The Domestic Determinants of Hedging in Singapore's Foreign Policy.

• Date: 01 April 2024
• Author: Lee, Terence

... sometimes, the steps we take may look like it is more aligned with
                one country, other times it may look as if we are more aligned with
                another country, but actually we are always only aligned to one
                country--Singapore, ourselves and our principles.... The consistent
                message is: We act, always, based on what is in Singapore's interests
                and our principles-based approach. (1)
                

In this statement made on 5 February 2023, Singaporean Minister for Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam described Singapore's foreign policy in seemingly schizophrenic terms. He portrayed it as cooperative and aligned, yet independent and neutral. For observers of Singapore's foreign policy, these contradictions describe "hedging", a concept that eschews the realist concepts of "balancing" and "bandwagoning" as irrelevant in explaining how small states respond to security challenges. (2) Hedging also entails an evident "inclination to diversify, to preserve policy independence, or to keep options open". (3) Singapore hedges by not choosing between Washington and Beijing. Instead, it seeks to benefit from the economic opportunities offered by its relations with China while striving to keep a US military presence in the region for stability and security. (4) Singapore is far from alone in articulating this strategic preference; several Southeast Asian states pursue similar proclivities. (5)

Prima facie, hedging is prudent as it mitigates risk while keeping fallback options, mixing engagement with balancing while "maximizing policy autonomy and minimizing provocation of either great power" and "reserving the flexibility to align in the future should either great power come to constitute [a] direct threat". (6) However, if foreign policy reflects the means to achieve the interests and values of nation-states, what ends does hedging seek to attain? Paraphrasing Clausewitz, what are a hedging state's political goals if foreign policy is the continuation of politics by other means? In other words, what are Singapore's political objectives if hedging is its strategy to guide its diplomatic interactions with the United States and China?

This article answers these questions by examining the domestic sources of Singapore's foreign policy. While acknowledging certain shortcomings in the existing literature, the article does not seek to add to the theorizing on hedging in International Relations. Instead, it explores how hedging addresses the political goals of Singapore's ruling elite. Because the government, the ruling elite and the People's Action Party (PAP) are analogous in Singapore, examining their political goals offers insights into why it hedges when dealing with China and the United States. Thus, this elite-centred analysis is consistent with the observations that foreign policymaking in Singapore is divorced from the broader public. (7)

By hedging, Singapore's foreign policy legitimizes the PAP, which has ruled the city-state since its independence in 1965. Unpacking this process further, this article reveals that hedging fosters legitimacy for the PAP through "specific" and "diffuse" support mechanisms. Specific in that support from the population is circumscribed to officeholders or government bodies based on evaluations of their actions and decisions. Diffuse in that support is determined by attachments to prescribed principles, values and norms. (8)

This article is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief overview of how Singapore hedges in dealing with China and the United States. It then discusses how the existing literature fails to explain why states hedge and how this practice achieves foreign policy objectives. The next section then presents the theoretical explanation of how hedging, as a foreign policy tactic, can effectively contribute to the goals of domestic legitimation. The empirical discussion of the article shows how the theoretical argument works in the case of Singapore. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the key findings and offers preliminary thoughts on whether Singapore's domestic legitimation considerations are likely to persist.

How Does Singapore "Hedge"?

Most scholars identify Singapore as a typical hedger. (9) According to Evelyn Goh, the city-state's hedging entails "strong engagement with China and the facilitation of a continuing US strategic presence in the region to act as a counterweight or balance against rising Chinese power". (10) Singapore views the United States as indispensable to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. (11) The two countries share a close defence relationship, which Tim Huxley has called a "quasi-alliance". (12) Singapore has supported the United States' presence in Asia, hosting US naval and aircraft deployments. Its facilities were utilized by US forces en route to Afghanistan and for use in various counterterrorism operations following the 9/11 attacks. Under the "Rebalance to Asia" policy during the Obama administration, which the Trump administration continued, Singapore agreed to the forward deployment of US Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The LCS deployment was followed by that of the P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft and the conclusion of an enhanced bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement, both in 2015. (13)

Singapore's hedging involves actively courting China as well as the United States. Singapore seeks a range of cooperative economic opportunities with Beijing, including Singaporean investment in China and encouraging Chinese investment in Singapore. It is a supporter of the Beijing-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), was one of the founding members of the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and is an enthusiastic promoter of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Singapore has also increased defence cooperation with China. For example, they signed the Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation in 2008. However, according to Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, the "scope and depth of Singapore's defence cooperation with the United States far exceeds that with China, Singapore has been careful to cultivate positive security relations with Beijing." (14)

When Singapore hedges, it maintains "policy autonomy" and "independence" vis-a-vis the great powers. (15) Although close to the United States, Singapore has remained independent in several instances. In 1988, for example, the Singaporean government expelled a US diplomat, E. Mason Hendrickson, for meeting and allegedly cultivating opposition politicians, which Singapore claimed amounted to interference in its internal affairs. (16) During the "Asian Values" debate of the 1990s, Singaporean leaders were forthright in challenging the United States' position that democratic freedoms and human rights are universal. (17)

Singapore has also been cautious and tempered in its perceived military alignment with the United States. For instance, in 2003, it declined the offer to become a "major non-NATO ally," preferring not to antagonize China (nor its Muslim-majority neighbours). (18) When hosting the US Air Force and Navy, Singapore has frequently stressed that US military assets are not permanently based in Singapore.

While courting China, Singapore has asserted its sovereign right to act no matter what Beijing thinks. In 2004, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made a "private visit" to Taiwan. Singapore has also voiced concerns about China's increasing militarization of the South China Sea. (19) It has stood up to what it has perceived as Chinese pressure, interference and subversion. It has rebuffed Beijing's expectations that it should pay due deference to Beijing because it is a small Chinese-majority nation. (20) Singapore responded robustly to 2016 accusations carried in the Global Times. It refused to cede to Chinese pressure about its military training in Taiwan despite China detaining the Singapore military's Terrex fighting vehicles in Hong Kong. (21) Also, it revoked the permanent residence status of the Chinese-American academic Huang Jing, accusing him of being an "agent of influence" seeking to subvert Singapore. (22) In 2018, Singapore's veteran diplomat Bilahari Kausikan publicly alleged that Chinese covert influence operations had targeted Singapore. (23)

Why Do States "Hedge"?

As Singapore's relationship with China and the United States illustrates, hedging denotes a mixed foreign policy, combining cooperative and conflictive approaches and a mix of engagement and balancing. However, there is a notable gap in the existing literature regarding what states do when they hedge, why they hedge, what ends hedging attains, and if hedging realizes a state's goals.

There are at least three theoretical explanations for why states hedge: as a form of alignment; as a means for risk management; and as a strategy. (24) In essence, states hedge to avoid decisive alignment amid a major-power competition. According to Evelyn Goh, hedging is a "middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another". (25) Denny Roy sees it as a midpoint between outright balancing and bandwagoning, to keep options open "against the possibility of a future security threat". (26) Hedging may also be viewed as non-alignment and a "multipronged" alignment, simultaneously "cultivating, maintaining, and enhancing partnerships with as many powers and players for as long as feasible". (27)

However, the existing understanding of hedging is imprecise regarding what alignment behaviour it entails. Hedging is a catch-all concept encompassing any combination of engagement and protective measures, ubiquitous for a broad range of state actions, rendering the term analytically inconsequential. In addition, without a precise specification of what type of foreign policy behaviour hedging is (or isn't), assessing successful (or unsuccessful) hedging in relation to a state's goals becomes challenging.

Relatedly, assuming that foreign policy results from a...