Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeJudith Prakash J
Judgment Date20 October 2010
Neutral Citation[2010] SGHC 308
Plaintiff CounselJayagobi Jayaram (Grays LLC)
Docket NumberOriginating Summons No 455 of 2010
Date20 October 2010
Hearing Date08 July 2010,01 July 2010
Subject MatterProbate and Administration,Family Law
Year2010
Citation[2010] SGHC 308
Defendant CounselKuldip Singh (Yu & Co)
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Published date01 November 2010
Judith Prakash J: Introduction

This was an application by Mdm Toh Seok Kheng (“the plaintiff”) for, inter alia, a declaration that the marriage entered into between Ms Huang Huiqun (“the defendant”) and the late Mr Yeo Sze Heng (“the deceased”) on 20 December 2005 (“the marriage”) was a sham marriage. Having heard the submissions of counsel for both parties, I dismissed the application. I now give the reasons for my decision.

Background

The material and undisputed facts were these. The plaintiff was the mother of the deceased who died intestate on 9 June 2009. The defendant was a Chinese national. The deceased had entered into the marriage without informing his family of it although he was close to them and had been living with his parents for over forty years. After the marriage, the deceased continued to live with his family and apart from the defendant. Up to his death, he did not disclose his marital status to his family. After the deceased’s unexpected demise, the defendant appeared at his funeral and revealed to his family that she was his wife. The deceased’s family was shocked and did not accept the legitimacy of the marriage.

The plaintiff applied for a grant of letters of administration of the deceased’s estate (“the estate”) on 15 July 2009. On 7 October 2009, the defendant lodged a caveat in court because she too intended to apply for a grant of letters of administration. The plaintiff responded by making the present application.

Submissions, analysis and decision

In the plaintiff’s submissions, it was argued that the marriage was a sham marriage for the following reasons. First, it was alleged that the purpose behind the marriage was to facilitate an application for Singapore permanent residency status for the defendant. Secondly, it was asserted that even after the marriage, the deceased had conducted his life as though he was a bachelor, and had never introduced the defendant as his wife to the rest of his family. Thirdly, it was alleged that the deceased was compelled by the defendant to enter into the marriage.

The defendant disputed the plaintiff’s allegations relating to the first and third reasons for the marriage to be declared a sham marriage. Her rebuttals, however, were irrelevant because, even assuming all the allegations and assertions made by the plaintiff were true, Singapore law does not recognise any such creature as a “sham marriage”.

Before dealing with the plaintiff’s arguments proper, a preliminary issue must be addressed. The plaintiff’s counsel argued that what was being sought here was not a “declaration to invalidate the marriage” between the defendant and the deceased, but a declaration that the marriage was a “sham marriage in keeping with public policy considerations” [emphasis added]. I did not accept this artificial construction.

Ignoring for a moment the non-existence of a legal concept of “sham marriage” which entails legal consequences, the plaintiff had for the purposes of this application clearly argued for the existence of a sham marriage as a means to invalidate the marriage or to render it void.

This was apparent from a comparison between the second and third prayers of the application. The second prayer was for an order for the estate to be distributed according to s 7 r 5 of the Intestate Succession Act (Cap 146, 1985 Rev Ed) (“ISA”) if the court was to find the marriage to be a sham marriage. In the alternative, the third prayer was for an order for the estate to be distributed according to s 7 r 4 of the ISA, if there was no sham marriage.

Although rule 5 is subject to the rights of the surviving spouse as provided in rule 4, its purpose is to address the situation where a deceased left behind a parent or parents but no descendants. It is rule 4 which expressly contemplates the situation where the deceased left behind both a spouse and a parent or parents. If the plaintiff thought that a declaration of a sham marriage would not amount to a declaration of a void marriage, then she would not have asked for a distribution according to rule 5 where there was a sham marriage; or where there was no sham marriage, for a distribution according to rule 4. In both cases, assuming that a sham marriage does not amount to a void marriage, it was rule 4 that would be applicable. By comparing the nature of the alternative reliefs claimed, it was clear that what was being sought was in substance either a declaration to invalidate the marriage or a determination that the marriage was void, on the ground that it was a sham marriage.

Sham marriage

Neither the term “sham marriage” nor its synonym “marriage of convenience” has been defined locally by statute or case law. What is certain is that it is pejorative. The concept of a sham marriage probably arises as a corollary to the socially constructed idea of an “authentic marriage”. The idea that marriage has a special moral status and involves established moral obligations is both commonly held and philosophically contentious.

As the idea of marriage as a contract achieves prominence, questions have been posed as to how far its obligations and the motives for entering into it can be amenable to individual choice. The contractual perspective of marriage implies that spouses can choose marital obligations to suit their interests, and can choose to get married for myriad reasons. To others, however, the good of marriage consists precisely in the restrictions it imposes on individual choice. This institutional perspective of marriage holds that the purpose of the institution sets out its obligations and overrides the spouses’ wills. What these institutionally-mandated obligations consist of remains contested; and the tension between the contractual and institutional perspectives of marriage upon which the concept of a sham marriage rests cannot be resolved by the courts.

For present purposes, I need...

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2 cases
  • Gian Bee Choo and others v Meng Xianhui
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 31 July 2019
    ...the terminology used in this judgment ought to be clarified. The term sham marriage is not a term of art (Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun [2011] 1 SLR 737 (“Toh Seok Kheng”) at [17]). A sham marriage is a general term which may refer to any marriage where the parties do not genuinely intend t......
  • Soon Ah See and another v Diao Yanmei
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 6 September 2016
    ...they were informed by a district judge that the lower court was constrained by the High Court decision in Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun [2011] 1 SLR 737 (“Toh Seok Kheng”), to which I shall return later. After the plaintiffs started Suit No 69 of 2014 on 17 January 2014, the defendant sough......
3 books & journal articles
  • Family Law
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2010, December 2010
    • 1 December 2010
    ...Tan Ah Thee v Lim Soo Foong [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957 (‘Tan Ah Thee’) was reviewed. Tan Ah Thee was applied in Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun [2011] 1 SLR 737 (‘Toh Seok Kheng’) where the mother of the deceased applied for a declaration that the marriage entered into between the defendant Huang an......
  • Family Law
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2016, December 2016
    • 1 December 2016
    ...Summons No 1274 of 1990. 34 [1991] 2 SLR(R) 525. 35 Cap 133, 2008 Rev Ed. 36 Soon Ah See v Diao Yanmei [2016] 5 SLR 693 at [31]–[48]. 37 [2011] 1 SLR 737. 38 [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957. 39 Soon Ah See v Diao Yanmei [2016] 5 SLR 693 at [46]. 40 Soon Ah See v Diao Yanmei [2016] 5 SLR 693 at [48]. 41......
  • Family Law
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2019, December 2019
    • 1 December 2019
    ...Xian Hui [2019] 5 SLR 812 at [101] and [104]. 38 [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957. 39 Tan Ah Thee v Lim Soo Foong [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957 at [58]. 40 [2011] 1 SLR 737. 41 Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun [2011] 1 SLR 737 at [16]. 42 [2016] 5 SLR 693 at [48]–[49]. 43 Cap 36, 2013 Rev Ed. 44 See para 16.20 above......

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