Werner Samuel Vuillemin v Overseas-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd and another matter

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Woo Bih Li J
• Judgment Date: 20 April 2018
• Neutral Citation: [2018] SGHC 92
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Registrar’s Appeal from the State Courts No 3 of 2018 and HC/Summons No 1502 of 2018
• Year: 2018
• Published date: 26 April 2018
• Hearing Date: 22 February 2018,08 March 2018,02 April 2018
• Plaintiff Counsel: Appellant/Plaintiff in person
• Defendant Counsel: Jansen Chow, Sara Sim and Ang Leong Hao (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,Anton Piller orders,Courts and Jurisdiction,Judges,Recusal
• Citation: [2018] SGHC 92

Woo Bih Li J: Introduction

High Court Summons No 1502 of 2018 (“the Recusal Summons”) was the application of Werner Samuel Vuillemin (“V”) that I be recused from hearing any application or matter arising out of or in connection with his substantive action in District Court Suit No 3051 of 2013 (“DC 3051”) including HC/RAS 3/2018 (“RAS 3/2018”). RAS 3/2018 was V’s appeal against the order of court dated 18 January 2018 by District Judge Chiah Kok Khun (“DJ Chiah”) in DC/SUM 3920/2017.

DC 3051 is an action initiated by V in the State Courts of the Republic of Singapore against Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (“the Bank”) in which V claims an order for delivery by the Bank to him of contents kept in V’s safe deposit box (“the Box”) that was located in a branch of the Bank at Specialist Shopping Centre which was to be re-developed. The Bank had opened and kept the contents of the Box in a sealed bag when the branch relocated from Specialist Shopping Centre.

I had heard two previous applications of V before. As regards the first application, the Bank had applied for and obtained an order from the State Courts that V was to provide $7,000 as security for the Bank’s costs in the substantive action up till the exchange of affidavits of evidence-in-chief. V then appealed against that order and his appeal was dismissed by a district judge (“the Appeal Dismissal Order”). He then sought to appeal to the High Court against the Appeal Dismissal Order but he was out of time. Therefore he applied for an extension of time to file that appeal out of time. After hearing arguments, I dismissed his application for an extension of time.

V then filed another application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against that decision of mine. I dismissed that application as well.

I delivered my grounds of decision for both applications on 30 November 2016. It is reported in Werner Samuel Vuillemin v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd [2017] 3 SLR 501 (“my previous GD”).

Prior to hearing the Recusal Summons and RAS 3/2018, I had also heard an appeal by V against the outcome of another application of his (District Court Summons No 131 of 2017) in which he had applied for leave to commence committal proceedings against one Ms Lee, an officer of the Bank, on the basis that she had lied in her affidavit. His application was dismissed by the State Courts. He then filed an appeal (“RAS 9/2017”) which was heard by me. I dismissed his appeal.

In DC/SUM 3920/2017 filed on 17 November 2017, V applied for an Anton Piller (“AP”) order for V and his representatives to enter, search and inspect the Bank’s premises, and to deliver into the safekeeping of V or a supervising solicitor: a sealed bag containing the contents which were removed from the Box by the Bank; a recording of the occasion (however made) when the Box was opened and the contents removed on 28 June 2007 and/or any other day.

I will refer to that application as “the Summons for an AP Order”.

The Summons for an AP Order was dismissed on 18 January 2018 by DJ Chiah. V then filed RAS 3/2018 on 25 January 2018 to appeal to the High Court against that decision. That appeal was fixed for hearing before me.

However, before the appeal was finally heard by me, V filed the Recusal Summons on 29 March 2018.

Both the Recusal Summons and V’s appeal in RAS 3/2018 were fixed for hearing before me on 2 April 2018. After hearing arguments, I dismissed the Recusal Summons. I also dismissed V’s appeal. Consequential costs orders were then made. I set out my reasons below.

Background

The appeal in RAS 3/2018 was initially fixed for hearing before me on 22 February 2018. However, as V was not present, I adjourned the hearing to 8 March 2018. I directed the Bank’s solicitors to write to V to inform him of the next date of hearing.

On 6 March 2018, V wrote to the Registrar of the State Courts to seek an adjournment of the hearing fixed for 8 March 2018 to 2 April 2018.

On 7 March 2018, the Registrar of the Supreme Court replied to inform him: that the hearing on 8 March 2018 would remain; that he was to copy his correspondence with the court to the other party; and that since he had mentioned a delay in his receipt of correspondence (which was sent to his correspondence address which was in turn the address of a company), he might wish to provide the court with an email address at which correspondence might be sent to him.

On 8 March 2018, V and the Bank’s solicitors appeared before the court. V said that he was not aware of the hearing on 22 February 2018. He asked for an adjournment as he needed more time to prepare his submissions and maybe an application for recusal.

It transpired that V had written on 5 February 2018 to the Bank’s solicitors to say that he would be overseas from 6 February 2018 and would return on or about 23 February 2018, and that the Bank’s solicitors omitted to inform the court of this when they attended before the court on 22 February 2018.

As for V’s application for an adjournment, the Bank’s solicitors pointed out that V himself had already argued the Summons for an AP Order before DJ Chiah. He had had enough time to prepare for the hearing of his appeal.

Although the Bank wished to proceed with the hearing of the appeal on 8 March 2018, I adjourned the hearing to 2 April 2018 with the direction that V was to file and serve any application for recusal with the supporting papers by 22 March 2018 and that that application was to be heard on or before the date of 2 April 2018.

I also urged V to give the court and the Bank’s solicitors an email address in addition to the postal correspondence address he had given so that urgent communication might reach him in time. If the email address was that of a friend, it was for him to make the necessary arrangement as to how his friend was to update him.

The Recusal Summons was filed on 29 March 2018 after the deadline of 22 March 2018 I had stipulated.

On 2 April 2018, V and the Bank’s solicitors attended before me. The Bank’s solicitors were prepared to carry on with the hearing of the Recusal Summons although the papers were served after the 22 March 2018 deadline.

After hearing arguments, I dismissed the Recusal Summons and directed V to proceed with his appeal in RAS 3/2018.

V then said he was told that there should be another hearing for RAS 3/2018 (on a different day) after my decision on the Recusal Summons. He should have time to properly prepare for the appeal. The Bank’s solicitors objected to any further adjournment.

I again directed V to proceed with his appeal. Thereupon he produced a 9-page document which he called a “draft” of his submissions, proceeded to sign it and tendered it to the court with a copy for the Bank’s solicitors.

After hearing arguments, I dismissed his appeal as well. After hearing arguments on costs, I made consequential orders on costs of the appeal and of the Recusal Summons.

The court’s reasons The Recusal Summons

In respect of the Recusal Summons, V had proceeded to attack my previous GD to argue that I had been prejudiced against him. I do not propose to respond to all his arguments as that will entail repeating many of the reasons in my previous GD again.

However, I will mention a few points that V had raised partly to give an idea of his allegations and partly to address some allegations which were based on matters arising after my previous GD was delivered.

Before I do so, I would mention that V said that he is a litigant in person and is unfamiliar with litigation procedure although he had gathered some basic understanding of the rule of law as he had been conducting the litigation on his own for several years. He emphasised that at no time was he ever represented in court by a solicitor.

Yet, it seemed to this court that it was likely that he did have access to legal advice, whether or not a solicitor was formally on record as representing him in court. I alluded to this at [18] of my previous GD.

The language and substance of V’s supporting affidavit for the Recusal Summons (“the Supporting Affidavit for RS”) suggested that it was likely that he did have the benefit of a solicitor or someone with legal expertise to assist him. While V was entitled to obtain assistance from whatever source he saw fit, he was not entitled to portray himself as someone who was as severely handicapped as he was suggesting. If V had prepared the Supporting Affidavit for RS all on his own, this would suggest that he is more capable and resourceful than he had suggested. I now elaborate on some of V’s allegations about prejudice on my part.

First, at para 31 of the Supporting Affidavit for RS, he referred to [28] of my previous GD where I referred to Mr Kirpal Singh (“Mr Singh”) as his “then-solicitor”. In [28] of my previous GD, I referred to a meeting which V and Mr Singh had had with the Bank. V had alleged that although he had signed some forms as required by the Bank, he was not allowed to collect the contents of the Box because he had reserved all his rights against the Bank. V’s argument for the Recusal Summons was that he had never engaged Mr Singh to advise or represent him in DC 3051 or otherwise and I was therefore incorrect to refer to Mr Singh as his “then-solicitor”. Yet, in the same para 31 of the Supporting Affidavit for RS, he also said two other things. First, Mr Singh was a solicitor who had accompanied him to the Bank’s office. Secondly, “Mr Kirpal Singh was the one [he] approached for advice and help on Singapore law on an ad hoc basis when it became necessary”.

Therefore, even though V had not engaged Mr Singh to represent him in court, that did not mean that he had not engaged Mr Singh at all. Mr Singh was not accompanying V merely as a friend. In V’s own words in the Supporting Affidavit for RS at para 31, Mr Singh “was a solicitor whom [he] found and over...