The "Dream Star"

JudgeBelinda Ang Saw Ean J
Judgment Date12 September 2017
Neutral Citation[2017] SGHC 220
Citation[2017] SGHC 220
Defendant CounselMr Richard Kuek Chong Yeow, Mr Eugene Cheng Jiankai and Mr Kevin Chan Wai Yi (Gurbani & Co LLC)
Published date01 June 2018
Hearing Date08 May 2017,21 February 2017,16 February 2017,17 February 2017,22 February 2017,15 February 2017,14 February 2017,24 February 2017
Plaintiff CounselMr Navinder Singh (KSCGP Juris LLP)
Date12 September 2017
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberAdmiralty in Rem No 9 of 2015
Subject MatterAdmiralty and shipping,Regulations,Collision
Belinda Ang Saw Ean J: Introduction

This action in rem is brought by the owner of the Meghna Princess for damages arising out of a collision between two bulk carriers, the Meghna Princess and the Dream Star, in Singapore waters on 16 May 2014 at approximately 12:30:40 (all timings in this judgment will be in local time). The defendant, the owner of the Dream Star, has counterclaimed. The collision occurred in good weather and visibility. The wind was light, and the sea was slight.

Both sides have, amongst other things, alleged breaches of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (“the COLREGS”). The COLREGS have been incorporated as collision regulations for the purposes of the Merchant Shipping Act (Cap 179, 1996 Rev Ed) pursuant to s 3 of the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Collisions at Sea) Regulations (Cap 179, Rg 10, 1990 Rev Ed); reg 28 of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (Port) Regulations (Cap 170A, Rg 7, 2000 Rev Ed), which applies to vessels within the port limit of Singapore, also provides that the COLREGS apply for the purposes of navigation and anchoring of vessels.

The trial is on the issue of liability alone. Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr Navinder Singh (“Mr Singh”), claims that the Dream Star was solely responsible for the collision. The case for the plaintiff is that the vessels were on a crossing path and that the Dream Star being the give-way vessel failed to take action in ample time to keep out of the way of the Meghna Princess in breach of rule 15 of the COLREGS thereby causing the collision. The defendant takes a diametrically opposite position. Counsel for the defendant, Mr Richard Kuek (“Mr Kuek”), asserts that the Meghna Princess should shoulder more blame for the collision and that liability should be apportioned 80:20 in favour of the defendant. The defendant’s case by counterclaim is that the Meghna Princess as the overtaking vessel did not keep out of the way of the Dream Star under rule 13 of the COLREGS. In response to Mr Singh’s argument that the two vessels were in a crossing situation in the main action, Mr Kuek argues that the plaintiff as the stand-on vessel neither acted in due time nor with the skill and care expected of a good (competent) seaman to avoid a collision. To denote the standard of good seamanship, the notion of a “competent seaman” has been used interchangeably with that of a “prudent seaman”.

Ultimately, the questions for determination in this judgment are: (a) whether the Dream Star is, as Mr Singh alleges, the vessel that is solely to blame for the collision; and (b) if both vessels were at fault, how liability should be apportioned. The first question is complicated by the experts’ contention on the situation encountered by the two vessels – on the one hand, the expert for the Dream Star saw the encounter between the vessels as an overtaking situation, but on the other hand, the expert for the Meghna Princess saw the encounter as a crossing situation. It is important to determine whether the vessels were in an overtaking or crossing situation before considering the respective alleged fault of each vessel.

This judgment will also examine whether the collision was the result of a lack of appreciation of the situation or a misapplication of the overtaking or crossing rules that led to uncertainty as to the status and responsibilities of the vessels. A related question of significance is what blame, if any, could be attached to the vessels for the Very High Frequency (“VHF”) exchange between them, which took place minutes before the collision – ie, who was culpable for the conversation and whether the VHF conversation was causative of the collision. As regards the alleged breaches of other rules of the COLREGS, this judgment will likewise examine the nature and effect of these breaches in terms of culpability and causation.

The vessels

The Meghna Princess is a single screw bulk carrier built in 1995. She is 26,381 tons gross register, 189.99m in length overall and breadth of 30.53m. The vessel loaded cargo at Cam Pha, Vietnam and whilst en route to a discharge port at Chittagong, Bangladesh, she called at Singapore for bunkers on 15 May 2014. At the time of collision, the Meghna Princess was laden with 46,105 metric tons of cement clinker. She was fitted with modern navigational equipment that was functioning correctly.

The Dream Star is a newer and larger bulk carrier built in 2014. She is 43,008 tons gross register, 228.99m in length overall and breadth of 32.26m. At the time of collision, the Dream Star was laden with 78,750 metric tons of coal. The Dream Star was transiting the Singapore Strait westbound to the Eastern Boarding Ground B to pick up her pilot before proceeding to anchorage for bunkers. She was fitted with modern navigational equipment that was functioning correctly as well.

I pause here to make a brief observation on an evidential deficiency in how the parties presented their cases. As stated, both vessels had cargo on board at the time of the collision and they were bulk carriers of different sizes, the Dream Star being the larger of the two. The Meghna Princess had already taken on bunkers and was sailing out of the port whereas the Dream Star was calling at Singapore for bunkers. This being the case, it would have been helpful for the court to take into consideration evidence as to each vessel’s manoeuvrability, as ascertained from the subject vessel’s stopping distances and turning characteristics at different speeds having regard to, inter alia, the vessel’s laden conditions and other factors. No such evidence was adduced.

At all material times, there were two other vessels in the vicinity. The first is the Ishwari, which was heading towards the Eastern Boarding Ground B at a distance behind the Dream Star. The second is the Pioneer 93, a tug with a barge in tow. On 16 May 2014, at 12:15, the Pioneer 93 was heading in a south-westerly direction approximately 0.8 nautical miles (or nm for short) away from the Dream Star. There is no information as to the barge or the length of the tow line. The Pioneer 93 is 140 tons gross register, 23.50m in length overall and breadth of 7.33m.1 According to the defendant, the navigation of the Dream Star was to some extent affected by the presence of the Pioneer 93 which caused the former to alter course to port as is shown on a plot annexed to this judgment (see Annex 1). I will elaborate on Annex 1 and explain the selection of it later in the judgment (see below at [12]). Suffice to say that the alteration to port is depicted in Annex 1 as starting to shape from C-18 (or 12:13) and completing at about C-12 (or 12:19). The Dream Star and the Pioneer 93 fully cleared each other after 12:27 (see [72] below).

The collision on 16 May 2014

The location of the collision was fixed at latitude 01º 15.57'N, longitude 103º 57.52'E. This fix is about 0.28 nm east-south-east of the pilot Eastern Boarding Ground B and located between the southern-most boundary line of Singapore Port Limit and the northern-most boundary line of the westbound lane of the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Singapore Strait (“TSS”). As stated, the time of collision was at approximately 12:30:40. There is no allegation that the weather, wind and tidal conditions at and before the collision affected the navigation of either vessel.

At all material times up to the collision, the Master of the Meghna Princess, the Second Officer and the Third Officer were on her bridge; the Second Officer was the officer on watch (the three officers hereinafter will be referred to collectively as “the bridge team”). The Chief Engineer of the Meghna Princess also testified at the trial. In this judgment, all the four officers who testified at the trial will be referred to collectively as “the crew” There was a good deal of evidence available from the Dream Star, but no factual witness was called on her behalf. Significantly, even though the officers of the Meghna Princess testified at the trial, the entries in her Bell Book, Chief Officer’s Log and Engine Manoeuvre Book for the period leading up to the collision were patently unreliable. I will elaborate on the unreliability of these records later in the judgment. In this judgment, the narrative of the events before and at the time of collision are based on the movements of the vessels (latitude, longitude, heading, distance, speed and time at one minute intervals) gathered from the electronic data on board the vessels and subsequently agreed to by the experts, Captain Christopher Phelan (“Captain Phelan”), who is for the plaintiff, and Captain Nicholas White, (“Captain White”) who is for the defendant.

Specifically, the plots depicted in Annex 1 to this judgment serve to demonstrate in a graphic way the positions and relative bearings of the vessels at different time points (marked C-21 to C-0) between 12:09:58 and 12:30:54. Captain White has also made use of an electronic charting application called SeaPro to process raw data from the vessels’ Automatic Identification System (“AIS”) as well as data from the Vessel Traffic Information System (“VTIS”), a tracking and monitoring system used by the Maritime Port Authority of Singapore (“MPA”). I digress to mention that MPA monitors traffic in the Malacca and Singapore Straits by sectors via numerous VTIS work stations operated by MPA. Each sector is assigned a VHF radio channel, and vessels are required to maintain a listening watch on the appropriate sector channel. VTIS data is monitored real-time and when an operator notices something of concern (either a contravention of traffic rules or any potential danger), the operator would alert the vessels in question over the assigned VHF channel.

The plaintiff had appended to its closing submissions a graphic depiction of the vessels’ movements before and at 12:30. This annexure to the closing submissions is the...

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4 cases
  • The "Mount Apo" and the "Hanjin Ras Laffan"
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • Invalid date
    ...passage from The “Nordlake” and The “Seaeagle” [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 656 (“The Nordlake”) which was cited with approval in The Dream Star [2018] 4 SLR 473 (at [126]): 148 In The Samco Europe and MSC Prestige [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 579 the court summarised the task of apportionment of liability......
  • Public Prosecutor v John Sun (previously known as Sng Wee Hock)
    • Singapore
    • District Court (Singapore)
    • 27 Abril 2023
    ...the distinction between an expert and a factual witness. In support of this submission, the Defence cites the case of The Dream Star [2018] 4 SLR 473 (“The Dream Star”). However, that case reveals no such proposition, as contended for by the Defence. The Dream Star involved a collision betw......
  • The "Navigator Aries"
    • Singapore
    • Court of Appeal (Singapore)
    • 7 Julio 2023
    ...based on a “broad, commonsensical and qualitative assessment of the culpability and causative potency of both vessels” (The “Dream Star” [2018] 4 SLR 473 (“The Dream Star”) at [127]; The “Mount Apo” and another matter [2019] 4 SLR 909 at [96]). The focus is on each vessel’s responsibility r......
  • The "Tian E Zuo"
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • Invalid date
    ...leading up to and following an incident (“VDR”). While these plots are useful, I am mindful of what I have said in The “Dream Star” [2018] 4 SLR 473 at [13] (“The Dream Star”); that they show what might have happened, not what did happen. The same comments equally apply to the defendant’s v......
3 books & journal articles
  • Book Review - COLLISIONS AT SEA VOLUME 1: LIABILITY AND THE COLLISION REGULATIONS By Harry Hirst
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 2020, December 2020
    • 1 Diciembre 2020
    ...15 July 1977. See also Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Collisions at Sea) Regulations (Cap 179, Rg 10, 1990 Rev Ed). 3 The Dream Star [2018] 4 SLR 473; The Mount Apo [2019] 4 SLR 909; The Tian E Zuo [2019] 4 SLR 475. 4 Disputes arising out of collisions can be resolved by arbitration. In p......
  • Admiralty and Shipping Law
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2019, December 2019
    • 1 Diciembre 2019
    ...heads of damage.94 1 [2019] 4 SLR 909. 2 Cap IA3, 2004 Rev Ed. 3 The Mount Apo [2019] 4 SLR 909 at [95]. 4 [2016] 1 Lloyd's Rep 656. 5 [2018] 4 SLR 473. 6 The Mount Apo [2019] 4 SLR 909 at [96]. 7 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 125. 8 The Mount Apo [2019] 4 SLR 909 at [108]. 9 The Mount Apo [2019] 4 ......
  • Admiralty Law
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review No. 2018, December 2018
    • 1 Diciembre 2018
    ...E Zuo [2018] SGHC 93 at [132]. 32 The Tian E Zuo [2018] SGHC 93 at [136]. 33 [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep 579. 34 [2016] 1 Lloyd's Rep 656. 35 [2018] 4 SLR 473....

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