The Thai-Cambodian border dispute: An agency-centred perspective on the management of interstate conflict.

AuthorJenne, Nicole
PositionReport

Armed conflict between states in Southeast Asia has been relatively-rare, especially since 1979. The most recent exception to this pattern was a border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand that turned violent in 2008 and remained militarized for more than three years. Existing studies of this long-standing conflict have concentrated on explaining the upsurge in violence between 2008 and 2011, but have tended to ignore that fighting was quickly contained each time clashes occurred. This article provides a different perspective and asks how the dispute was managed short of large-scale armed violence. To answer this question, the author adopts an agency-focused perspective that emphasizes the role of critical actors who worked to de-escalate the conflict. Based on field research conducted in Cambodia and Thailand, as well as consulting primary and secondary sources, the author adopts a historical narrative that revisits critical periods from the 1950s onwards and argues that relevant actors in both Cambodia and Thailand had long-standing incentives to avoid escalating the conflict. Two elements were critical: first, crucial actors including Cambodian and Thai bureaucrats, diplomats and members of the security and intelligence services developed an understanding of the problems inherent in defining their land border; and second, the establishment of personal contacts, even in the context of antagonistic relations. Together, these factors created possibilities for Cambodia and Thailand to cooperate in managing conflict and increased the willingness of both sides to exercise self-restraint.

Keywords: Cambodia, Thailand, border conflict, Preah Vihear temple.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is commonly recognized as a successful model of institutionalized interstate cooperation midway towards forming a security community of states that do not fight each other. (1) Yet, in early 2011 Southeast Asia witnessed what a senior Thai diplomat called "the first war between two members of ASEAN". (2) Following months of diplomatic strain and sabre-rattling over unresolved border issues, Thai and Cambodian security forces clashed in early February 2011, leaving at least eight persons dead and close to a hundred military, police and civilians injured. (3) The ensuing stand-off led to renewed fighting in mid-April. Over the course of one week, both sides exchanged mortar and heavy artillery fire, and with no solution in sight, Cambodia referred the most critical aspect of the border dispute--the stretch of land adjacent to the temple of Preah Vihear--to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. As the Court began its deliberations, relations between the two countries soon returned to normal. The ICJ delivered its judgement in November 2013 and tensions have not flared anew, although the ruling on the Preah Vihear border provided only a partial solution to one of several outstanding border problems between Cambodia and Thailand. (4) The Thai-Cambodian dispute reinforced the notion that conflicts within Southeast Asia's incipient security community tend to be shelved rather than resolved on the battlefield. (5)

The 2011 clashes prompted a new interest in the border conflict and its impact on Thai-Cambodian relations. Since the conflict erupted, at least four doctoral theses, (6) two single-authored monographs (7) and about a dozen book chapters and articles in peer-reviewed academic journals have been written on the topic in English. (8) One can also add an extensive list of government publications and media commentary. In essence, the existing literature provides ample empirical detail on the border dispute and other problems that bedevilled relations between the two countries. (9) However, because these analyses focus mainly on explaining conflict, the existing literature has largely ignored the fact that despite the widely cited "hostility", (10) "historical animosity" (11) and "underlying distrust" (12) between the two countries, they have succeeded in managing their border dispute short of large-scale armed conflict. As such, why did this already militarized conflict not escalate further, despite pressures to the contrary?

To answer this question, the author focuses on human agency as opposed to structural conditions that determine the outcome in interstate conflict. (13) Separating agency from the structural conditions under which it takes place is an analytical distinction that is blurred in practice. Indeed, few theorists hold that actors' interests can be reduced purely to structural incentives or, on the other extreme, that agency is independent of the recurrent patterned arrangements that structure social life--be they material (financial assets, military power) or non-material (identities, cultures, voter preferences). As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith wrote, "such pure methodological holism or individualism would rule out an obvious interplay". (14) In this interplay, the author agrees with most social science theorists: agents and structures constitute each other mutually. This means actors are both constrained and enabled by structures, but at the same time, they retain the capacity to appropriate, reproduce and innovate structures. (15) Take the example of a legislator, whose action is limited by the protocol regulating the workings of the chamber (constraining function). However, by virtue of being a legislator he or she has certain possibilities to act in the first place (enabling function), including the possibility to solicit modifications of the protocol, thus changing the structural context he or she is embedded in and that, in turn, influences his or her future as a legislator.

Despite the dialectic linkage between agency and structure, it is useful to analytically distinguish empirical action from structural categories in order to better understand the micro-dynamics of conflict. Doing so allows one to show how key actors in Cambodia and Thailand developed similar beliefs over the causes of this long-standing dispute and its desired outcomes. Specifically, the author identifies three broadly defined groups of actors who, through their attitudes and direct involvement, had a decisive, conflict-inhibiting impact on policymaking: border experts; diplomats; and members of the security and intelligence services. Eventually, their impact prevailed over the structural pressures for war as highlighted in the existing literature on the conflict.

This article makes two contributions to the literature. First, unlike most studies in International Relations (IR) which focus on the structural conditions of conflict, (16) this article emphasizes the role of agency in security policymaking within a region where interpersonal relationships have been found to be crucial in managing conflict. (17) Paying particular attention to actors' beliefs, and the national and transnational roles they had exercised in conflict, this line of inquiry may benefit future research on security in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region. Second, in contrast to existing studies that are more concerned with the conditions leading to conflict along the Thai-Cambodian border, this article lays out instead primary empirical details of conflict-mitigation and the inherent difficulties in demarcating borders. This however should not be read as an excuse for the failure to prevent the deadly violence between 2008 and 2011. Although conflict develops a spiralling dynamic of its own, it is certainly not immune to the influence of decision-makers. The agency perspective adopted in this article shows that the same actors who took advantage of political opportunities provided in the border dispute also--and often simultaneously--worked to contain the conflict. Ultimately, acknowledging that crucial actors on both sides worked to avoid escalating the conflict is a prerequisite for future cooperation between the two countries to handle outstanding border issues.

The remainder of this article is divided into six parts. The author begins by discussing the relevant literature on Thai--Cambodian relations. Next, by providing an overview of the border problems, she describes the shared knowledge and the role of border experts on each side. It is worth pointing out that border experts, like the other groups of actors, did not constitute a strictly defined group. Membership was fluid and in some cases overlapped with other groups of actors. For instance, border experts had different professional backgrounds such as law or geology and worked at different state and non-state institutions. Thus, some border experts belonged simultaneously to the diplomatic circle of actors, while others were part of the security and intelligence services and acquired an intimate knowledge of the border situation through their operational responsibilities.

The article's remaining sections proceed in a chronological order to sketch the evolution of the dispute and how this process shaped the attitudes of critical decision-makers. The first episode considered in the third section is the dispute over the ownership of Preah Vihear, which ended in 1962 when the ICJ awarded the temple to Cambodia. Although this episode clearly carried overtones of the increasingly tense Cold War environment, the author discusses primary sources which suggest the conflict was arguably less contentious than has been commonly assumed due to bilateral interactions between foreign policy officials. The fourth section deals with the impact of the Third Indochina War, before the fifth section turns to the latest episode of the conflict in 2008-11. Focusing on conflict de-escalation, the author highlights the intervention of relevant actors in the areas of diplomacy, foreign policy and defence. The article concludes with a summary of findings and reflects on the prospect of future conflict over persisting problems along the Thai-Cambodian border.

The Existing...

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