Wee Keng Hong Mark v ABN Amro Bank NV and Another

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: MPH Rubin J
• Judgment Date: 13 January 1997
• Neutral Citation: [1997] SGHC 10
• Docket Number: Suit No 28 of 1991
• Date: 13 January 1997
• Year: 1997
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Roger Gyles QC, Lok Vi Ming and Low Chai Chong (Rodyk & Davidson)
• Citation: [1997] SGHC 10
• Defendant Counsel: Elizabeth Appleby QC, Christopher Chuah, Mano Sandrasegara and Ian De Vaz (Drew & Napier),Peter Goldsmith QC, Lek Siang Pheng and Paul Wong (Helen Yeo & Partners)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Whether a non-party to an application is entitled to costs,Principles,Civil Procedure,Costs

This matter concerns an interlocutory application for further and better particulars taken out by Mr Mark Wee Keng Hong, the original plaintiff in Suit No 28/91, in his action against Algemene Bank Nederland NV (now known as ABN AMRO Bank NV) claiming damages (for conversion, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence) and a declaration that he was not indebted to the defendants for a sum of $3,691,337.99. As the action wound its way up, it became decidedly complex and in the result Mr Mark Wee`s father, Mr ASK Wee, became in a sense the co-claimant against the bank and the bank`s former employee one Mr Thio Syn Ghee became a co-defendant - the plaintiff and his father on one side, the Bank and the said Mr Thio on the other.

The suit, along with a related Suit No 1504/91 was scheduled for hearing from the week commencing 16 September 1996. However on 4 September 1996, Mr Mark Wee`s solicitors took out an application for further directions (see Notice for Further Directions No 380 of 1996 - `NFD 380/96`) in which they prayed for an order requiring the bank to file and serve on him within five days from the date of the order, a further supplementary list of nearly 46 sets of documents verified by affidavit.

This interlocutory application in NFD 380/96 originally came for hearing before the learned Judicial Commissioner CR Rajah along with two other applications in NFD No 382/96 and NFD 283/96 on 11 September 1996. The learned judicial commissioner dealt with and disposed of NFD 382/96 and 283/96 but adjourned NFD 380/96 to be dealt with by the judge who was scheduled to hear the case from 16 September 1996. Consequently the application was heard by me for nearly five days from 16 September 1996.

Noting that this application was taken out by Mr Mark Wee and was directed exclusively against the bank , I suggested to counsel representing Mr Thio that they need not be present and could be excused from the hearing. Counsel for Mr Thio made it known that they wished to be present as according to them they were interested in knowing the outcome. As a result, with the court`s leave, they remained in court throughout the hearing.

At the conclusion of the hearing of NFD 380/96, I made the following orders:

I have carefully considered all the arguments advanced by the respective counsel in this application for further directions. When the hearing of this application commenced, the plaintiff`s application was in relation to a total of 46 items. Ultimately, the request was narrowed down to only 21 items, namely, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 30, 31, 32, 36, 39 and 46. Amongst the foregoing, item 30 is admittedly subsumed under item 3. It would appear to me that the whittling down of the list was partly due to the recognition by the parties that some of the items originally asked for are not discoverable and the remainder had already been disclosed or provided to them.

Of the items now being demanded by the plaintiff, several objections were taken as to their discovery based on grounds of legal professional privilege, banking secrecy, relevance and the lateness of the application. No doubt, Mr Gyles vigorously contested this.

During the hearing, a great deal of emphasis was placed by the parties, particularly on items 4 and 13, in relation to an internal report by the bank and the correspondence between the bank `s solicitors and the bank dated on or prior to 3 January 1991 referred to in the discovery items submitted to the court by Mr Gyles.

Having considered all the arguments and the learning referred to, I order, save for items 4 and 13 which will be dealt with by me shortly, the plaintiff`s application concerning items 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 30, 31, 32, 36, 39 and 46 is disallowed with costs. I shall no doubt in due course, if necessary, give my reasons in writing for my decision. Suffice it if I said most of the items disallowed are irrelevant for the due prosecution of the claim at hand; some of the items, as the documents tendered show, do not exist; some of which had been asked for previously were either disallowed or temporarily abandoned; and some of them are clearly protected by legal professional privilege of banking secrecy.

Now, reverting to items 4 and 13, in the main, they concern an investigation report commissioned by the bank after a complaint lodged by Mr Wee senior in his letter dated 7 January 1991. There is no indication anywhere in the documents tendered during the proceedings that the investigation report was for the purposes of placing it before the Bank `s legal advisors although the writ against the Bank by Mr Mark Wee was issued on 7 January 1991.

Apart from the submission by the plaintiff`s counsel that the report is privileged and a very general averment by Tan Hwee Suan in her affidavit filed on 17 September 1996, there is no further material to suggest

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