TXE v TXF

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Goh Zhuo Neng
• Judgment Date: 29 November 2016
• Neutral Citation: [2016] SGFC 165
• Court: Family Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: D4117 of 2006/S
• Year: 2016
• Published date: 04 February 2017
• Hearing Date: 17 August 2016
• Plaintiff Counsel: Ang Yu Wen Amelia (Lee & Lee)
• Defendant Counsel: Liaw Jin Poh (M/s Tan Lee & Choo)
• Subject Matter: Variation of Maintenance to Wife
• Citation: [2016] SGFC 165

District Judge Goh Zhuo Neng: Introduction

In SUM 1433 of 2016 (“Application”), the Plaintiff ex-husband (“Plaintiff”) filed an application, seeking that he no longer be required to pay monthly maintenance to the Defendant ex-wife (“Defendant”) from 1 May 2016.

Both parties were legally aided and represented by counsel.

The amount of maintenance in this case was a monthly amount of $250.00 a month. The obligation arose under a consent order dated 14 February 2007 (“Order”). By then, interim judgment had been pronounced (29 December 2006), and on 30 July 2007, the divorce was made final.

After hearing parties and considering their submissions, I found that there had been a material change in the Plaintiff’s circumstances justifying a temporary variation. I ordered that the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay maintenance be suspended, and he not be liable to pay maintenance from August 2016 to December 2016.

On 15 September 2016, the Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal, having obtained leave of court to do so on 14 September 2016 in OSN No.27 of 2016. The Defendant has not appealed against my decision. I set out below the grounds of my decision.

Alleged Material Changes of Circumstance

In their submissions, both parties accepted that the test for a variation of a maintenance order required not just a change of circumstances following the making of the Order, but a material change of circumstances.

Here, the Plaintiff relied on the following grounds to establish a material change of circumstances, which the Defendant disagreed with.

Plaintiff Had Allegedly No Income Since 2011

The Plaintiff claimed that he had no income since 2011. Prior to 2011, he was able to work odd jobs earning $1,200 to $1,300 a month. However, he had been incarcerated from April 2011 to July 2012. After being released from prison, he had remained unemployed as he was caring for his Mother who passed away in April 2014 and was also diagnosed with depression. He had only been able to pay the maintenance to date as a result of financial contributions from his siblings.

In support of this allegation, the Plaintiff produced documents from the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) and the Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) which showed that: The Plaintiff was certified unfit to work by IMH from 16 July 2015 to 7 April 2016. The CPF had not received any employee contributions into his CPF Account since 2013.

The Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff had not provided full and frank disclosure of his income, and invited me to draw an adverse inference against him.

The Defendant alleged that at the time they were married, the Plaintiff had been working as a loan shark and had a considerable income. She claimed that the Plaintiff would still be working as a loan shark and this was why he did not have CPF contributions from an employer. Being certified as unfit to work would also not impede him in carrying out his work as a loan shark.

The Defendant also claimed that prior to 2011, the Plaintiff had been able to incur significant expenses. This included paying for his sister in law’s car, drugs, and an Omega watch. The Plaintiff would also be entitled to a share of his late Mother’s home. The Plaintiff stated that the Omega watch had been won as a prize and that he had not received a share of his late Mother’s home.

I did not give much credence to the Defendant’s allegations. First, they were bare statements. Second, the parties had been divorced since 2007, which gave rise to the question of how the Defendant would have had knowledge of the Defendant’s financial affairs.

Notably, the Defendant did not challenge the allegation that the Plaintiff was unemployed or certified unfit to work from 16 July 2015 up till 7 April 2016. Instead, it was her point that the Plaintiff was not entitled to a variation after April 2016 (from May 2016) as he did not have the necessary medical certification to show that he was medically unfit since April 2016. See paragraph 7 of her affidavit dated 19 July 2016:

“There is also no change in circumstances. The report that he has produced from the Institute of Mental Hospital only certified...