Tominam bte Tukimin v Toh Kai Chup

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
CourtPrivy Council
JudgeLord Brandon of Oakbrook
Judgment Date11 April 1989
Neutral Citation[1989] SGPC 1
Citation[1989] SGPC 1
Published date19 September 2003
Defendant CounselJulian Priest QC and Christopher Lau (Barlow Lyde & Gilbert)
Date11 April 1989
Plaintiff CounselV Ramakrishnan (Le Brasseur & Monier-Williams)
Docket NumberPrivy Council Appeal No 69 of
Subject MatterDelivery of vacant possession delayed,Whether purchasers entitled to set off liquidated damages against instalments due,Sale & purchase agreement,Statutory set-off,rr 12(2), 12(3), 15(1) and 15(2) Housing Developers Rules 1985,Bankruptcy,Project completed,Vendor wound up and liquidator appointed,Express wording in s 88(1) of Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 1996 Rev Ed) unlike s 41(1) of the pre-1995 Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 1985 Rev Ed),Land,Insolvency Law,Protection of purchasers over unsecured creditors,Contract,Development,Statutory right of set-off,Contractual terms,Housing developers

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Singapore dismissing an appeal from the judgment of Mr Justice Chua, the trial judge, who had dismissed the claim of the plaintiff appellant for damages for personal injuries sustained in a road accident when she, a pedestrian, was in collision with the defendant riding a motor cycle.

The learned judge set out in his judgment the evidence which was given by the defendant motor cyclist in these terms:

He was riding along Teck Whye Avenue. He had come from Choa Chu Kang Road and was going to his elder brother`s house at Teck Whye Avenue. He was travelling in the

middle of the road at a speed of between 40-50 km/h. There was a slight bend in the road. As he was rounding the bend he saw two women crossing the road from his left to his right and they were close to the centre white line. When he first saw them they were 14 to 15 feet away ahead of him and to his right. He slowed down and steered to his left. Suddenly one of these women, the plaintiff, turned around and ran back across the road and in doing so she collided into his motor cycle. The plaintiff fell and he quickly stopped his motor cycle and placed it on its side on the kerb at the side of the road. The plaintiff was then carried to the side of the road.



The learned trial judge accepted in substance that account.
He expressed his findings in these terms:

The defendant was travelling in the middle of the road and the plaintiff was to his right. He could have passed her without going to the left but he veered to the left. The plaintiff suddenly turned round and walked fast into the motor cycle. That was how the accident happened. It is clear that if the plaintiff had not turned round suddenly to walk back fast in the direction from which she had come this accident would not have happened, because in doing so she collided into the motor cycle. There is no evidence that the defendant was travelling at a fast speed or that the defendant should have seen the plaintiff earlier. It does not matter at what speed the defendant was travelling or whether he could have seen the plaintiff earlier or not as whatever evasive action taken by the defendant would have been in vain. The plaintiff turned around suddenly and walked fast into the motor cycle. The defendant had no opportunity to avoid the accident.



I find that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the plaintiff.


Those findings of the learned
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1 cases
  • Peh Diana and Another v Tan Miang Lee
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 3 January 1991
    ...... . (d) Tominam bte Tukimin v Toh Kai Chup [1985] 2 MLJ 345 decided by FA Chua J on 9 April 1988. ......

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