Uzk v Uzl

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeTan Puay Boon JC
Judgment Date12 November 2019
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberDivorce (Transferred) No 3368 of 2017 and High Court (Family Division) Summons No 128 of 2019
Date12 November 2019
UZK
and
UZL

[2019] SGHCF 23

Tan Puay Boon JC

Divorce (Transferred) No 3368 of 2017 and High Court (Family Division) Summons No 128 of 2019

High Court (Family Division)

Family Law — Matrimonial assets — Division — Application of structured approach in ANJ v ANK[2015] 4 SLR 1043

Family Law — Matrimonial assets — Division — Husband and wife entering into deed of arrangement after marriage broke down — Deed providing for equal division of net value of immovable assets — Husband not obtaining legal advice prior to entering into deed and subsequently breaching deed terms — Weight to be given to deed

Held, dismissing the application and ordering the division of assets:

HCF/SUM 128/2019

(1) The Singapore courts had jurisdiction to hear the divorce proceedings. The Wife, being a Singapore citizen, was presumed to be domiciled in Singapore at the time of the commencement of the proceedings, and the Husband did not raise any evidence to rebut this presumption. This was regardless of whether the IJ would be recognised or enforced in the UK, which the court could not determine absent expert evidence on the relevant foreign law to be applied: at [10].

(2) The application for an extension of time to appeal against the IJ was not granted. The application was filed six months after the IJ was granted. Notwithstanding the Husband's impecuniosity, he took part in the hearing of the ancillary matters (“AM”) hearing but filed the application one month later. Any appeal was also unlikely to succeed. The Wife was entitled to have the matter resolved expeditiously: at [12].

Division of assets

(3) The Deed was valid and binding between the parties but was only one of the factors that the court would consider in the division of assets. It did not appear to be manifestly disadvantageous to either party; it provided that the net value of the immovable properties was to be divided equally. There was no evidence that the Husband was pressured to enter into the Deed and he played an active role in negotiating its terms. But the Deed was not a “separation agreement” as it was signed when the Husband still hoped that the parties would remain together. He also did not obtain legal advice when drafting and signing it. His conversations with the Wife prior to signing the Deed and his subsequent breaches of the Deed (by contesting the divorce and objecting to the proposed division) indicated that he entered into it motivated by the prospect of saving the marriage, without knowledge of the legal consequences and without full consideration of his interests. In the circumstances, although it was not fair to give conclusive weight to the Deed, due weight would be given to it in the division of assets: at [20] and [21].

(4) The classification methodology was adopted to identify the assets and separate the matrimonial assets into two classes: (a) the immovable properties and (b) the assets in the parties' sole names. The parties' respective contributions clearly differed in relation to both classes of assets: at [25].

(5) As regards the immovable property, the values supported by a formal valuation report or documentation were adopted. The S$285,000.00 loan from the Wife's father was a matrimonial liability. The contemporaneous e-mail evidence established that the loan was given to purchase the “Hong Kong Property”. Clause 4.3 of the Deed reflected that the parties acknowledged that the Wife's parents loaned them S$250,000.00 to purchase the Hong Kong Property and that this loan should be repaid before the net value of the Property was shared: at [28] to [32].

(6) The Wife's Singapore Island Country Club membership was not a matrimonial asset. It was acquired before the marriage. Although the Husband played golf at the club, there was no evidence that the Wife ordinarily enjoyed or used it, and the Husband's payment of membership fees did not substantially improve the membership: at [35].

(7) The mere fact that the Wife made larger bank transfers did not justify a finding that she wrongfully dissipated matrimonial assets. Likewise, she sufficiently accounted for the rental income on the immovable properties: at [41] and [42].

(8) The Wife's loans to the Husband and her contributions to mortgage loan payments were not considered in the valuation of the pool, but were relevant to the assessment of her indirect contributions under the structured approach in ANJ v ANK[2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ v ANK”): at [44] and [46].

(9) The parties' agreed ratio of equal direct contributions in relation to the immovable properties was adopted. The ratio of direct contributions for the assets in the parties' sole names was 85:15 between the Wife and the Husband, calculated on the basis that the parties contributed only to the assets in their own name: at [52] and [55].

(10) The Wife made greater indirect contributions especially towards the end of the marriage. She was the more financially secure partner, took charge of the management of the immovable properties, and bore the burden of property tax, maintenance and service charge payments. She eased her Husband's relocations, cared for him after he was assaulted, and supported him even after they separated. The Husband took the Wife's career into account when making his employment and relocation decisions and took a lead role in purchasing and renovating the immovable properties. A ratio of indirect contributions of 60:40 between the Wife and the Husband was fair and equitable: at [58] to [60].

(11) The average ratio derived was 55:45 and 72.5:27.5 between the Wife and the Husband in respect of the immovable properties and the assets held in the parties' sole names. The average ratio was not adjusted, given that this was a moderately long marriage of 18 years and the parties under cl 4.1 of the Deed intended for the net value of the immovable properties (forming the bulk of the pool) to be shared equally: at [61] to [64].

(12) The Husband did not claim to own assets beyond his Central Provident Fund account and offered no evidence on how he would raise the money needed to pay the Wife's share of the immovable properties. The three immovable properties were to be sold and the net sale proceeds divided 55:45 between the Husband and the Wife. The Wife was to have sole conduct of the sales given that a joint conduct of the sales was unlikely to be workable: at [68] to [69].

(13) The Husband was entitled to S$52,524.04 from the assets in the parties' sole names, less the sum of his unpaid costs orders in the sum of S$37,600.00: at [71] to [73].

Case(s) referred to

ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (folld)

ARY v ARX [2016] 2 SLR 686 (folld)

AVM v AWH [2015] 4 SLR 1274 (folld)

AYQ v AYR [2013] 1 SLR 476 (folld)

AZZ v BAA [2016] SGHC 44 (folld)

BPC v BPB [2019] 1 SLR 608 (folld)

Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party [2008] 1 SLR(R) 757; [2008] 1 SLR 757 (folld)

NK v NL [2007] 3 SLR(R) 743; [2007] 3 SLR 743 (folld)

Surindar Singh s/o Jaswant Singh v Sita Jaswant Kaur [2014] 3 SLR 1284 (folld)

TNC v TND [2016] 3 SLR 1172, HC (folld)

TND v TNC [2017] SGCA 34 (folld)

UKA v UKB [2018] 4 SLR 779 (refd)

UYP v UYQ [2020] 3 SLR 683 (folld)

Facts

The plaintiff wife (“the Wife”) and the defendant husband (“the Husband”) were married in 2000 in the UK. Interim judgment (“IJ”) for divorce was granted on 8 November 2018 following contested proceedings, ending the marriage after 18 years. There were no children to the marriage. The Wife was a Singapore citizen and the Husband was a UK national and Singapore Permanent Resident.

After the marriage in 2000, the parties lived rent-free in London in a flat owned by the Wife's father. The Wife was employed by a financial institution and relocated in 2005 to the institution's Hong Kong branch. The Husband moved to Hong Kong in 2005 and was assaulted there in 2014. He suffered a traumatic brain injury and was hospitalised for approximately three weeks. The parties relocated to Singapore in November 2014. The Wife continued to work for the same employer and the Husband was a contract employee in another financial institution.

The marriage broke down in 2016. The Wife moved out of the premises she rented with the Husband in November 2016. The parties entered into a deed of arrangement dated 18 January 2017 (“the Deed”). The Deed provided, inter alia, that the Wife could commence divorce proceedings in Singapore after 1 June 2017 if she was still of the view that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, and that such proceedings were to be uncontested. The Deed also set out the appropriate division of assets.

The Husband applied in High Court (Family Division) Summons No 128 of 2019 (“HCF/SUM 128/2019”) to strike out the IJ on the ground that it was not valid in the UK or for leave to be granted for him to appeal against the IJ out of time.

Legislation referred to

Women's Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) ss 3(5), 93(1)(a), 112, 112(1), 112(2)(e), 112(10)(a)

Hing Wei Yuen Angelina and Ng Yu Hui Michelle (Integro Law Chambers LLC) for the plaintiff;

Defendant in person.

12 November 2019

Judgment reserved.

Tan Puay Boon JC:

Introduction

1 The plaintiff (“the Wife”) was born in 1977, and the defendant (“the Husband”) was born in 1976 (collectively “the parties”). They were married in 2000 in the UK, and filed for divorce in Singapore on 21 July 2017. Interim judgment (“IJ”) was granted on 8 November 2018 following contested proceedings, ending the marriage after 18 years.

2 The Wife is a Singapore Citizen and the Husband is a UK National who is also a Singapore Permanent Resident. There are no children to the marriage, and neither party seeks maintenance. Before turning to the sole issue for determination, ie, the division of matrimonial assets, I set out the background facts and the brief reasons for my decision in High Court (Family Division) Summons No 128 of 2019 (“HCF/SUM 128/2019”), which was an application filed by the Husband on 15 May 2019 to strike out...

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