Understanding the Domestic Determinants of Indonesia's Hedging Policy towards the United States and China.

• Date: 01 April 2024
• Author: Priamarizki, Adhi

In the mid-2000s, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a prominent Indonesian foreign policy scholar, asked: "Is Indonesia's foreign policy shifting towards the East or the West?" (1) This question has resurfaced with renewed urgency due to the increasing tensions between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific. The conventional answer is that Indonesia's foreign policy does not lean towards either the West or the East, but rather, Jakarta strives for close cooperation with both Beijing and Washington. In order to maintain regional security and stability and uphold its strategic autonomy, Jakarta employs a strategy of "hedging" between the great powers. (2) This approach is not new, as Indonesia has always aimed to avoid external interference while seeking external support since gaining independence. (3) As pointed out by Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, Jakarta has always had to make trade-offs over "the fundamental (but conflicting) interests of autonomy and alignment". (4)

Nevertheless, it is important to note that hedging strategies are not solely a result of geopolitical pressure. They also emerge from "contingent adjustments to events as well as responses to particular and changing domestic and international agendas". (5) In other words, foreign policy cannot be isolated from domestic politics. A variety of actors, including governmental and non-governmental entities, opposition parties, and internal government dynamics, all play a role in shaping Indonesia's foreign policy. (6) In fact, in 2022, former foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda coined the term "intermestic"--a combination of "international" and "domestic"--to describe how both factors intertwine to shape Indonesia's foreign policy. (7)

Against the backdrop of escalating US-China strategic rivalry, how have domestic factors shaped Indonesia's hedging policy towards the two great powers? This article contends that domestic and external policies are closely intertwined, as the nation's domestic priorities--such as the agendas of its politicians and public opinion--have influenced its approach towards these two superpowers. As a result, despite maintaining robust defence relations with the United States, Indonesia has increasingly viewed China as a crucial economic ally that supports its leaders in achieving their development goals.

This article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the existing literature on domestic determinants and hedging and then discusses the role of domestic determinants in Indonesia's foreign policy. The second and third sections elaborate on Indonesia-US and Indonesia-China relations, respectively. The article concludes by summarizing the key findings and offering some preliminary assessments of the role of domestic factors in Indonesia's foreign policymaking under the presidency of Prabowo Subianto.

Domestic Determinants, Hedging Strategy and Indonesia's Foreign Policy

According to Evelyn Goh, hedging "cultivate[s] a middle position that forestalls or avoids choosing one side at the obvious expense of another". (8) Goh also noted that fear of uncertainty amid great power competition makes hedging a rational response for weaker states. (9) According to Cheng-Chwee Kuik, this uncertainty, notably when the power dynamics of international politics are unclear, allows weaker states to balance "returns-maximizing"--the maximizing of economic gains and diplomatic and political benefits by forging a partnership with a stronger power through selective collaboration but without accepting a subordinate position--and "risk-contingency"--the avoidance of dependency through diversified economic cooperation, the utilization of non-military means to cultivate a balance of influence amongst the great powers and the minimization of security risks through defence partnerships and upgrading military power. (10) Because of this, hedging means that small states send ambiguous signals about their future alignment. (11)

However, the idea of sacrificing partial or complete autonomy in security relations is not uncommon; throughout history, larger powers have often provided security protection for smaller states, as seen during the Cold War. (12) In addition, a small state's autonomy can also be compromised through what scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye refer to as "asymmetrical interdependence", in which smaller states may put themselves at risk in pursuit of economic gains from their relationships with larger powers. (13) However, while external systemic pressures may push smaller states to hedge, domestic factors also play a significant role.

David Martin Jones and Nicole Jenne argue that the lack of a grand strategy is a principal reason in how domestic politics can influence a small state's hedging policy. They point out that the ruling party's domestic considerations or the personal preferences of the current head of state often hold more sway in decision-making than a strategic assessment of security risks. (14) As a result, the formulation of a hedging strategy may not always be based on rational calculations. Instead, the leader's discretion can play a significant role in shaping the policy, as has been the case in Indonesia since independence.

In September 1948, Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta delivered a famous speech titled Mendayung di Antara Dua Karang ("Rowing between Two Reefs"). It became the basis of Indonesia's sacrosanct "independent and active" foreign policy ever since. According to Ahmad Rizky M. Umar, Hatta's concept was a response to both internal and external dynamics. (15) Primarily, his speech was a response to critics of the Renville Agreement. Ratified in January 1948 during the Indonesian War of Independence (1945-49), this agreement led to Indonesia losing a significant portion of its territory to the Netherlands, which was attempting to reassert its colonial authority over the country after the end of the Second World War. In his defence of the agreement, Hatta argued that it would resolve the conflict with the Netherlands via democratic means and provide a pathway for greater international recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, particularly his idea of a "United States of Indonesia". Hatta emphasized the necessity of internal stability--which he thought the Renville Agreement would bring--in order to achieve international recognition. He also believed that Indonesia's weak position in global politics undermined its internal development. (16) As a result, his 1948 speech outlined three key elements of an "independent and active" foreign policy: a strong link between foreign and domestic policies; a rational and realistic diplomatic approach amid great power competition; and national interests as the ultimate objective of foreign policy. (17)

As a result, Indonesia's foreign policy has frequently shifted as it responds to the changing domestic priorities. Interactions between government and non-government entities, such as domestic opposition and civil society groups, act as catalysts or hurdles for foreign policymaking. The alignment or incompatibility of political interests and aspirations among them plays a significant role in shaping foreign policy decisions. For instance, between 2007 and 2008, the Indonesian parliament lambasted the government's stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Iran's pursuit of a nuclear programme and allegations that it could potentially be used for military purposes resulted in the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC)--the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France--drafting UN Resolution 1747, which imposed sanctions on Tehran. As a non-permanent member of the UNSC at the time, Indonesia voted in favour of the resolution, a move that met with strong criticism from opposition parties within the parliament because they felt they had not been adequately consulted over the issue. In the aftermath, the Indonesian government agreed to increase dialogue with the parliament before making any foreign policy decisions on sensitive or crucial issues. This example highlights how domestic politics can significantly influence and shape Indonesia's foreign policy. (18)

The values and characteristics of Indonesia's governmental bodies and bureaucratic competition can also influence foreign policy decisions. This is evident in Indonesia's response to tensions in the South China Sea, where multiple agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and the Indonesian military all have a say. This sometimes leads to conflicting viewpoints and disagreements, making it challenging for the government to have a unified stance. (19)

In sum, the involvement of non-government entities and political opposition as well as bureaucratic competition add complexity to the foreign policy-making process. These actors bring their own interests and agendas, creating a mismatch between international pressures and domestic politics. As a result, Indonesia is often forced to reinterpret its non-alignment stance and adapt to changing circumstances, rather than rigidly sticking to it.

Indonesia-US Relations: Partnership without Devotion

Following the Madiun Affair in 1948, an attempted military coup by the Indonesian Communist Party and its sympathizers, Indonesia found itself in a tumultuous political climate and started to turn to the United States for political support, notably to end hostilities between the Netherlands and Indonesia during the Indonesian War of Independence (1945-49). (20) However, during the 1950s, Indonesia remained neutral and refused to align with either Cold War bloc, fearing a backlash from its parliament. (21) Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir (1950-51) even cancelled an agreement to purchase arms from the United States over concerns that it would spark a parliamentary revolt. (22) In fact, the government of Natsir's successor, Soekiman Wirjosandjojo (1951-52), collapsed over secret negotiations it had held with the United...