decision of the judge. A preliminary point was raised that this court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and that was upheld. Wee Chong Jin CJ said, at pp 190-191:

With regard to the question of jurisdiction on which we reserved our opinion, we are of the view that, although s 95 of the Act empowers an application such as the appellant`s to be made by way of originating summons to a judge to set aside the Council`s order, the order made herein is not an order made by the High Court in a civil matter either in the exercise of its original or of its appellate jurisdiction. Section 29 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 15) confers jurisdiction
...

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2 cases
  • Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore
    • Singapore
    • Court of Appeal (Singapore)
    • 8 January 2021
    ...albeit in obiter dicta. The decision in Hilborne (PC) was followed by the Court of Appeal in Wong Juan Swee v Law Society of Singapore [1994] 3 SLR(R) 619 (“Wong Juan Swee”), which concerned an application by a solicitor under s 95 of the LPA. The Law Society raised a preliminary objection ......
  • Law Society of Singapore v Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd
    • Singapore
    • Court of Appeal (Singapore)
    • 7 April 2011
    ...to the contrary. However, Hilborne (PC) was subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal in Wong Juan Swee v Law Society of Singapore [1994] 3 SLR(R) 619 (“Wong Juan Swee (CA)”) on an additional ground not mentioned by the Privy Council in Hilborne (PC). We will now discuss this decision. (......
3 books & journal articles
  • Civil Procedure
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2011, December 2011
    • 1 December 2011
    ...Law Society of Singapore[19771978] SLR(R) 342 (Hilborne) and the Singapore Court of Appeal in Wong Juan Swee v Law Society of Singapore[1994] 3 SLR(R) 619 which approved of Hilborne: Top TenENR at [50] and [57]. Costs Action brought on behalf of another party 8.11 A court will generally not......
  • Legal Profession
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2011, December 2011
    • 1 December 2011
    ...Law Society of Singapore[19771978] SLR(R) 342 and a previously constituted Court of Appeal in Wong Juan Swee v Law Society of Singapore[1994] 3 SLR(R) 619 which followed the Privy Council, were wrong to entertain appeals from a review judge's determination (under s 95 of the LPA) of the Law......
  • WINDS OF CHANGE: DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE LEGAL PROFESSION (AMENDMENT) ACT 19931
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 1995, December 1995
    • 1 December 1995
    ...Law Society of Singapore[1994] 2 SLR 476 and the dissenting judgment of Justice Warren Khoo in Wong Juan Swee v Law Society of Singapore[1994] 3 SLR 846 on the role of the Inquiry Committee. 44 Under section 94A. In this respect, it must be noted that the previous position was that such a c......

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