Vew v Vev

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Sundaresh Menon CJ,Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA,Judith Prakash JCA
• Judgment Date: 14 April 2022
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 52 of 2021

VEW

and

VEV

[2022] SGCA 34

Sundaresh Menon CJ, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA and Judith Prakash JCA

Civil Appeal No 52 of 2021

Court of Appeal

Conflict of Laws — Restraint of foreign proceedings — Husband and wife staying in UK property solely owned by husband after marriage — Husband and wife divorcing in Singapore — Husband obtaining anti-suit injunction against wife's application under Pt III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (c 42) (UK) in respect of UK property — Principles applicable to grant of anti-suit injunction against proceedings under Pt III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 — Whether anti-suit injunction should be set aside — Part III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (c 42) (UK)

Family Law — Divorce — Husband and wife staying in UK property solely owned by husband after marriage — Husband and wife divorcing in Singapore — Husband obtaining anti-suit injunction against wife's application under Pt III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (c 42) (UK) in respect of UK property — Principles applicable to grant of anti-suit injunction against proceedings under Pt III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 — Whether anti-suit injunction should be set aside — Part III Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (c 42) (UK)

Held, allowing the appeal and setting aside the ASI:

(1) The present case was different from a “typical” case where an ASI was sought based on allegations of vexatious or oppressive conduct, as it concerned a situation where: (a) the foreign proceedings were initiated under an English statute; and (b) Singapore had enacted its own legislation modelled after Part III, in the form of ch 4A (“Chapter 4A”) of the Women's Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (the “Women's Charter”): at [49] and [54].

(2) Part III offered a statutory right of relief that was conferred upon a certain class of litigant. On the face of it, there was nothing inherently vexatious or oppressive in the conduct of a party who sought financial relief under Part III after having received an order for financial relief from a court overseas. Further, the “filter mechanism” in the MFPA presupposed that the English court would indeed be diligent in sifting out unmeritorious cases: at [56] and [59].

(3) As Chapter 4A was part of Singapore's public policy under the Women's Charter, the court had to consider whether allowing the Part III proceedings to continue would offend the public policy underpinning Chapter 4A. The present appeal also had potential ramifications for how foreign jurisdictions dealt with Chapter 4A: at [60] to [62].

(4) It was uncontroversial that the party against whom the ASI was sought had to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court, both in the present case and in the “typical” case: at [64].

(5) However, the question of whether Singapore was the “natural forum” for the resolution of the dispute between the parties was not relevant in this particular context. The whole basis of Part III (and Chapter 4A) was that it might be appropriate for more than one jurisdiction to be involved: at [66] to [68].

(6) The heart of the analysis in the present context really rested on whether the Part III proceedings would be vexatious or oppressive to the respondent if allowed to continue. In this regard, the court preferred the test of “vexatious and oppressive” conduct to the test of “unconscionable” conduct: at [69].

(7) It could not be the case that the commencement of Part III proceedings was always vexatious and oppressive, justifying the grant of an ASI. This position would render Part III ineffectual and would be an affront to comity. It would also sit uncomfortably with the fact that Singapore itself had modelled Chapter 4A after Part III, and with the fact that the leave mechanism in Part III of the MFPA presumed that the UK court would be diligent in sifting out unmeritorious applications. The statutory provisions in the MFPA (where the English court would consider whether to grant leave and order relief) were useful “safety valves” against a foreign applicant taking advantage of the MFPA to undermine the Singapore court's orders. Further, Singapore had itself adopted those same provisions in Chapter 4A. A Singapore court should therefore generally be slow to grant an ASI against the commencement of Part III proceedings in the UK: at [72] to [76].

(8) That, however, did not mean that a Singapore court could never grant an ASI against Part III proceedings. While the “safety valves” in Part III of the MFPA were useful as supplementary aids, and weight should certainly be placed on the grant of leave by an English court, that should not be conclusive of whether an ASI should be granted against Part III proceedings, as the Singapore court had to retain the ability to intervene to safeguard its own public policy, and the integrity of its court proceedings, where necessary. However, what exactly constituted an unwarranted interference with Singapore's public policy ought to be dealt with after full consideration of all the facts in each case, taking into account factors like whether the English court had granted or denied leave, the stage of the divorce proceedings in Singapore, and the nature of the parties' claims in the Part III proceedings: at [77].

(9) In the present case, the mere fact that the appellant was commencing Part III proceedings in respect of the Property, and her reliance on the same arguments or the same factual matrix present in the Singapore proceedings for her claim in the UK, was not a sufficient justification for the grant of an ASI: at [83].

(10) As for the possibility that the English court might come to a different decision from the Singapore court in respect of the division of the Property, this was not an unattractive argument. The issue might well have to be addressed by Parliament should such cases arise for decision in the future. However, it might be possible to lower the incidence of such disputes in future similar cases involving Part III proceedings (or proceedings under similar foreign legislation) through active case management, for example, by inviting parties to confirm from the start of their divorce proceedings in Singapore all possible jurisdictions in which they intended to litigate the ancillary matters pertaining to the divorce, so that the Singapore court (and the parties themselves) could consider whether certain assets should be left to be divided by the courts of that particular jurisdiction after the parties had been divorced in Singapore (or indeed, whether it would be more prudent to commence divorce proceedings in that foreign jurisdiction instead): at [84] and [85].

(11) In the context of Part III proceedings, there could arguably be an impact on Singapore's public policy in ensuring the finality of its judgments, depending on the conditions that were attached to the grant of financial relief under Part III. In previous cases, it seemed that the English and Singapore courts had, in substance, either supplanted the foreign orders or foreclosed the possibility of such foreign orders. It could be argued that there would be an impact on Singapore's public policy in the present case if, as a condition of being granted financial relief under Part III in respect of the Property, the appellant was similarly required by the English court to relinquish her claim to the matrimonial assets in Singapore, as this would, in effect, amount to setting aside the DJ's AM orders: at [86] and [87].

(12) However, neither of those concerns applied in the present case to justify granting an ASI. First, the DJ found that the Property was not part of the pool of matrimonial assets. Thus, the Property could not have been divided between the appellant and respondent pursuant to the divorce proceedings in Singapore, and the Part III proceedings initiated by the appellant could not constitute a re-litigation of the division of the Property, which made it less likely that there would be any conflict with Singapore's public policy in relation to the division of matrimonial assets. Further, had the appellant accepted before the Singapore court that the Property did not form part of the pool of matrimonial assets, she would not have been precluded from initiating a claim pursuant to Part III in respect of the Property as the Property would not have been the subject of the matrimonial proceedings in the Singapore court. The outcome should not be different just because the appellant was unsuccessful in her claim in respect of the Property before the Singapore courts: at [89] to [92].

(13) Second, it would be mere speculation to assume that the appellant would be required to relinquish her rights over the matrimonial assets in Singapore as a condition of being granted financial relief under Part III. There was no indication of such a condition being imposed when the appellant was granted leave to commence Part III proceedings. Nonetheless, such a question could possibly arise for determination in future cases, depending on the facts and circumstances of those cases: at [93].

(14) The court therefore set aside the ASI on the basis that there had been no re-litigation of any kind, nor had there been any vexatious or oppressive conduct on the appellant's part: at [94].

(15) For completeness, commencing Part III proceedings without first appealing against the AM orders did not automatically lead to the conclusion that the appellant's conduct was vexatious and oppressive. If the Singapore court's position was that there was no requirement for a foreign party to exhaust foreign remedies before applying in Singapore under Chapter 4A, the Singapore court should similarly not require a party to exhaust remedies in Singapore before applying in the UK under Part III of the MFPA and preclude the applicant from seeking such relief by granting an ASI. In this case, given that the appellant was in fact granted leave under Part III, and given that...