The Law Society of Singapore v Chia Shih Ching James

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 03 September 1984
• Date: 03 September 1984
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Law Society of Singapore

Plaintiff

and

Chia Shih Ching James

Defendant

[1984] SGHC 46

Wee Chong Jin CJ

,

Lai Kew Chai J

and

L P Thean J

High Court

Legal Profession–Disciplinary procedures–Disciplinary Committee determining that no cause of action of sufficient gravity existed against advocate and solicitor–Whether Law Society can apply for review of determination–Whether Law Society “person who made the written application or complaint”–Part VII, ss 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 96 and 97 Legal Profession Act (Cap 217, 1970 Rev Ed)–Statutory interpretation–Construction of statute–Alternative interpretations–Words and Phrases–“Person who made the written application or complaint”–Part VII, ss 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 96 and 97 Legal Profession Act (Cap 217, 1970 Rev Ed)

The respondent, James Chia Shih Ching (“Chia”) was an advocate and solicitor who was convicted on a charge of cheating under s 420 of the Penal Code (Cap 103, 1970 Rev Ed). Upon the Council of the Law Society's application, the Chief Justice appointed a Disciplinary Committee (“DC”) to hear and investigate the matter. The DC reprimanded Chia after concluding that no cause of action of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action to be ordered against Chia under s 84 of the Legal Profession Act (“the Act”). The Law Society applied as a “dissatisfied” person under s 97 of the Act to a judge of the High Court for a review of the DC's determination and for an order directing the Law Society to make an application under s 98 of the Act. The High Court set aside the DC's determination and directed the Law Society to make an application to the court under s 98 of the Act for Chia to show cause why he should not be dealt with under s 84 of the Act. In the show cause proceedings, it was argued that the Law Society was not “the person who made the written application or complaint” and therefore did not have locus standior jurisdiction under s 97 (1) and could not in law apply for a judicial review of the determination of the DC.

Held, ordering the respondent to be struck off the roll:

(1) Where alternative interpretations are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating, and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system: at [28].

(2) The construction of the words “the person who made the written application or complaint” in s 97 (1) must include the Law Society, having regard to the general scheme of the Act and particularly having regard to ss 86 (5), 87 (1) (b) and 90 of the Act. The exclusion of the Law Society would introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion. Accordingly, the Law Society had locus standi or jurisdiction to apply under s 97: at [27] and [29].

(3) Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, Chia had been convicted of a criminal offence, implying a defect of character which made him unfit for his profession within the meaning of s 84 (2) (a) of the Act: at [47] to [49].

(4) It would not be in the public interest nor in the interest of the profession that Chia's name remained on the roll of advocates and solicitors. His conduct was reprehensible and his name was accordingly ordered to be struck off from the roll: at [51].

Wee Harry Lee, Re [1983-1984] SLR (R) 274; [1984-1985] SLR 323 (refd)

Shannon Realties Ltd v Ville de St Michel [1924] AC 185 (folld)

Legal Profession Act (Cap 217, 1970 Rev Ed)ss 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 96, 97 (1) (consd);s 98

Legal Profession (Amendment) Act1979 (Act 11 of1979)

Penal Code (Cap 103,1970 Rev Ed)s 420

Tan Kok Quan for the applicant

George Carman QC and H E Cashin for the respondent.

Lai Kew Chai J

(delivering the judgment of the court):

1 The respondent, James Chia Shih Ching, is a non-practising advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court, Singapore. He has been on the roll of advocates and solicitors since 11 July 1973. In April 1970 he joined the Legal Section of the Inland Revenue Department of the Government of the Republic of Singapore as a legal officer. On 1 May 1979 he was promoted to the post of senior legal officer to head the Legal Section. He remained as head of the Legal Section until his interdiction on 8 August 1980 and was dismissed from government service on 11 February 1983.

2 On 14 November 1981, the respondent was convicted on a charge under s 420 of the Penal Code (Cap 103).

3 The charge reads as follows:

that you, on or about 7 March 1980, in Singapore, cheated Tong Eng Brothers Pte Ltd by deceiving the company into believing that a sum of Pound Stg 800 was due and payable to one DC Potter, Queen's Counsel as legal fees for work rendered when you knew that such sum was not in fact determined nor due and payable and thereby dishonestly induced the company to deliver to you a bank draft for Pound Stg 800 which it would not do if it were not so deceived and thereby committed an offence punishable under s 420 of the Penal Code.

4 He was sentenced to one day's imprisonment and was fined $3,000. Being dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence, he appealed to the High Court which, on 20 October 1982, dismissed the appeal.

5 As the respondent was convicted of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty, the Council of the Law Society of Singapore, in discharge of its statutory duty imposed by sub-s 86 (5) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 217) (“the Act”), applied to the learned Chief Justice to appoint a Disciplinary Committee to hear and investigate the matter.

6 The Disciplinary Committee was appointed and its hearing took place on 30 April 1983. In July 1983 the Disciplinary Committee delivered its report to the learned Chief Justice and the Law Society. The Committee found that no cause of sufficient gravity existed for disciplinary action under s 84 of the Act and that the respondent should only be reprimanded. In doing so, the Disciplinary Committee made a determination under s 93 (1) (b) of the Act.

7 The Disciplinary Committee set out its findings and determination in the following terms:

Findings

1. (1) We find that this is not a case in which we are entitled to go behind the conviction to enquire if it was correctly made.

2. (2) We find, however, that on a consideration of the whole of the circumstances of this case, and bearing fully in mind that a conviction of cheating is a conviction which, in all but exceptional circumstances. [sic] (In Re Weare; Re a Solicitor [1893] 2 QB 439) would necessarily entail disciplinary action under s 93 (1) (c), read with s 84 of the Act, such circumstances do exist in this case, which may be summarized as follows.

   1. (a) the basis of the said conviction was that there was no sum of money due to Mr Potter as at the date on which the respondent deceived Tong Eng as to Mr Potter's fee, but the degree of turpitude in such deception and in requesting the issue of the draft, which was in Mr Potter's favour, was in our view minimal, because the respondent had no way of knowing at that time whether Mr Potter's fee for the opinion which had been delivered would be 800 Pounds, 400 Pounds, or more or less than either of those sums, and in particular he had no way of knowing that Mr Potter would waive his fee altogether, but rather had no reason to expect that a fee would not be charged in the ordinary course;

   2. (b) the minimal sentence passed on the respondent is a clear indication that the district judge did not regard the offence as much more than a minor one within the ambit of the section;

   3. (c) the Public Prosecutor did not appeal against the sentence, and it was not criticised by the High Court as being too lenient and;

   4. (d) Tong Eng has not suffered any material detriment.

We are of the opinion, and so find, having carefully and anxiously considered the whole of the evidence before us, that while no cause of sufficient gravity exists for disciplinary action under s 84 of the Act, the Respondent should be and is hereby Reprimanded.

8 As the Law Society was dissatisfied with the determination of the Disciplinary Committee, it applied to a judge under s 97 of the Act by Originating Summons No 528 of 1983. In those proceedings the Law Society and all three members of the Disciplinary Committee were heard by the learned Chief Justice who ordered that the determination of the Disciplinary Committee made on 2 July 1983 be set aside. Acting under s 97 (3) (b) of the Act, the learned Chief Justice directed the Law Society to make an application under s 98 of the Act for an order calling upon the respondent to show cause why he should not be dealt with in the manner prescribed by the Act.

9 By Originating Summons No 54 of 1984 the Law Society accordingly made the ex parteapplication. On 10 February 1984 the respondent was ordered to show cause.

10 In the show cause proceedings before us, Mr George Carman on behalf of the respondent submitted that the Law Society had no locus standi or jurisdiction to apply under s 97 of the Act nor to plead before us. In other words, it was submitted that the Law Society could not in law apply for a judicial review of the determination of the Disciplinary Committee.

11 Before we consider the submissions in detail, we turn...